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Alexis de Tocqueville noted that the key to democracy is “knowledge of how to 
combine.”  This dissertation focuses on the following question:  Can participation in 
associations facilitate democracy within the communities in which they exist even if such 
associations are not democratically organized – i.e., vertical, hierarchical organizations.  
To consider this question, this dissertation explores a poor community’s transition from a
sparse to a highly developed associational space, and examines the impact of this prcess 
of democratization on social relations at both the associational and the personal levels 
(between leaders, participants, and non-participants).  Specifically, I compare three 
different associational settings in a barrio in Greater Buenos Aires, Argentina -- i.e., a 
non-governmental organization, a religious network, and a political party network -- to 
assess whether democratization can occur with the construction and communication of 
symbolic meaning and objective practices by vertically structured, hierarchic l 
 
organizations.  I analyze the interplays between inclusion and exclusion; solidarity and 
generalized distrust; and inequality and protagonism.  Ultimately, this dissertation 
demonstrates how the configuration of social relations serves to legitimate and r produce 
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Writing a dissertation is a process ridden with conflict.  Before entering the Ph.D. 
program, I had no idea how hard it was going to be to create a dissertation proposal.  I 
have always been full of ideas.  Later, while I was in the field and collecting data for my 
dissertation, it was both at times nerve-racking and wonderful interspersed with moments 
of loneliness and company.  Writing this dissertation was the most difficult step. 
Of course I could not have done this alone.  First and foremost I would like to 
thank my adviser, Patricio Korzeniewicz, who gave me constructive and critical advice 
along the way.  I appreciate the wide latitude he gave me during my fieldwork to explore 
new ideas and directions.  David Crocker, a member of the dissertation committee, 
provided guidance and support throughout the doctorate process and is a person full of 
humanity.  Michael Woolcock, another member of the committee, originally inspired me 
to work on a doctorate in sociology and has provided guidance throughout the process.  
He has the marvelous combination of a strong work ethic, an incredible capacity to 
memorize and synthesize information and to see what is next on the horizon, along with a 
deep sense of responsibility and caring that makes him top in his field.  I also want to 
acknowledge and thank the other members of my committee who provided constructive 
and helpful guidance:  Reeve Vanneman, Jerald Hage and Judith Freidenberg.  I would
also like to thank Ken Conca, who for personal reasons could not be on my committee 
but still continued to provide guidance nevertheless.  My utmost gratitude goes out to 
Joseph Lengermann who shouldered my teaching responsibilities during my fieldwork 
thus enabling me to travel to Argentina.  I also was fortunate to have conversations with 
Javier Auyero which helped me incrementally due to his expertise in the area. 
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I also want to acknowledge the National Science Foundation Dissertation for 
awarding me an Improvement Grant.  Not only was this support critical for financing my 
research, it was gave me a sense of legitimation.  
I also wish to thank the many people who assisted me in the field with contacts 
and ideas.  Of course I want to thank all of the people by name that opened up their lives 
to me while in the field, but I cannot.  I will never forget their generosity.  I do want to 
thank Marcelo Cavarozzi, Carlos Forment, Mario Navarro, Hilario Moreno del Campo, 
and Ary Piovaroli at the Universidad de San Martin for sharing their ideas and assisting 
me with contacts.  I would like to thank Naomí for putting me in contact with a place to 
live; Vero and Joana for their incredible support and understanding; Seba for 
energetically introducing me to the NGO; Dori and Flavio for all of their patence for my 
language and cultural ineptitude; Alicia, Yaneth, Sergio, Mabel, Inés, Maria and Sergio 
whose friendships kept me going; and to all of those whose names I have not mentioned, 
but I have not forgotten 
My family was critical in keeping things in perspective and helped me to realize 
that there is more to life than a dissertation.  My old man “Jimmy Sac” always reminded 
me of to keep social justice in the center of everything I do.  He became critically ll 
during the month that I defended, and even during that difficult time he was supportive of 
me.  My Mother doused me with her pearls of wisdom that kept me going through all of 
my periods of extreme self doubt.  There were many times when she metaphoric lly 
pulled me of the floor as she has done since she birthed me.  I would like to thank all of 
my friends, particularly in the Washington DC area, who were so supportive of me.  Most 
of all I would like to thank the man that has stood by my side for the last five years,
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Kevin Minsky.  It is no exaggeration to say that his incredible encouragement, tolrance, 
patience, understanding, respect, and financial support were critical for the production of 
this dissertation.  He is a light in my life and I am very lucky to have him as y partner. 
This dissertation is dedicated to two women Delia and Vicky.  The works of these 
women were both subtle in fact that neither of them brought notice to themselves and yet 
their efforts had palpable effects in the community.  Vicky remains an icon in the 
community and is an icon for me personally, in terms of her gentle and wise leadership 
style.  She works tirelessly and has deep knowledge of community organizing.  Even 
though she was extremely busy, she took out time to guide and converse with me for 
which I am ever grateful.  Although I thought of her as the most important leader in th  
community for all sorts of reasons, I was surprised to find out she was paid very little 
compared to others.  In addition, I saw that she was regularly looked over by outsiders 
perhaps due to very humble origins and gender.  This did not bother her as much as it did 
me, an indication of her lack of personal pride. 
Delia is the wonderful woman with whom I shared a deep friendship and respect.  
She was the main inspiration of this dissertation.  She became personally involved in this 
dissertation, and helped me establish contacts and gave me advice.  I had almost daily 
discussions with her about my ideas and thoughts on life in this shantytown.  Though we 
were deeply divided along many social lines, we consciously strove to be together as 
equals.  This was no mean feat as it meant that I had to learn how to wash clothes by 
hand and she had to learn to leave the house in my care to do her school work.  She 
taught me so much about courage, love and social responsibility, and her presence in my 
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In 2006, I lived in one of the many poor neighborhoods that had sprouted in the outskirts 
of Buenos Aires.  It was approximately 40 kilometers from the capital of Argentina, 
Buenos Aires which meant a two hour bus and train rides in order to arrive in the center 
of Buenos Aires.  The inhabitants were impoverished or lower-class, some were migrants 
from the interior, and there were also a large number of immigrants from neighboring 
countries.  This place I call Villa Campo, because it was at the time I was there a cross 
between town (“villa”) and countryside (“campo”).  The residents had recently suffered 
from an economic crisis which climaxed in 2002, whereby the national unemployment 
rate rose above 25% and poverty levels skyrocketed.  Since that time poverty le ls have 
decreased to 23% in 2007 from 48% in 2003.1   In 2001, the average Villa Campo 
resident had a 40% chance of being in extreme poverty (2001 national census).   
The political party in power at the time was Justicialist political party led by 
Néstor Kirchner.  The party was founded in 1945 by Juan Peron and is the largest 
political party in Argentina.  This party generally promotes strong central government 
and freedom from foreign influences.  According to peronists, one of their main missions 
is to assist and campaign for the causes of the poor which made this political party very 
present and popular concretely and figuratively in Villa Campo.   
Villa Campo’s growth from a rural area with limited avenues of civic participation 
to an urban area with a large number of associations and the changing social relations th  
have accompanied this shift provides an excellent context in which to consider the 
                                                      
1 Argentina Country Brief, worldbank.org, 7/23/2008. 
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relationship between i teractional participation and expressions of citizenship.  Indeed, 
in the eighties, when residents had few choices and politicians had an almost 
monopolistic stranglehold on the building of infrastructural development, there were far 
less opportunities than there are today.  Before there was a very different participatory 
logic, one, I argue, that remains in place in some large, non-governmental organizations, 




Chapter 1: The Relational Civic Process and Democratization 
 
Introduction 
In the dusty streets of Villa Campo, a poor barrio in the province of Buenos Aires, 
a small group of residents, including a middle-aged woman, Flor, stood on the side of the 
road of where people expected the president of the nation to pass.  They planned to hold 
up placards pressing for paved roads that the municipal government promised during the 
last elections.   
A woman working for the municipal government passed by and repeatedly told 
them, in an authoritative manner, to take down their placards.  When they refused, she 
threatened to take their names.  It was then that Flor replied saying that the national 
Constitution said they had the right to protest.   
Just a few days earlier Flor had asked her civics teacher in a night school for 
adults run by the municipality, why, even though she paid her taxes, the government was 
not paving the roads in the barrio as they promised.  He told her that it was because no 
one took the initiative to do anything.  It was then she started to organize others to 
participate in a demonstration during the president’s upcoming visit. 
 
Several years earlier, a Catholic nun had formed a committee to build a daycare 
center (guardería) and community kitchen, the first in the area.  In this project, Flor 
received training and became involved in the decision-making, the proposal writing, 
presentation and the accounting of the center.  She had also received training on how to 




 The guardería was one of the many small initiatives that the nuns had started in 
the community giving informal education.  Flor is presently one of the coordinators of 
another program of Re-evaluation counseling for women, explained as a liberation 
program based on the idea of self-help.  Flor, who had participated to various degrees in 
the program according to the circumstances of her life at the time, explained how the 
program allowed her to see herself and the world around her differently and helped in her 
in other community work.  “Because I was listened to, because there are things from 
childhood that you need to let go; if not it is a cargo (weight).  Letting things go frees 
your manner of thinking.  I decided I could return and finish my schooling at night 
despite of all the difficulties that it entails … It helped me to see más allá (further ahead), 
things I had not seen before.  There are some people with a lot of studies, and so on, but 
everyone has their problems.” 
 
Meanwhile, a non-governmental organization (NGO), called “Manejo,” organized 
a community effort to get the houses on the streets where Flor lives to an innovative 
“water for all” project.  Neighbors chose Flor as a volunteer representative for her block 
for this NGO initiative.  Her job was to circulate information on the association’s 
activities, and in turn communicating to the association the opinions of neighbors.  
Another woman from the community exclaimed that participating in Ma ejo allowed her 
to leave the house, learn about her community, and gave her an opportunity for public 
speaking.  The NGO describes itself as "an inter-institutional network of 45 distinct 
organizations and is a fundamental part of a Management Model allowing poor 
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communities to have access to infrastructure services” (translated from the organization’s 
website). 
 
These opening vignettes set up the main story of this dissertation.  Associational 
networks, even when not democratically organized, can be crucial in promoting 
democratization processes and giving vulnerable populations with both human and 
symbolic capital in order to participate in public life.   
I am not only suggesting that hierarchical associations do not limit democratic 
processes, but, like one of the many paradoxes of human life, may even help support 
democratization, limiting dependency on external institutions, increasing spaces for 
choices and preparing the way so that people can treat each other as truly equal. This 
argument is supported by the numerous interviews and observations of the persons in 
Villa Campo as I will demonstrate throughout this paper.  
Another point that comes from Flor’s history of civic participation is that she 
gained different qualities from participating in each of these associational networks.  An 
important reason that Flor’s active civic life was so varied was that there were diverse 
associational networks, there was not a monopoly.  These associational networks had 
different objectives and practices.  Furthermore, these associational networks were all in 
communication, relating, with one another, directly and indirectly.  Each assocition’s 
activities, practices and rhetoric were often in response to the activities, practices and 
rhetoric in other associations. 
 
The Setting: Villa Campo 
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In 2006, I lived for six months in a poor barrio on the outskirts of Buenos Aires and 
witnessed the everyday obstacles that local residents faced in trying to have a dignified 
life -- e.g., their isolation; the fear that outsiders have of them; the garbage that outsiders 
bring into the community; the polluting smoke from all the garbage that causes residents 
to get respiratory illnesses; the violence at every level; teachers who don’t eve  bother 
showing up to classes; outsiders coming in taking credit for the work that the community 
had done; the dirt roads that make travel next to impossible when it rains.  Especially 
notable the overbearing dirt, dust and the stench of garbage in the air that all symbo ize 
the complete lack of respect these local residents receive from the outside worl .  If 
struggling with the outside world was not enough, the residents’ daily struggles with 
fellow neighbors were; from violent burglaries as well as theft, to the promiscuity that 
fuelled constant suspicion between couples.  The worst cases of physical violence 
occurred in the homes where physical and sexual abuse was almost considered normal.  
Neighbors, as well as family members, insulted each other; calling each other names like 
“bruto”  (dumb one) or “negro” (dark one).  This is a common picture of the harsh reality 
lived in a poor community and was often how people from Villa Campo described it.  
Their description, in my experience does contain some truth, but it is ultimately coated in 
one color and therefore is only part of the reality.  Despite all of the general dist ust and 
suspicion, the people living in Villa Campo formed a sense of community.  They did this 
by sharing food and medicine, chatting and joking, minding one another’s houses and 
children occasionally and, most importantly, recognizing their common location in the 
social map of Argentina.  
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In this dissertation, I will focus on how both associational participants and 
nonparticipants promoted democratization within their community (despite the named 
influences) through their interactions with support--albeit often indirect--of associations.  
As this is the focus of the dissertation, I do not want to alternatively convey that the 
community was a virtuous spot of sunny yellow in an area of squalor.  Outlining all of the 
complexity of the community is far beyond the reach of this dissertation. 
My home during my ethnographic research was situated in a municipality near 
Villa Campo where some community leaders helped me to find a place.  My host was a 
woman in her fifties named Flor, the same woman whose stories introduce this chapter.  
In many ways, Flor was a well respected woman who lived in the community.  She was a 
widowed grandmother and very helpful to Villa Campo and her fellow neighbors.  
Different from many others I met in the community and others shared my opinion, was 
that Flor was independent, she was her own boss and did not want to be seen as working 
for anyone else or under anyone else’s rules.  She ran a little shop out of the window of 
her house (the kiosk), and occasionally cleaned houses on her own terms and received 
orders to cook food.  Flor, a native of Santiago del Estero Province, was taken out of 
school at a young age, and at the time of my research was trying to finish high sc ool 
classes at night.  With the support of her neighbors, she was able to start her own 
business (the kiosk) when her husband was disabled by a stroke.  Flor strongly valued 
responsibility and independence, and she tried to exemplify these values by avoiding 
handouts (government or otherwise) except in emergencies, and by having only one child 
in a community where the norm was for women to have many.  During my time living in 
her house, I wondered if her business was a financially successful one, in part due to her 
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lack of bookkeeping and her generosity with neighbors.  Yet, Flor never said anything 
that insinuated that she felt that she lacked options or felt trapped in this poor barri .  She 
was impressed with my life choices and independence (“son muy independiente 
Ustedes”) and often stressed the importance of education and her desire to pursue her 
own education.  
   
The Three Associational Networks  
 The NGO Network 
There are three major associational networks in this community: they are non-
governmental, religious and political.  The NGO network (Manejo) became well-known 
after winning extensive funding for a project submitted implementing a waterproject in 
the community.  Although Manejo received much of its funding based on claims that it 
was grassroots, in many ways, it appeared to function as a vertical associational network.  
There are a core group of five representatives who issue press releases, circulate plans of 
action, and formulate ideas for community development, the slogan “Unidos Para 
Crecer” (united to grow) is used to symbolize the solidarity of many member 
organizations.  This centralized coordination committee indicates centralized decision-
making practices even though non-governmental organizations are known for being 
decentralized structures.  The associational space also showed the relative pol rity 
between community members and leaders, and vertical civic interactions predominated.  
These features of civic life at Manejo also served to identify the association, in the minds 
of Villa Campo residents, as being connected to politicians (politicos). 
 
The Religious Network 
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In 1983, a parish was built in Villa Campo by the Catholic Church to develop the 
spiritual life in the community by setting up the first chapel in the locality.  The priests 
and nuns serve the community in a personal capacity by participating in associations 
other than those explicitly associated with the Catholic Church.  Community members 
who were instrumental in establishing the parish had a history in community organizing, 
and in particular, many were involved in the Community Council established in the mid-
eighties.  These activities included holding discussion groups, providing food for the 
poorest in the community, and picking up garbage in community centers.  In Villa Campo 
today, religious associations, and by extension their members, are involved in the most 
vigorous civic work.  In many cases, relations between leaders and community embers 
in this religious associational setting were consciously designed to produce social 
democratization at the level of personal interaction.  Personal interactions--combined 
with acts of deference, reciprocity, and mutuality--were recognition of citizenship.  
Ultimately, the religious associations served as spaces where community embers 
developed civic entitlements and civic recognition.  The civic meanings produced by 
their work served as a powerful collective undermining of social inequalities–i.e., every 
person deserves respect. The nuns, particularly, supported the idea that poor people have 
the right, and the duty to basic necessities and to speak out for their rights. 
 
The Political Party Network 
Within Villa Campo’s field of associations, the political party members occupied 
a low position.  Their activities included organizing rallies and teach-ins, getting people 
to vote for their parties during elections, as well as implementing municipal programs in 
the community such as housing and literacy classes.  Political brokers and the people 
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associated with them were strongly viewed as dishonest and disreputable people.  Villa 
Campo residents viewed their activities as necessary at times, but of low quality in 
contrast to associations where oversight, leadership, and associational policies ensured at 
least a demonstration of professionalism.  It was the bad image of the political network 
and their unscrupulous, unrestrained political brokers that made religious associations 
and non-governmental organizations appear as a sort of haven by comparison.   
For political party members, the boundaries between “authentic”’ participation 
and theatre were muddled.  Though participants of the better-regarded associational 
networks were not necessarily regulars in the political network, they were from the same 
class that was “struggling-to-make-ends-meet.” Sometimes they needed to patronize the 
extensive political network.  This very real socio-political competition, particularly 
between the NGO network and the political party members, had begun to drive new 
development in Villa Campo. The NGO leaders also recognized the symbolic capital their 
association had commanded was threatened by their social similarity to the poli ical 
parties.  NGO leaders in the community began to create new civic practices, seeking to 
distinguish themselves from untrustworthy politicians, yet, many times, with many of the 
same language and practices. 
 
In Villa Campo, there is a saying among the residents with respect to participation 
in formal institutions:  “no me vendo,” or "I don’t sell myself."  Residents often repeated 
this to me when describing their participation in these associations.  They wanted me o 
know that they were participating in these associations in a conscious manner and, more 
importantly, were not supporting something that they do not believe in just to get material 
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goods that is so commonplace in clientelism.  In this dissertation, I will demonstrate that 
the participants in these associations used the ideas and insights they gained in their own 
civic initiatives and through interactions with their fellow neighbors.    
 
Argument: As opposed to what Existing Literature tells us, Vertical Organizations Can 
Facilitate Democratization --  
 
According to Robert Putnam (2000), the lived experience of civic life can be an 
integral part of what participation produces, as he demonstrates in his study of 
participation in American bowling leagues.  Putnam argues that bowling leagues serv  as 
sites for the enactment and legitimation of democratic relations and understaings 
through participants’ social engagement.  Part of what participants do, Tocqueville and 
others (Ammerman 2005; Putnam 2000; Tocqueville 1939) argue, is to recognize 
themselves and others as part of a greater network; a recognition that in fact constructs a 
sense of collective civic responsibility.  Indeed, because civic stru ture simultaneously 
affects civic relations, Putnam argues that bowling leagues and other similar settings 
“explore the challenge of reconciling cohesion (bonding) and heterogeneity (bridging)” 
(2000:10) and hence can reconstruct relations and boundaries between social groups.  
Looking at the structure of the organization is important because, as Putnam argues in his 
study, civic dispositions are constituted through networks and “a wide range of empirical 
evidence that the quality of public life and the performance of social institutions (and not 
only in America) are indeed powerfully influenced by norms and networks of civic 
engagement”  (1993:66). 
 In addition, and in response to Putnam’s work, a number of other studies consider 
how beliefs about fellow citizens shape the organization of participation and participatory 
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strategies in associations (Ulslaner 2002) or how civic engagement shapes the atterns of 
civic norms (Putnam’s 1993 study of political institutions in Italy is exemplary; see also 
Ikegami’s exploration of Japanese aesthetic associations).  These and other works not 
only challenge the division of structure and culture into separate theoretical and research 
agendas, they raise questions about how we theorize and empirically study civic life.2   
This dissertation builds upon these works by proposing a particular approach – 
i.e., a comparative ethnography of democratization and civic processes.  Specifically, I 
make a three-way comparison of these associational settings in this poor neighborhood in 
Argentina--a NGO, a religious network, and a local political party network –and argue 
(based on empirical ethnographic data)–that existing literature analyzing vertical 
organizations fails almost always to predict that democratic tendencies can be facilitated 
in the participants of these organizations. 
As I will discuss below, the existing literature that focuses on local 
democratization processes typically concludes that there are profound differences in 
social outcomes between vertical-type and horizontal-type organizations.  Vertical-type 
organizations are identified as hierarchical, inegalitarian, centralized, in which 
participation is limited and leaders only have authority to decide how the organizatio  is 
run.  These organizations are viewed, in essence, as anti-democratic (authoritarian).  
Horizontal-type organizations are defined as being participatory, decentralized, where 
participation is rationalized, and viewed, in essence, as democratic.  In horizontal-type 
organizations, participants are more likely to gain public action skills and make social 
connections.  Vertical-type organizations, on the other hand, rather than having civic 
                                                      
2  There are parallels between research that challenges the civil society/identity divide and feminist 
critiques of the division between collective action and identity. 
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goals, are seen as being more oriented towards providing services, create dependency a  
not giving their members the opportunity to increase their capacities to be protagonis s.  
In sum, horizontal-type organizations lead to more democratic outcomes than vertical-
type organizations.  In reality, organizations have both vertical and horizontal elements. 
 Typically, associational structures and practices that are horizontal in ture are 
viewed as being more democratic.  The criteria for whether practices and structures are 
horizontal or vertical are summarized in Table 1.1 below:   
 
TABLE 1.1:  Associational Structures and Practices 
 Horizontal (commonly 







is dispersed; accountability 
and transparency  
Centralized; rules of 
participation are defined 
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dispersed 
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Below are simple organizational maps of the three associational networks in order 
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Each of these associational networks has a different style of engagement within
Villa Campo.  I argue that the distinctions
associations about the quality of participation 
oversimplified and incorrec
Putnam 1993; and Bain et. al. 2002).  Specifically,
participation of members in vertical
ultimate authority; whereas horizontal
the formation of citizens as members are more lik
egalitarian relations.  This argument is presented by Robert Putnam’s study of Italy 
(1993).  He argues that horizontal ties
more useful for democracy than vertical tie
narrow patronage relationships.  
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ly to gain public action skills and 
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In contrast, my research demonstrates that these distinct types of associations 
(including vertical-type organizations) all play a role in a larger process of 
democratization and social change in this barrio, and in poor communities in general.  
Vertical connections may be valuable for their ability to gather and disperse civic 
information or mobilizing for collective action (see Lazarsfeld, et al. 1948; Dahl 1961; 
Robinson 1976; Huckfeldt 2001).   
Evidence suggests that even in vertical, hierarchical structures there may be room 
for some form of horizontal-like, grassroots participation and vice-versa.  As all
associations have formal models of participation – i.e., rules and regulations for the 
engagement of members – there are also forms of participation in both “vertical” and 
“horizontal” associations that take place “unregulated by rationalized conventions” 
(Lipset 1956; Stark 1989:644-645).  Therefore, horizontal “web-like" networks may form 
within formally vertical-type organizations, and vertical hierarchical networks may form 
within formally horizontal-type associations.  Such variations of participation suggest 
that local-level democratization is a process that may include both horizontal and vertical 
networks associations. 
Throughout this dissertation, the working concept of “democracy” will refer to the 
conditions in the left-handed column of Table 1.2.  This table demonstrates how I will 
operationalize civic outcomes as democratic or undemocratic.  Democracy, in this 
project, is a set of indicators that demonstrates if there is more or less democracy, but 
does not treat democracy as an end product.  These primarily individual-level indicators 
stem primarily from that literature on social capital and democracy as well as the 




TABLE 1.2: Indicators of Democratic Outcomes  
Democratic  Non-democratic 
Generalized trust Categorical distrust 
Equality of participation and voice Inequality of participation and voice 
Decision-making practices are deliberative 
and inclusive 
Decision-making practices are authoritative 
and exclusive 
Protagonism and respect for others Paternalism and righteousness 
Heterogeneous membership Homogeneous membership 
 
The tensions and potential conflict between the practice of democracy and the 
development of modern and effective bureaucratic associations have long been of great
concern to scholars of socio-political development.  Max Weber suggested that 
“‘democracy’ as such is opposed to the ‘rule’ of bureaucracy, in spite and perhaps 
because of its unavoidable yet unintended promotion of bureaucratization” (Weber 1946: 
231).  By this he meant that the cornerstone of modern bureaucratic organization, the 
separation between the leadership entrusted with shaping policy and the personnel 
charged with enacting it, may be undermined by democratic principles as well as 
simultaneously promoting bureaucratization.  In principle, democracy’s egalitarian 
disposition proscribes the emergence of an insulated group, making it difficult to not set 
up an alternative hierarchy (Gingrich 2007:2).  
In reality, associational networks demonstrate these tensions, containing both 
bureaucratic and democratic elements, centralized and decentralized practices.  As 
bureaucracy is efficient but exclusive, and democracy is time-consuming and inclusive, 
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theoretically it can be assumed that associations combine both bureaucratic and 
democratic elements.  For example, in the case of the Catholic Church network in Villa 
Campo, the associational network may be conceived as simultaneously containing both 
bureaucratized and hierarchical and democratic features.  
Over the past 20 years, Villa Campo has gone through a rapid rural-to-urban 
structural transition because of a large increase in population.  It has a high density of 
civil society associations and a record of very successful projects that have developed 
over a span of just over two decades.  During this period, there have been severe 
economic and political crises.  In the process, Villa Campo has shifted from a 
“monopolistic” associational climate to one that is pluralistic, and in many ways, 
multidimensional.  New socio-economic conditions in V lla Campo are reconfiguring 
social relations and citizenship in particular.  These social changes are increas gly 
understood through a discourse that depicts the rise in the number of associations as both 
positive and important while portraying government (especially at the municipal level) as 
a tarnished institution and not part of Villa Campo’s success.   
 Some associations are more “hierarchical,” and others are more “democratic.”  A 
reason for this vertical-horizontal spectrum may be related to the diverse associational 
activities.  An association dedicated to providing public services to its members 
(Manejo), for example, will face a different mixture of verticalities and horizontalities 
than would an association intended to educate or distribute information (the Religiosos).  
This is partially because of the exclusionary and bureaucratic problems endemic to 
service provision which favors efficiency over open participation, and partially becaus  
of the funding needed for the goods to be produced.  Namely, service provision has very 
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specific needs such as money.  Consequently, we might posit that the greater the funding 
the more likely vertical factors will be needed (Williamson 1985:53-54).   
Associations have relations with other associations; some connections are much 
more bonding than others; some are hierarchical and others more egalitarian.  Not a lot of 
attention has been paid to relationships between associations (Cornwell and Harrison 
2004) in terms of the influence that they have and the associational context and the 
influence they have on non-members.  In the case of Villa Campo, for example, there is a 
high level of embeddedness; meaning that many community participants are involv d in 
various initiatives and therefore create linkages between associations, as well s to 
nonparticipants.  A lot of this has to do with the historical work of the nuns; for example, 
it is important to note that most of the community leaders, particularly the female ones, 
had been trained by the nuns on issues such as leadership and human rights.  The 
complex mix of associational networks is not only at the level of leaders, but is carried 
out through the participants’ own networking within the community.  It is a way for 
people to trade opinions and information on various associations.  Through these 
linkages, a particular associational culture has developed.  Various associations are 
embedded in a particular associational context; the links are created by memers.  
Leaders are always viewed as important, but community volunteers are also doing civic 
work.   
In this dissertation, the relationships between leaders and members, and between 
members and fellow residents in the community (including other members) amongst 
themselves (see Figure 1.1) are the focus in order to assess how different associations do 




Figure 1.1:  The associational networks will be compared on the basis of these relationships.  The 
purpose of this comparison is to assess not only how associational participation influences the 
civic lives of community participants, but how they in turn impact the civic process in Villa 
Campo. 
 
Influences of Relations Within and Between Associations 
This dissertation explores how everyday experiences of relating are organized nd 
understood in a poor community, Villa Campo, by focusing upon settings where people 
from differing social backgrounds encounter one another and combine in different ways: 
associations.  It is mainly within associations and settings of civic partici tion more 
generally, that civic relations consciously happen and are strengthened.  Villa Campo is a 
social context where new ways of organizing and social interactions arise and existing 
patterns are challenged.  This “unsettled cultural” period (Swidler 1986) provides a 
unique opportunity to understand how systems of social change are constructed and 














social relations and of civic difference in particular, shed light on the experienc  of social 
change in everyday life. 
This dissertation is not only a study of relations in poor communities; it is also an 
investigation of participation.  In the last few decades, scholars have turned their attention 
to civic participation identifying a host of issues either specific to or neglected by the 
established literature on institutional, or “top-down” democracy (Tilly 2004:4).  These 
scholars have argued that in order to understand civic participation, an expanding and 
dominant topic in democratic countries, we need to think about how associations are 
organized, what kinds of participation practices leaders use, and even what might be 
deemed “participation” in the first place. 
While the concerns explored in studies of civic participation have opened up a 
range of new and important questions for scholars of civil society, at the same time 
linkages between the organization of civil society and the broader structures of social 
relations remain unclear.  As Michael Edwards (2004:53) has argued, “the connectis 
between a strong civil society (measured by a healthy associational ec system) and a 
society that is strong and civil (defined as one considered “good” by the majority of its 
citizens) are complex and contingent.”  Critical studies that understand the effects 
associations have within a context of civic relations are small in number. 
 
New Analytical Tool:  Relational Civic Process 
At the heart of this dissertation lies the central argument that relations through 
associations--among leaders, participants, and nonparticipants--and between associations 
play a key role in the construction and reproduction of broader social relations.  To make 
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this argument, I examine these relations in order to determine how they influence 
relations between neighbors (participants and nonparticipants).  I found that associational 
relations influenced conversations, activities and social networks.  I develop th  concept 
of the “relational civic process” in order to explore how democratization can be created 
around the developments and the impediments of associational life.   
The relational civic process occurs when engagement and participation activities 
are organized in relation to —and distinct from — other similar associational setting , 
placing associations in direct dialogue with one another.  As I will explain below, 
relational civic processes are embedded in broader social relations and draw upon wider 
social, cultural, and historical meanings.  At the same time, I argue, what Bourdieu called 
a “field,” a relational configuration of actors and the settings in which they op rate 
(Bourdieu 1998; Bourdieu 1992), creates any given set of relational civic processes.  The 
actual relationships of the field are always determined by a specific context, i  this case a 
single locality. 
Development, in the form of “democratic development,” is a key aspect of 
“knowledge of how to combine” that produces, and is in turn produced by, objective and 
subjective social structures (Tocqueville 1939).  The construction of democratization, 
then, is closely tied to structures of human relations. 
Associations in a relational civic process do civic work, in two senses.  First, 
associations produce combinations at the organizational level as leaders engage and 
manage participants in ways that either distinguish or relate their association to other 
associational settings.  Second, participatory interactions create social relations among 
categories of individuals — especially leaders and participants — that both draw upon 
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and help construct and reconstruct broader patterns of social relations.  Social distance 
and boundaries in civic participatory settings are key indicators of civic democratization, 
according to the literature on social capital (Putnam 1995, 2000).  These social 
boundaries may be deteriorated or strengthened at the associational or individual le el. 
When and where might we expect to find civil society organized relationally?  
Below I explore two key conditions for the r lational civic process and democratization.  
The first is the existence of a diverse population, and the second is the existence of a 
diverse associational field.   
More specifically, the first condition refers to interactions between different social 
categories—for example, in cases where the participants and leaders are from different 
social categories.  The second condition requires that participatory interactions be 
contained within a relational field of participation in which leaders, participants, nd non-
participants in one setting consciously organize their actions in relation to other settings 
and groups of people in their field.   
 
Participation and Democratization 
Tocqueville’s work on the social creation of democracy, along with sociological 
traditions such as social network theory (Bearman 1993, Gould 1995) and political 
sociology (Fishman 2004; Skocpol 1979, 1992, 1994; Tilly 1978, 1986, 1990) remind us 
that the construction, distinction, and maintenance of social combinations is embedded in 
every facet of social life.  Associations are also spaces where social democratization is 
shaped and civic dispositions carried out.  The argument, however, goes further:  with the
right combinations, certain forms of participation create new social relationships, and for 
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this reason, they are especially powerful sites for influencing and establishing democratic 
development.  We must take this creation of democratization into account when 
examining such forms of participation. 
 In this dissertation, I demonstrate that in interactive participatory settings civic 
education is a critical result of these interactions.  I argue that democratization happens 
on two levels:  the institutional and the interactional.  In the institutional, associations 
engage in practices of civic engagement, relying upon leadership and participation 
practices to distinguish themselves from other institutions, which, in turn, causes 
associations to change their practices to be more popular.  In the interactional, 
associational leaders create democratic or undemocratic outcomes in the cours  of 
participatory interactions by recognizing, or not, participants’ civic capabilities and 
circumstances in which they live which define these capabilities.  Both levels of my 
argument assume that participatory settings are spaces where residents are able to seek 
and gain control over their own lives and thus are important spaces for acts of citizensh p.  
Associations organize and manage participants’ actions as they attempt to secure 
residents’ participation. 
 Tocqueville by no means argued that democratization took place in diverse 
associational settings.  However, as my research reveals, participation is especially likely 
to be organized relationally to increase democratization when there are diverse 
associational types.   
 In a diverse associational environment, I suggest, that interactive participation -- 
compared to participatory processes with limited interaction between different social 
groups -- engages not only participants and leaders but also residents who did not 
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participate in associations.  The interaction itself, and the civic meanings co tained 
within it, are an integral part of what is created and learned.  
 
The Forces in Civic Work 
Analyses tend to be divided between democracy as certain outcomes in the socio-
political order vs. democracy as a set of meanings, power, and experiences.  In light of 
this, my discussion on civic relations and participation includes three key points.  First, I
suggest that the customary separation of democratic development into structural and 
cultural modes of analysis, and the consequent separation of studies of civic structures 
and outcomes from studies of lived civic experiences and knowledge, results in an 
impoverished understanding of how civic work operates in the social environment.  This 
is largely because, as I have argued, interactive structures of associations produce specific 
civic meanings and experiences—meanings and experiences that are indirectly learned by 
non-participants.   
Two additional points follow from this.  Second, we need to follow Tocqueville’s 
lead and understand the democratic citizen as the result of the complex mediation 
between socio-political (material) and cultural (immaterial) forces.  Third, to understand 
how citizenship is created, maintained, and experienced through interactive forms of 
associations in a context, we need to adopt an interactional approach to understanding 
associations.  This simply is looking at the interactions that take place in institut onal and 
personal spheres.   
In what follows, I argue that while the distinction between socio-cultural beliefs 
and the organizational structure is useful, the relationship between the two, especially in 
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civil society, must be conceptualized as closely connected.  The relationship between 
culture and structure needs to include both how socio-political spheres structure cultral
understandings as well as how ideology shapes the socio-political realm, including the 
outcomes themselves.  It is difficult to distinguish between the material world and 
immaterial forces because they are hard to separate one from the other. 
 Splits in the literature on democracy are reproduced in social scientific 
explorations of political parties and clientelism.3  Indeed, works on clientelism, such as 
James W. McGuire’s (1997) Peronism without Peron: Unions, Parties and Democracy in 
Argentina and Javier Auyero’s (2000) Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival 
Networks and the Legacy of Evita, argue that the key factor shaping the organization of 
participation is leaders’ need to extract participants’ active support.  Particip n s and their 
civic activities are defined by their positions in the social hierarchy, and the poor are used 
as a source of electoral support.  Civic engagement is understood as when “destitute 
people who do not mobilize in the usual sense of the term, without, however, being in any 
way passive” (Auyero 2000: 217).  Poor communities are sites where political 
expropriation of political power actually takes place.  Such studies by no means neglect
the cultural aspects of political domination, and poor communities, as a site, become the 
key locale for analyzing socio-political relations.4 
 Studies of civil society that consider socially-constructed identities also tend to 
retain an emphasis on structure (McAdam and Snow 2000).  Many scholars have detailed 
how identities formed outside the associational setting — e.g., class, racial, generational, 
                                                      
3  The primary example of how these clientelistic networks are operationalized is when political party 
members (brokers) provide desired goods to poor women and men (clients) in exchange for votes and 
demonstrations of support (Auyero 2001; Gay 1990).   
4  A large body of work expands on the insights and questions raised in the literature on clientelism.  For 
recent work on the topic using Argentina as a case study see: Auyero (2003), Calvo and Morillo (2004), 
Merklen (2005), and Stokes (2005). 
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place-based (nationalism) — impinge upon associational cultures and participant 
identities (Levine 1993; Ireland 1999; Paxton 1999, 2002; Putnam 1993, 2000) and even 
how these “external” identities may be deployed by leaders to bolster participation 
loyalty or may be drawn upon by participants to organize their own civic lives (Barber 
1998, Edwards 2004, James 1988).  In some instances, associations may be designed in a 
manner that challenges hierarchies from outside the associational environment (Gibson 
and Woolcock 2008).  In the end, however, the actual organization of associations 
remains largely independent of, even if influenced by, cultural forces in these studies.  
The central dynamic of civil society remains that of participation, and cultural forces 
simply interact with associational environments that are assumed already to have a 
certain structure. 
 By contrast, cultural analyses challenge the primacy of the structuralist paradigm 
(Sewell 1994).  These studies have argued that patterns of identity are crucial elements of 
social coherence, delineating boundaries between social groupings (Bourdieu 1999, 
Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Ikegami 2005, Moore and Kimmerling 1995, Sewell 1994).  
Nevertheless, when the sociology of identity considers questions of development, 
inequality, and citizenship, it tends to ignore the connections of these phenomena to the 
organization of civil society. 
The separation of studies of civil society from those of culture, a split that creates 
and sustains the division between structural and cultural definitions of democracy, has 
shaped the study of civic life.  In part because the individualistic bias in the literature on 
citizenship in the public sphere, studies of participation usually avoid questions of civic 
relations altogether, instead exploring issues of autonomy and control over one’s own 
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affairs.  The result, Henri Englund (2006) has argued, is a focus on the individual and 
questions of individual rights and selfhood rather than issues such as domination and 
subordination, power relations in associations, and broader structures of inequality. 
The presence of non-participants (residents) in associational settings also 
complicates considerations of civic life in what Ernesto Sabato (2001:13) labeled “nests 
of democracy.”  While sociologists have produced innovative research on the complexity 
of manipulative strategies on the part of leaders, participants’ passiveness, a d the role of 
non-participants in such settings (Auyero 2000, Ireland 1999, Levine 1993, Mann 2005, 
Putnam 1993, Tilly 2004), none of these studies highlights the ways in which 
participation and interactions between participants and non-participants may also, and 
centrally, involve what Almond and Verba term “civic culture” (1963) as well as the 
construction of varying shades of ‘civicness.’ 
How then to investigate the relational and subjective aspects of “civicness”?  One 
strategy for linking culture (beliefs of what is legitimate, acceptable) to associational 
structures (and the organization of civic action in particular) lies in Rogers Brubaker’s 
explorations of symbolic power and, through his efforts, bridging socio-political and 
ideological definitions of citizenship.  In Citizenship and Nationhood in France and 
Germany (1992), Brubaker theorized the concept of citizenship.  Citizenship, according 
to this formulation, is not reducible to state (or in this case, associational) functions, for 
example access to certain programs, but rather through the interaction between structural 
and cultural factors and the complex mediation between the political environment and 
culture.  Brubaker portrays all of these different institutional functions as minor to the 
idea of who is, and who is not, a citizen (1992:182).  A growing body of research that 
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explores the social dimensions of the construction, maintenance, reproduction of civic 
action and identity rejects what Giddens calls “the duality of structure” (1984:25) 
between individual agency and the social practices. 
 Ariel Armony (2004) points to civil society as a key site of investigation into 
exploring the specific ways in which social (and moral) categories actually operate to 
differentiate and distance people.  If we are to take seriously the connections that 
Tocqueville identifies between political participation and culture, then we must recognize 
that civic dispositions and distinctions can be produced and reproduced through civic 




In a book entitled Citizenship (2000), Keith Faulks portrays both ideal and 
empirical conceptualizations of citizenship.  He writes, “It recognizes the dignity of the 
individual but at the same time reaffirms the social context in which the individual acts” 
(2000:5).  Social structure and objective, material conditions limit and shape individual 
dispositions through what Bourdieu (1977) terms the habitus, but structures do not 
mechanistically generate social practices.  As Faulks has suggested, “a ky defining 
characteristic of citizenship, and what differentiates it most from meresubj cthood, is an 
ethic of participation” (2000:4).  Perhaps we can even go further than that and view 
citizenship as “an activity in which categorization, structures, disposition , and social 
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choice combine” (Wilkes 1990:123; note that he was discussing the concept of social 
class).5 
 This formulation of civic work as a way of realizing citizenship as a social 
practice directs our attention to social interaction as a fruitful site for exploring how 
citizenship operates in everyday life.  Brubaker (1992:23) has suggested that the 
symbolic boundaries that inform civic identities can be located in Weber’s idea of open 
and closed social relationships, an idea that can apply at both the interactional as well as 
the macro-sociological or structural levels.   
 Exploring citizenship as a social practice can be found in scholarship that seeks o 
understand how politics is recognized and reproduced through social interaction.  Javier 
Auyero (2000) takes this approach in his study of clientelism in Argentina, which draws
upon Goffman’s and Bourdieu’s work and symbolic interactionism more broadly to 
construct a performance view of the culture of clientelism.  Auyero argues that 
Goffman’s work can provide an interactionist approach to politics in which “actors 
present themselves and their activity in public interactions that serve to influence any of 
the other participants in the interaction” (2000:123) and involves the “perpetuation and/or 
reinvention of cultural traditions” (2000:124).6  Auyero reinserts broader social forces 
and structures into Goffmanian, micro-level observations by suggesting that “restored 
behavior” is performed in institutional settings and is shaped by social structures 
(2000:122, 150-51).  Ultimately, the expression of citizenship and civic (political) 
identity occurs through social interaction. 
                                                      
5  The notion of social structure as constituted by and reproduced through action (though not mechanically 
or inevitably so) is echoed in many theorizations of ocial structure and human agency, including Antho y 
Giddens’ (1984) concept of structuration, William Sewell’s (1992) theory of structure and agency, Ann 
Swidler’s (1986) cultural tool kit model, James Coleman and Jeffery Alexander. 
6  Auyero is specifically referring to interactions between Peronist party brokers and their clients, but this 
idea can be applied to the more general face-to-face interaction that occurs in the civic sphere. 
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 According to Auyero, the “symbolic labor” done by political brokers consciously 
or unconsciously reproduces social structure through social interaction and “the circular 
reproduction of social hierarchies” (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977:208, quoted in Auyero 
2000:127). “Performance” acknowledges agency in the sense that position in social 
structure does not automatically translate into civic behaviors, practices, and identities.  
The unconscious and self-conscious performance of civic life occurs through social 
interaction.  Auyero contends: “brokers present themselves and their activity to their 
clients and shown how this public presentation re-creates a powerful tradition in Peronist 
political culture.  …  The performance masks domination that … brokers exert owing to 
their structural position and functions” (2000:151) and is part of the everyday politics of 
poor people. 
 Brubaker (1992) has suggested that citizenship, which involves social relations, 
involves the marking of symbolic boundaries.  My research recognizes the interactve 
associational sphere as a site of both structure and culture as shaped by political and 
ideological objectives.  As such, there is the cultural production of distinct types of 
‘civicness’ in this sphere.  Civic performances, organized at the level of the institution 
and enacted at the level of leader-participant and participant-nonparticipant interactions, 
are key aspects of democratization and civic processes.  At the same time, they are 
important mechanisms in the production of experiences of relating in everyday life.  
Differences among leaders, participants, and nonparticipants become powerful ag nts for 





Associations, Fields, and Relations 
The relational civic process and the civic work it entails are not simply the 
product of individuals’ actions, for interactions among associations are also what make 
the civic process relational.  In what follows, I suggest that by setting social-political 
understandings into its associational context — and, in particular, recognizing what 
Bourdieu labels a “field” — we can draw more concrete connections between 
experiences of civic life and the associational forces that help create and maintain it.  The 
concept of field also provides a way of thinking about the relational civic process and the 
specific context in which civic work is organized and performed.  
 Similarly, the civic work performed in Villa Campo’s associations makes little 
sense without taking into account their larger social context or “field.”  Here, the field of 
interest is what I call the “socio-political field.”  The socio-political field is not simply a 
sphere of political, social and economic alliance, conflict and competition.  As I hopeto 
demonstrate—and this is the essence behind the concepts of relational civic process and 
civic work—the “gains” to be attained and competed over in this associational field are as 
symbolic as they are political and economic.  The symbolic side of civil society is 
important in part because it is so closely connected not only with social, political and 
economic relations among associations, but, also with the broader changing socio-
economic relations and positions of social actors within poor communities, including 
Villa Campo.  The associational field in Villa Campo is not autonomous from the larger 
social changes taking place in the social environment, the majority of these changes 
directed by external forces.  It is a field in which the democratization process and the 
creation of social relations tell us much about the society of Villa Campo as a whole. 
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 Bourdieu stated, “To think in terms of field is to think relationally” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992:96).  A field can be thought of as a social space, “a network” made up of 
“objective relations between positions” occupied by individuals or by organizations 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:97).  A field is simply not an array of positions, for the 
relations between positions simultaneously entail an “organization of forces”—a 
distribution of power and the rules by which relations are recognized and used—and a 
battle over that distribution and those rules (Martin 2003).  As Raka Ray notes: “A field 
can be thought of as a structured, unequal, and socially constructed environment within 
which organizations are embedded and to which organizations and … (social actors) 
constantly respond” (Ray 1999).  For Ray the concept of a field enabled her to consider 
social movements as embedded in a network of relationships that both limit and facilitate 
collective action.  Indeed, much like the relationship between habitus and individual 
action, the concept of field enables us to view relations as forces that structure 
associational and individual actions and behaviors.  Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:16) 
explain that whereas habitus describes “a set of historical relations ‘deposited’ within 
individual bodies”, the notion of field refers to a “set of objective, historical relations 
between positions”; both habitus and field “designate bundles of relations.” The concepts 
of habitus and field “function fully only in relation to one another” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992:19) in the sense that a field requires inclinations toward certain actions, 
and habitus requires a structured environment to be expressed, changed and reproduced.  
Similarly, as DiMaggio and Powell (1991:26) have argued, institutions must be 
recognized as “inseparable from the distribution of dispositions,” for an organizatio  
“only become(s) enacted and active” if, “(it) finds someone who finds an interest in it, 
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feels sufficiently at home in it to take it on” (Bourdieu 1981, quoted in DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991). 
 
The Configuration of Associations in a Field 
An associational setting, as a micro-universe, is a field in which to examine daily 
experiences of civic life.  The idea that associations operate in relation to one another, 
makes the concept “field”7 especially useful for this study.  In particular, an associational 
field can be seen to provide boundaries for the relational civic process.  Associations 
(here, associational networks in Villa Campo) organize their participants’ activities (in 
this. case primarily social welfare activities) in relation to other associations that they 
recognize as doing a similar activity. 
 In addition, because Bourdieu conceived of fields as constructed not only by 
positions but also by a struggle over positions the concept of field is not static but instead 
allows a conceptualization of social relations that undergo changes.  In Villa Campo, 
associations and participation are changing as new actors enter the field and new ideas of 
civic work are introduced.  Many of these changes are driven by growing population and 
changing socio-economic conditions in Villa Campo.   
In order to be clear, I will define the field that will be analyzed in this dissertation: 
the associational sector and residents within a single geographical area—the locality of 
Villa Campo.  Clearly, this field is not “an autonomous … field capable of formulating 
and imposing its own values and principles of legitimacy while at the same time rejecting 
external sanctions and demands” (Bourdieu 1993:21).  The study is limited to 
                                                      
7  As noted, one of the problematic aspects of defining the concept of field for Bourdieu was that the 
boundaries of fields are always contested (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:100).  In this study, the concern is 
less with the contests over boundaries of the fieldthan the contests that occur within it.   
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associations within a single locality, this being the reasonable geographic bounds for 
Villa Campo residents (though certainly this field could also be considered to extend 
across the Conurbano region of the province of Buenos Aires where Villa Campo is 
located).  Within this field, within the three major associational networks, I identify three 
specific key players—a non-governmental organization called the Manejo, a  local group 
of nuns, and the local activities of the Peronist party network—that illustrate the 
relational civic process and the creation of new civic relations and capacities in Villa 
Campo, a poor community.  
 
Villa Campo, Social, Economic and Political Changes in the Current Democratic Period 
The political and economic reforms that the new democratic state implemented 
starting in 1983 brought changes to the country.  Political restructuring, and in particular, 
the dismantling of the authoritarian military state and new participatory and localized 
programs, has been a basis for many reform policies.  The effects of these reforms have 
penetrated many facets of contemporary Argentine society, reshaping everything from 
population movements to employment patterns, but several aspects of these changes hold 
particular relevance for this study.  First, Argentina’s new democratic-era has witnessed 
increasing gaps between socio-economic categories.  Second, social and political reforms 
have given birth to a growing localized political culture and booming “civic” 
participation where civic meanings are produced and performed. 
 
Political and Economic Changes  
Civic participation, of course, did exist prior to this period of the return to democracy 
(see, for example, Sabato 2001).  Argentina’s industrialization period (approximately 
from 1932 to 1974) lead to massive internal migrations from the rural areas to urban 
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areas, such as Greater Buenos Aires, where people established and settled in barrios and 
villas miserias (shantytowns) (Auyero 2000:49-50).  The Peronist government at that 
time was not prepared for the sudden urban growth, yet there were plenty of employment 
opportunities in the industrial plants nearby (Auyero 2000:52-55).  These communities’ 
access to public goods and services was largely determined by their collective claim 
making, individuals’ efforts and connections with the state (Auyero 2000:58).  In the 
Greater Buenos Aires region during the 1950s and 1960s, residents felt that they had 
higher levels of social capital and job opportunities than they did near the turn-of-the-
century (Auyero 2000:54-56). 
 Over the past two decades, however, economic disparities have increased.  It has 
been demonstrated that a gap between rich and poor has been exacerbated by economic
reforms (World Bank Country Brief 2007).  In Greater Buenos Aires, the median 
monthly income for the top 10% is 3180 pesos and for the bottom, 10% the median 
monthly income is 115 pesos (INDEC 2006).  Income inequality has risen since the 
return to democracy.  One recent study showed that the incomes of Argentina’s richest 
10% went from representing 33.8% of total wages in 1992 to 38.9% in 2001 (World 
Bank 2003).  This study compared different Latin American countries and found the rise 
in inequality in Argentina to be significant:  “Some relatively equal countries, including 
Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela have experienced rises in inequality--Argentina 
dramatically so” (World Bank 2003).8  The growth in inequality is accompanied by rising 
poverty as numerically shown in Table 1.3.  
 
                                                      
8  According to the Human Development Index (2006) on income and wealth distribution in Argentina in 
2001 the estimated Gini coefficient—where 0 represents absolute equality and 100 absolute inequality--was 
52.2.  All studies show growing income disparities in Argentina. 
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Table 1.3 Poverty and Growth in Argentina 
   US $1-a-day poverty line  US $2-a-day poverty line 
Time Span  Total  Growth  Total   Growth 
1992-98  1.8  0.0   4.1  -0.1 
1998-2002  6.4  3.2   15.3  10.9 
2002-4   -3.8  -2.7   -8.6  -5.0 
1992-2004  4.7  1.0   11.9  4.3 
Source: Gasparini, Gutierrez, and Tornarolli (2005) 
 
 Most studies of inequality draw upon large data sets.  Important as such studies 
are, ethnographic approaches offer a different perspective.  By focusing on the textur  of 
relations of inequality and of civic relations—“what powerful people can get others to 
do” (Stinchcombe 1965:180)—ethnographic studies highlight civic differences through 
everyday social interactions.  In particular, attention to daily life not only provides fresh 
insights of civic relations, it also highlights the nature of performances of civic life.   
 It is important to outline this larger context of rising poverty as a background in 
order to understand the social dynamics in civic work in Villa Campo.  This relates to the 
inequalities in the relations between paid leaders and community volunteers, and to the 
real desperation of the population due to material deprivation.  Inequality and poverty are 
commonly perceived as detriments to democratization, although the empirical evidence 
that supports this idea is mixed (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006:61).  This dissertation 





Social Categorization and Social Norms in the Democratic Era 
The social dynamics of civic life involve power, and often operate in tandem with 
certain participation norms and expectations for certain social groups.9  The exercise of 
specific norms in an institutional environment also involves the creation of associational 
structures and practices that directly engages social networks in processes of elaboration 
of efficiency, social legitimation, and access to resources (Meyer and Rowan 1977).  This 
idea is useful for understanding civic work, where identity serves as a key resourc  in 
how civic work is done.  
The interconnectedness in civic settings also means that norms and identities 
directed at participants in one associational setting are constructed in relation to other 
groups of participants.  In other words, norms and normative behavior operate 
comparatively and serve to create differences among participants as much as between 
participants and non-participants.  The participant communicates civic differences by 
performing forms of certain behavior governed by certain norms.  Social norms are key 
resources in the organization of civic work.  
 
Field Sites and Methods 
In this dissertation, I primarily rely upon ethnographic data gathered during six 
months of field research in Villa Campo, conducted between March and December 
                                                      
9  Feminist and Marxist scholars have produced a rich body of research on the ways in which gender, race, 
class and sexuality are integral to the organization of work and the reproduction of inequality.  
Organizations create jobs that incorporate employers’ assumptions about social categories, while workers 
bring their identities with them to work (Williams 1995).  Studies demonstrate that norms, practices and 




2006.10  The project began as a comparison between three different associational 
networks — one non-governmental, one political, and one religious — in the locality of 
Villa Campo, in the municipality of Garcia, in the periphery of the province of Buenos 
Aires.  My time in these settings convinced me of the necessity of understanding from the 
perspective of the residents.  I lived in the locality for six months while conducti g my 
fieldwork and participating, or volunteering, in these networks.  I also spent time 
observing interactions between neighbors in a number of settings in the locality.  I 
supplemented ethnographic work with over 42 formal interviews with participants, 
community leaders, people who work for the municipality, the bishop and directors of 
NGOs, and I conducted document research on changes to Villa Campo’s associational 




                                                      
10  The effects of my physical presence, as a white, Canadian woman, in the field raise important 
methodological issues that cannot be adequately addressed in this chapter.  I devote space to these issu s in 
a methodological appendix (Appendix A). 
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Villa Campo 
 In many ways, the locality of Villa Campo is taken as a case study of Argentina’s 
peripheral urban settings in the way that economic and political reforms have reshaped 
the locality’s political, economic and social structures.  Villa Campo is a locality, with a 
population of roughly 50,000 people, relatively isolated from the capital of the 
municipality of Garcia, in the eastern part of the province of Buenos Aires.  Villa Campo 
over the past 20 or so years has witnessed innumerable changes, including the rapid raise 
of self-help organizations and local businesses, the increase of infrastructure, and in 
particular an increasingly visible gap between the circumstances of the municipality’s 
richest and poorest residents.  Villa Campo’s increasingly stratified associational field 
serves as a barometer of these changes.  In addition, political and economic changes ame 
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later to the periphery of the province of Buenos Aires than the Federal Capital; in this 
regard, Villa Campo is similar to the areas outside of the Federal Capital of Buenos Aires. 
 Within the locality of Villa Campo, the position occupied by any given 
association is simultaneously a political, economic and symbolic one.  Because I wa  
interested in the relations between and among positions, I identified three critical
locations around which civic work was constructed: an NGO serving and directed by 
members of the community, a Catholic Church network guiding members according to 
their faith, and a political party network linking local and provincial governments with 
community residents, particularly the poorest.  These three networks were organized 
across the social map of present-day Villa Campo. 
 My first field site was an NGO network that I call the “Naranjas”, which was 
where Villa Campo’s established, and largest non-governmental organizations are and 
approximately 30 people are employed.  Ever since the Naranjas was established in the 
1990s, the area has symbolized the bounty of grassroots collective action.  Physically, the 
land is a ”hive” of non-governmental organizations, three small buildings scattered on 
about an acre of land in one of the few places in the locality that is without garbage.  
Inside, community leaders held meetings between themselves, with outsiders, an  with 
participants.  Here I participated as a volunteer attending and helping out with mee ings 
and working in community gardens.  Within the Naranja network, I focus on the most 
popular organization that has as a main objective to support public infrastructure in Villa
Campo; this organization I will call Manejo. 
 One of the most respected associational networks--my second field site, highly 
integrated within the personal lives of residents--was a network made up of a number of 
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Christian groups that I call the “Religiosos.”  Houses of worship are located throughout 
Villa Campo where residents from different backgrounds met regularly.  The Catholic 
Religiosos first arrived in the mid-1980s and since that time approximately 50 Christian 
(Catholic and other) churches have been established, and have initiated and supported 
many groups and individuals in Villa Campo.  Connected with international and national 
organizations, the Religiosos were generally acknowledged by residents and leaders alike 
as Villa Campo’s most dedicated, and probably most important, participatory network.  
Here I participated in a number of projects and services.  
 Conveying its low status and socially dubious position in the locality, my third 
site is called the “Politicos” and was quite hard to uncover.  Politicos were usually sitting 
in on “community” projects, occasionally directors of schools, and mostly connected with 
Villa Campo’s residents in an almost secretive manner.  The Politicos were a large 
diverse network where members of political movements or representatives of the 
municipality (politicos) borrowed associational space to give their ideas and inexpensive 
government goods to people.  Here I spent time observing and interviewing members. 
 Having previously been in Villa Campo and Buenos Aires generally, I gained 
access to field sites through personal connections with community leaders and academics, 
to which I presented myself as a graduate student from Canada conducting research on 
civil society and seeking a volunteer position at their association or project.  At my first 
site, the Naranjas, leaders viewed my arrival both with a little skepticism and as an 
opportunity to gain an “outside perspective,” frequently asking for my opinion at 
meetings from the beginning.  I definitely found myself in the position of the “observed.”  
Interest in me faded a little and I found the initial excitement of being a stranger in Villa 
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Campo made my research and purpose in the Naranjas generally known, easing my entry 
into other field sites, especially the Religiosos. 
 Although I never blended into any of the three sites nor in the neighborhood I was 
living, in each setting my presence achieved a kind of normalcy as I became another 
fixture in the environment.  My foreignness meant that my research was never covert 
(despite sensational rumors to the contrary), that I could take field notes openly, and that 
I could raise all sorts of issues and questions with my informants.  However, as a North 
American white woman biking and walking around Villa Campo, I was without question 
an oddity.  Within the Naranjas, leaders’ gossip gave me a lot of attention.  Within the 
Religiosos, participants frequently took me for a young nun driven by will to help the 
poor in Villa Campo, and the work that I was doing was viewed as respectable; it was 
compared to being on “mission.”  By contrast, with the Politicos, I was generally re d as 
a suspicious outsider—outsiders are typically a fairly despised group by the people 
seeking power in Villa Campo—and frequently the subject of disparaging and even 
prejudicial comments by leaders both in this network and with the Naranjas who assumed 
I could not understand because of my mediocre Spanish.  These variable perceptions of 
me in each site also reflected the power and dynamics of the three associational se tings. 
 
The Chapters that Follow 
There are many networks within Villa Campo that I could have focused on for this 
dissertation.  The range and types of collective action found in urban Argentina have 
proliferated rapidly over the past 15 to 20 years, with some initiatives targeting v ry 
small and specific groups of people.  The three associational sites examined here, 
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however, hold special symbolic weight in urban Argentina as the spaces identified with 
the popular classes, the working majority, the unemployed and those in conditions of 
acute poverty.  These three locales, and the organization of participatory interactions 
within them, were also very much in dialogue, albeit sometimes symbolically, with one 
another.   
 The small, local associations I studied conceived themselves as belonging to the 
bottom rung in the hierarchy of development, dominated by international agencies and 
the national government; an image (albeit often misleading) of them as struggling to “do 
good” while battling others who are more powerful.  Instead of viewing positions as 
locations of an associational hierarchy, I suggest that these positions are in fact stances 
that leaders took vis-à-vis one another.  These stances translated into relational civic 
processes in which participants expected to distinguish themselves and the volunteer 
service they provide from that found in other settings.  In this way, the stances or 
positions community leaders and outside leaders took within the associational field could 
be quite literally transposed onto the stances participants were directed to adopt in their 
relations with their neighbors. 
 I explore the broader, historical context in which this particular associational field 
is situated in Chapter 2, where I describe changes in associational life during the course 
of political and economic reforms.  Chapter 3 turns to the Politicos, the scattered, hidden 
political arena, busy but of low status.  I characterize the Politicos as a space mainly 
attempting cross-category organizing, where leaders and participants challenged the 
external legitimation of settings like the Naranjas by emphasizing the similarities 
between the goals and activities of both political (themselves) and social leaders.  By 
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contrast, Chapter 4 demonstrates how the Religiosos, an expansive, established network 
sought to develop and recognize indications and opportunities of civic work.  In this 
chapter, I argue democratization occurs in symbolic dialogue with the nonparticipants, as 
leaders seek to mold sufficiently empowered participants to, in turn, serve their neighbors 
and their community. 
 Subsequently, Chapter 5 then explores one site — the Naranjas, the NGO network 
— in detail, arguing that because this network was originally organized under conditions 
of a centralized, planned system, civic work there was often not democratic. 
In Chapter 6, I return to Villa Campo and explore how the diverse associational 
environment — and the types of relations between the associations in particular — 
reshaped residents’ practices and ideas in this “poverty-stricken” community.  I argue 
that the community members themselves began to create elements of civic work as they 
attempted to convert their barrio’s — and their own — civic knowledge and skills into 
civic capital.  Finally, I conclude with Chapter 7, where I draw out more clearly the 
implications of the links between civic outcomes, civic knowledge, and civic relations 




Chapter 2:  Transformation and Change: The Ju go of Community 
Development in Villa Campo 
 
Introduction 
The National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons’ report released 
during the early years of Argentina’s democratic reemergence begins with a stark 
description by Ernesto Sabato of life during the recent military dictatorship: 
A feeling of complete vulnerability spread throughout Argentine society, 
coupled with the fear that anyone, however innocent, might become a 
victim of the never-ending witch-hunt. Some people reacted with alarm. 
Others tended, consciously or unconsciously, to justify the horror. … In 
the semantic delirium where labels such as:  Marxist-Leninist, traitors to 
the fatherland, materialists and atheists, enemies of Western, Christian 
values, abounded, anyone was at risk - from those who were proposing a 
social revolution, to aware adolescents who merely went out to the 
shantytowns to help the people living there.    
 
All sectors fell into the net:  trade union leaders fighting for better wages; 
youngsters in student unions, journalists who did not support the regime; 
psychologists and sociologists simply for belonging to suspicious 
professions; young pacifists, nuns and priests who had taken the teachings 
of Christ to shanty areas; the friends of these people, too, and the friends 
of friends, plus others whose names were given out of motives of personal 
vengeance, or by the kidnapped under torture. The vast majority of them 
were innocent not only of any acts of terrorism, but even of belonging to 
the fighting units of the guerrilla organizations... (Sabato 1984). 
 
By the mid-1980s, just a few years into the country’s new program of democratic 
restructuring and decentralization, localized initiatives began to multiply, in the process 
of transforming the political landscape.  Marie-France Prévôt Schapira (1996:8 ) 
described this re-emergence of local actors such as churches, NGOs, and resident
associations, all who focused their efforts on the most vulnerable populations. 
Around the beginning of the 21st century, international organizations and 
foundations supporting new community “local” non-governmental 
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organizations/associations had sprung from the ground in Villa Campo and started 
replacing many of the peronist unidades básicas and sociedades de fomento that 
characterized the earlier period.  More of these associations generated more co petition 
and a new emphasis on self-help--unlike when pu teros had a monopoly and acted as 
gatekeepers to state merchandise and information--began to reflect the dramatic ise in 
stature of that neglected entity in Villa Campo, the protagonist, the citizen.  Villa Campo 
had become a place showcasing new forms of collective action, where associations 
scrambled to attract residents confronted with a vast and growing array of initiatives in 
which to participate.  
This chapter provides an overview of political, economic and social changes in 
Villa Campo’s associational sector and the impact of these changes on civil society 
organizations, participants, and residents.  The scope of these changes is large and covers 
different forms of social, political and economic organization.  In contrast to demcratic 
societies where supposedly the masses’ voice and participation drive government action, 
in the seven years prior to 1983, Argentina’s polity was an authoritarian or military state 
in which state ideology and action were dictated by policies of military officials.  But in 
the span of just over two decades, Argentina has shifted from the severely limited civ c 
action space during a period of authoritarianism to a democratic system straining under 
an explosion of participatory approaches developed in a diverse and expanding range of 
associational settings.  New patterns of participation have emerged that are tied to 
broader socio-economic changes, and associations have come to develop not only an 
array of new participatory approaches but new sets of cultural meanings. 
48 
 
 Below I outline changes to the structure of both the civic sector and civic patterns 
in Villa Campo, to the early years of the democratic transition, and through to the present 
day of over twenty years later.  The historical context frames the discussion of 
associational organization in later chapters and underscores the change in Villa Campo.  
At the same time, I consider the links between the growing diverse relations mong 
associations and among the residents.  I trace the new political, economic and symbolic 
interaction that situates the ethnographic account of the subsequent chapters.  Perhaps
most importantly, this chapter sheds light on the changes—including civic status—
experienced by associational participants over the course of the past twenty years. 
 
Standing in the Shadow of Perón: Civic Action Prior to 1983 
During the 1950s, the associational sector in Argentina underwent considerable change.  
Over time, the first Perón government (1946-1955) sought to expand its control over and 
ownership of the participatory channels of labor and other associations.  This program 
began in the mid 1940s when efforts were made to tie unions into the state system by 
giving them the right to engage in collective bargaining and receive other awards from 
the state (Lewis 2002; Rock 1987).  Approximately half of the economically active 
population was unionized by the early 1950s, up from just 20 per cent a decade before 
(Doyon 1988).   
What first began in the labor sector started in non-state associations who were 
urged to either close or be absorbed into state entities through the course of the 1950s 
(Lewis 2002:5; Rock 1987:314; Romero).  Bringing small residential associations under 
the umbrella of the state was a slower and far less complete process.  These associations 
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were much smaller and usually did not involve many people.  They were dispersed both 
in rural and urban areas and dealt with small, everyday matters not included in the 
purview of state centralized planning.  A policy for centralizing these associ tions began 
in 1949 (called La Comunidad Organizada) that sought to organize small associations 
into a centralized system; many of these associations were later changed into Peronist 
party-run operatives or incorporated into a network of unidades basicas (Rock, 
1987:314).  The attempt to consolidate civil society was an attempt to isolate many of the 
other channels of participation, contributing to blocking any forms of resistance (Ro k 
1987; Lewis 2002:7)11; but the success of the conglomeration of civic life was very 
uneven and although there was corporation in some areas, there was increased autonomy 
in others (James 1988). 
 One of the very few shared ideological aims of major political campaigns in the 
Peronist era (1946-1955) and the National Reorganization Process (1976-1983) included 
efforts to increase bureaucratic state authority, eliminate opposition, and enhance a 
uniform national identity.  During the first Peronist regime, policies promoting sate
corporatism sought to nationalize civil society participation, which led to local political 
patronage networks, regulated by the state, and attempting to limit the other forms of 
civic participation (Rock, 1987:317).12 
                                                      
11 Eduardo Elena (2005) argues that the political socialization of civil society was far less complete and 
quite complex, with pre-existing civil society organizations using government programs, such as Peron’s 
1951 letter writing campaign as an opportunity to have greater political influence.  Greater reorganiztion 
may have come directly after the military dictatorship of 1976-1982, when most of the social movements 
were turned into localized residential associations (u idades basicas) and political parties and associations 
were increasingly patronage-based (Auyero 2000:188; Merklen 2005; Prévôt Schapira 1996, 1999). 
12 One of the ironic consequences of attempts to eliminate any trace of opposition was the rise of an 
‘institutionalized’ or ‘formalized’ opposition that involved the ‘formerly supportive’ Catholic Church and 
Army.  Rock describes how the attempted influence of these institutions’ territories that had originally 
supported the Peronist regime “initiated a chain of events” in Argentina, which during the early years of the 
Peronist regime had become “almost a last refuge for Péron’s opponents” (Rock, 1987:315-317).  
Opposition to the Péron government, who were often forced to express their opposition in private, were 
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 The National Reorganization Process involved similar politically-motivated civil 
society restructuring.  Civil society organizations began to either serve the military 
government or be severely repressed starting in 1976.  At the associational level, 
collective and cooperative groups and organizations that had reestablished themselves 
during the 1960s and 1970s were banned, in name if not always in practice (Prévôt 
Schapira 1999).  During this period, opposition was once again seen as primarily anti-
nationalist, and activists and community leaders were forced to accept whatever the 
military forced upon the population.  Public opposition was virtually eliminated, the 
“threat” of militant guerrillas was eliminated in the first year of the military dictatorship 
and few associations survived (Jacobs and Maldonado 2005).  These arrangements were 
so unsustainable that they did not last, and the resulting repulsion over human rights 
abuses and economic problems laid the ground for a return to democratic arrangements 
between civil society and the state (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:277; Borón 2000:139). 
Participation was highly politicized, especially during the Process of National 
Reorganization (1976-1983) when space available for participation was further reduced 
by political campaigns aimed at cleansing society of all the markings of a diverse civic 
life.  Peronism, along with such ideologies as Marxism, public meetings and 
demonstrations, any organization efforts in poor communities, and even language and 
disciplines were labeled “subversive” and exterminated from the public sphere (Arditti 
1999:11, CONADEP 1984).  Political pressures also meant that groups such as family 
members of the victims relied on the display of cultural representations to signal group 
                                                                                                                                                              
able to find institutional protection to protest the state activities in the face of decreasing power and 
inefficiencies (Rock, 1987:317-318). 
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identity, avoiding conventional modes of civic participation (Brysk 1994, Buchanan 
1987:371-374, Loveman 1998).   
 On the introduction of political reforms, Argentina’s associational sector was 
beleaguered by shortages and structural limitations.  As Jamie Elizabeth Jacobs and 
Martin Maldonado (2005) have noted, this state monopoly over both civic participation 
and education meant shortages of collective venues for Argentine citizens.  This may help 
explain the silence and fear that Ernesto Sabato described in the quotation that begins this 
chapter. 
In the last years of the military dictatorship neighborhood associations 
(sociedades de fomento) re-emerged, in Argentina intending eventually to give low-
income communities greater control over their activities (Cavarozzi and Palermo 1995).13  
These occurrences, coupled with political reforms, contended with political party and/or 
clientelist-operated networks that did not allow for greater community–retained benefits 
(Cavarozzi and Palermo 1995:40).   
 A dramatic shift in the associational structure was taking place in Argentina.  At 
the same time, there was growth in the numbers of new associations, as political ar es, 
religious bodies, and private foundations established associations to improve the lis of
the growing number of poor people.  In the years of the democratic transition, the number 
of associations grew to be an estimated 80,000 organizations in second half of the 1990s 
(CIVICUS 1997).  According to one source, the average civil society organization had 23 
participants (Acotto 2003).   
                                                      
13  The idea of neighborhood autonomy was semantic: changes in levels of autonomy were far more modest 
(Cavarozzi and Palermo 1995).  Increased autonomy means greater control over participation practices and 
selection of activities as well as more retained benefits, and the organization as a whole could be held 
accountable for successes and failures.  
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As shown in Figure 2.1, there has been an overall increase in the membership in 
most associational types.  Yet, there has been a remarkable increase in the memb rship of 
religious groups in 1995, from 9.3 percent in 1984 to 33.8 percent in 1995.  This is 
similar to the findings in a World Bank study in 2002, which reveals that religious 
organizations have the vast majority of members in Argentina.  On the other hand, labor 
union membership has decreased by 40 percent (Luengo 2005).  
 
 
Source: World Values Survey 1995 
 
Participating in a Patronage Democracy 
The dynamics of machine politics have been labeled as “patronage democracies” 
(Chandra 2004), because they tend to produce dependent behaviors, meaningless political 
participation, and consequent shortages both of civic participation and knowledge.  For 





















the form of hoarding material resources and information, an important way of surviving, 
and a general scarcity of genuine democratic representation, phenomena which were 
exacerbated by the national government’s emphasis on the development of local 
politicization at the expense of civic democratization (Cavarozzi and Palermo 1995).  
One historical account of participation in working class neighborhoods in Argentina 
emphasized, “The degree that neighborhoods are used as political spaces to be fought 
over; where competition can be ferocious and even deadly” (Dubois 1998).  Many social 
programs could only be accessed through political party brokers; including jobs, basic 
foodstuffs, medicines, and entertainment (Figure 2.2 shows an artist’s depiction of a 
“client”).    
 
 
Figure 2.2: Image from Clarín, November 23, 2006 (Artist unknown). 
 
In poor communities, local political party brokers, or punteros, mediated access to 
state goods and services almost exclusively, casting Argentina’s shantytown population 
as, in the words of Javier Auyero (2000), “clients.”  In his study of Buenos Aires’s 
shantytowns, Auyero (2001) described a condition of “resource control and information 
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hoarding”, where the local resident was forced to rely upon his or her broker not only for 
employment but also for a range of goods and services—housing materials, basic 
foodstuffs, even entertainment and opportunities to get out of the shantytown—not 
always available through other channels.  Often the only alternative to long holdups—
both political and bureaucratic—was reliance upon elaborate personal connectis.  The 
accumulation of such “survival” networks was far more useful than going to a 
government office for gaining access to scarce goods and services by, for exampl , 
gaining quick access to state allocated food and housing materials (see e.g. M rklen 
2005; for a parallel situation in India, see Chandra 2004).  
 
The Door Opens: Participation in the Era of the Return to Democracy  
In this section, I present the past twenty years of life in Villa Campo as remembered by 
the residents and through document research.  In the 1980s, Villa Campo’s associational 
sector was basically monopolized by a political party network, and characterized by 
shortages of basic civic education possibilities, a very limited number of associational 
spaces, and inconvenient access to the small number of associational spaces available. 
In conditions of patronage, political brokers often act as gatekeepers to state 
goods and services, and they might hoard desirable resources within their own personal 
networks.  In Villa Campo’s patronage democracy, brokers were/are notorious for their 
abuse of residents, punishing residents or excluding them altogether.  One man told me,
“They (referring to two specific local brokers) are cheap politicians, they only give a little 
compared to what they expect to get.”  He said that certain “pu teros politicos” would 
respond to residents’ needs by seeing how much they could take advantage of (engañar) 
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them.  For example, for people to receive 150 pesos from Plan Trabajar through a 
political broker they would have to pay him 30 pesos, and the puntero goes with them to 
cash their checks to make sure they cumplen.  One woman I met remarked on clientelism: 
“They (the political brokers) want to manage people!  There was one time my husband 
was sick, and these politicos came by and offered to pay the electricity.  I accepted that 
one time.  Then one day they told me that I had to go to a march.  I told them I could not, 
for many reasons including being proud and not liking being told what to do, but most 
important because if something happened to me at the march—getting killed or injured--
there would be no one to look after (my husband).  He is my responsibility.  Anyway, I 
had to pay back the money they “lent” me.  Now I would never get involved with those 
people sinvergüenza.  All they want to do is manage people!” 
Perhaps those particular political brokers were “sinvergüenza,” because the 
interactions with brokers were not, of course, always as terrible as these particular stories.  
As with any association, model political brokers were identified and praised.  For 
example, in the late 1990s, Villa Paraíso’s residents described political brokerMatilde as 
“passionate about the people” (Auyero 2001).  Praised for her effectiveness in dealing
with material needs, Matilde was a clientelest “social worker” cast in the language of 
Peronism.  Traits such as “self-sacrificing,” “helpful” and the completion of promised 
transactions attributed to Matilde all depicted as inducing dependency.  At my field site, 
Villa Campo, leaders and residents tell stories of certain remarkable political brokers who 
would go out of their way to help people, such as getting books and courses to help with 
their education.  In addition, there were other stories of politicos getting badly needed 
help and speeding up bureaucratic processes for community groups and individuals.  
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 Yet bad experiences were common enough that this is very much how people 
perceive participation under a clientelist environment.  Given a small number of local 
political brokers and the lack of competition with any entity outside their network, 
residents at times had to participate, regardless of how they were treated by punteros.  
One historian noted that clientelism, and other “paternalistic measures” in Argentina’s 
poor communities, effectively broke down group solidarity by “atomizing the electorate 
and individualizing the voter”” (Rock 1975:79, quoted in Auyero 2000:190). 
In 1986, Villa Campo was plagued with problems and faced a crisis of identity as 
well as severe economic problems.  The economic problems precipitated the major 
collective action strategy changes laid out at community meetings held in the local parish 
meetings which set into motion a gradual but nonetheless dramatic reorientation of V lla 
Campo’s democracy and the transformation of the locality.  The resulting shift in 
emphasis away from a monopoly in clientelism and towards more venues of participation 
would have a powerful effect upon associating in Villa Campo. 
Through the last decades, Argentina’s associational sector and the diversity of 
venues of participation in poor communities went from what had been essentially a 
political party monopoly to a proliferation of participation venues and forms.  Informants 
told me that as the associational sector expanded and activities began to fill Villa Campo, 
political party channels increasingly fell into disuse, and much manipulation and 
corruption was lifted.  Most important for this study, Villa Campo’s associational sector 
developed into an environment made up of ever more diverse participatory venues.  The 
earliest steps to revitalize the associational spheres involved both the internal 
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reorganization of existing associations and the expansion of the non-governmental 
segment of the associational sector. 
 
Reconfiguration of the Associational Sector 
Competition for foreign financing is part of the associational context.  In Villa Campo, 
there was a lot of competition between community projects for external capital.  Vill  
Campo’s Naranja network is a perfect example of a local project attracting foreign 
capital, as the network originally came from being a decentralized community-based 
network to a centralized organization headed by an external foundation.  The Naranja 
network has been successful in receiving funding from both international and national 
donors.   
 Other communities similar to Villa Campo, at the time of this study, largely 
remained outside of the scope of major Western funding agencies.  With their arrival in 
the community in the 1980s, these new foreign connections became part of what had 
become a complex mosaic of associational settings; a field of players in which localized 
organizations, church initiatives, and political party networks were the “face” of civic 
activities.14  To be sure, over the course of 20 years, the organization of civil society in 
the community, and with it the urban landscape, has been transformed.  A survey of 
Greater Buenos Aires shows Villa Campo as being one of the areas with the most 
community associations.15  Through the 1980s, the associational arena in Villa Campo 
was dominated by a community council that worked with the municipal government, 
                                                      
14  The World Bank first gave money to the gas project in Villa Campo in 2001.  Gas Natural, Telefonica, 
Ford Foundation, Inter-American Foundation, FunCap, the Municipality, and the national government were 
other funding agencies that were involved.  
15  Interview with longstanding community activist November 2006. 
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whose most active members were from the active catholic network.  Nevertheless, by 
2006, the same area had become home to a large number of associations.  
 It is important to note, however, that the variety of associations in this area we  
not just different forms of participation; they also reflected the many individuals in the 
community.  Indeed, the line of work of Villa Campo’s associations and the environment 
where they all worked were closely connected to broader socio-economic changes in 
Argentine society and especially to the fact that there was further disparity among the 
population.  Therefore, there were some organizations that dealt with the acute povery of 
the population; including the incoming migrants from neighboring countries and regions 
who did not have homes.  Other organizations would not focus on material needs, but 
non-material needs, such as education and counseling.  These differences among people, 
and among associations, have been accompanied by equally dramatic changes to the 
organization of participation carried out in the poor communities. 
 
New Civic Relations, New Grassroots Relations: The Global World Enters the Local 
Sphere 
 
Broad changes to the leadership structure of Villa Campo’s associational sector and the 
rise of a diverse associational environment were accompanied by important changes to 
the internal organization of associations, affecting both participants and residents.  For 
participants, changes transformed civic relations in the community.  In particulr, 
conflicts, among leaders and among associations, gave rise to new forms of associational 
relations that involved increasingly diverse participant arrangements.  Given the 
associational settings that are the subject of this study, I focus upon changes to civic 
relations in localized parts of large associational networks, specifically national political 
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parties, religious institutions, and international and national funding agencies.  A brief
look at how a new associational form emerged reveals how much participation practices 
in Villa Campo today are a result of the way in which political and economic events 
unfolded. 
 With clientelism, political networks would supply goods to residents on a give-
first, pay-later basis, with accounts cleared eventually and political party networks 
making sure to get back a part of what they give.  This arrangement also allowed political 
party networks to expand with little investment.  By handing out material support to those 
in need, clientelistic brokers can  always return to these beneficiaries in order to demand 
political support when needed, thereby, in effect, retaining the right to have political 
support in exchange for inexpensive material items.  There is agreement that competition 
among associations was the key factor behind the criticism of clientelistic arrangements 
in associations.  “The punteros come to our homes, they want to give us things so that 
they can manage us,” one community participant explained.  Interviews also revealed 
that, in Villa Campo, the residents were reluctant users of these clientelistic 
arrangements, and that they were only turned to during financially difficult times. 
 Shifting to “social,” “nonpolitical” activities did not immediately spell dramatic 
change for community participants.  Unlike the clientelistic networks, theseassociations 
did not directly give goods and this shift in the associational paradigm saw changes to the 
expectations of participation.  “Social” projects for community participants, on both 
individual and group basis, have become widespread.  This was accompanied by a 
general criticism of the “ambition” (ambición) that characterized the politicos, when 
community leaders were getting something, regardless of how much actual work they 
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did.  As one Villa Campo participant recalled, participants went from looking for the 
easiest ways of getting resources (which required very little time and energy) to those 
participatory activities which usually involved the most time and energy. 
 Through the 1990s, influence not only from development agencies, but also local 
foundations, would soon bring about changes to civic participation arrangements.  As 
noted above, the late 1990s and early 2000s were boom years for associational life.  In 
Villa Campo, many different associational networks (representing state, private, religious 
and joint ventures) entered the community’s associational network since the 1980s.  New 
entrants into the associational sector, especially small-scale private org nizations, began 
disintegrating what was a monopoly on civic participation and associational funding by 
punteros.  Perhaps the economic recovery of the past several years plays an important 
role in the rise of non-governmental organizations as they can act to provide a safety net 
during periods of crisis when neither markets nor states are providing such safety, and 
then they have the ability to transform their activities and rise in importance when the 
crises recede, as appeared to be the case in Villa Campo.   
 It was in this increasingly competitive associational environment that non-
governmental organizations began to shift their operations to forms which presumably 
attract more funding.  “Participation”—a requirement for funding of many agencies—
required leaders to get more community members to participate besides other tasks of 
maintaining funding and outreach.  Within associations, top leaders (líderes) controlled 
access to popular participation spaces, activities and information; as well, they carefully 
tracked the participation performance of activities in the association.  
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 The scramble among associations to receive funding is related to the increasi gly 
stratified nature of poor communities’ associational sector and the development of civic 
activities.  Large networks like political associations still act as key sites for civic 
participation, despite growing diversity of the associational environment.  There ar  
regional variations, but in Villa Campo in particular large social associations stand in 
contrast to political party network environments, offering different courses of acti n, 
more guarantees on project results, and promises of beneficiary-oriented services.  These 
associations offer a degree of trust and respectability—and social status—that is absent 
from other settings.  For larger, collective projects, these associations ofte  provide the 
only suitable access for poor residents.16   
 For community participants, the rise of the internationally-networked associ tions 
has ushered in a new set of civic relations and participation.  With funding and wages 
paid by development agencies or other funding agencies, participants find themselves 
now answerable to two different hierarchies—leaders and the people who fund them.  On 
the community level, development agents and people who provide funding have become 
a regular presence—when I was there people from the foundation had almost a daily 
presence—checking up on results, managing relations, and supervising participant 
activities. 
 At the same time, in many associations participants do not seem to be considered 
full-fledged citizens by many of the “bosses,” and many associational activities appear 
                                                      
16  These funding agencies give funding to local foundations that then connect with community 
organizations for civic space and staffing.  In effect, both the development agency and local associati n re 
somewhat insulated from financial risks by these local foundations, who by virtue of their position as 
intermediaries are forced to seek out both financial backers from whom to obtain financing and existing 
associational outlets in which to do their activities.  Because the financing on associational activities such 
gas projects can be substantial—funding for associati n l activities are almost always more than the actu l 
project itself—there is competition to become an intermediary.  
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unlikely to provide public action skills or other benefits—although I will show in the next 
chapter that they do.  Moreover, although the internationally-networked associations had 
dramatically altered civic relations in only one of my associational field sites—the 
Naranja network—it represents an influential pattern of civic relations that had the 
potential to affect participants working in other associational settings.  New civic 
relations have shaped the conditions under which civic work is organized in most 
associational settings.    
 
Civic Relations, Participation and the Associational Field 
While the introduction of economic and political reforms were restructuring the 
associational sector and recognizing civic relations, the same policies init ated dramatic 
changes to the sphere of everyday interaction.  For community residents, clientelist c 
participation avenues are increasingly viewed as something of the past.   
 Still, according to the 2001 census, the monthly median income for Villa Campo 
was around U$S 433 ($ARG 1344,19).  Greater wealth on the national level has also 
meant greater inequality.  As I noted in chapter one, the growth of inequality itself is not 
in dispute.  Other research suggests that income disparities in Argentina translte, not 
surprisingly, into stratified participation patterns, with the rich participating in higher 
quality, educational, civic-enhancing activities (Bain et.al. 2002).   
In fact, for many residents—especially for vulnerable groups in the new social
order—participation provides a way to feel included in a modern, urban culture.  
Moreover, as the following chapters will demonstrate, barrio dwellers are divided both 
by what they can do and by how they participate: low-income residents participate in 
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largely informal networks with limited resources and include activities that are often 
risky.  Those who have slightly greater means, by contrast, participate in “risk-free” 
associational networks that carefully devise activities and offer formal partici tion 
practices. 
 
In places like Villa Campo, popular participation spaces have become a testament to 
Argentina’s new democratic face—and a visible gap between rich and poor.  The humble 
appearance and actions of the community participant contrasted with the appearance of 
authority of many community leaders, which contrasted with the aura of professionali m 
and power that representatives of funding agencies and visiting academics brought with 
them.   
 In many ways, stratification of participation and the growth of Villa Campo’s 
associational sector have gone hand-in-hand.  In addition, as I argued in the previous 
chapter, one of the concrete social spaces in which people enact social identity is the 
associational setting.  Associational venues, as spaces of participation, are important and 
particularly public venues for such social performances by both participants and 
leaders.17   
In Argentina today, private and foreign-invested associations that are populated 
by economic and social elites with claims of concerned service to those less fortunate, 
have joined political party-run associations.  Large numbers of small-scale private 
organizations have appeared in Argentina’s communities.  In the end, the differences 
made among associations are also difference among people and those ifferences are 
                                                      




laden with social meanings (Ikegami 2005).  Changes to Argentina’s associational sector 
also hold important implications, shaping the conditions for participation and for social 
relations.   
While this chapter has superficially traced the political and economic context for 
changes to associations, civic work, and participation in urban Argentina, the rest of thi  
dissertation will explore how Villa Campo’s associational sector is as much a symbolic 
field of meanings as it is a field of social interaction; and this supports the main theme of 
this dissertation, namely the necessity of certain hierarchy in processes of 
democratization.  As I will show, civic work, and the social-coded meanings it produces, 
draws upon understandings of both the recent past as well as aspirations for the future.  
Ultimately, these changes entail the rise of new types of civic work and the creation of 
new social relations in the civic settings of urban Argentina.  For while associ tions may 
no longer generally be viewed as a “sites of social struggle,” there is much contention and 
negotiation over what constitutes civic work—struggles that involve understandings of 








Almost hidden to the outside observer, throughout the locality’s associational activities, 
were the Politicos.18  There were a few political party and municipality buildings; plain 
concrete buildings usually without decoration.  Mainly, there were attempts by other 
community leaders to keep the Politicos outside of initiatives because of the prevailing 
opinion that they “close” initiatives.  These days, the political network does not seem to 
incite civic participation in Villa Campo; residents interested in a specific municipal 
program and project come, however they generally seemed to be casual participants.  
This associational sector provided a resource for finding work, emergency money, food, 
and housing materials.  With these particular activities, most of the interactions were 
asymmetrical.  
 The space was, primarily, a clientelistic space.  In this chapter, I mainly refer to 
political brokers and not to the medical and school administrators, or even the people 
involved in political movements necessarily.  The leaders in the political network usually 
tantalized residents with access to government welfare programs and merchandise.  
Through these politicos people could get many things, from schoolbooks, help with 
electrical bills, and materials for people’s homes.  There were both good and bad 
examples of this phenomenon: there were “bad” punteros that have the political 
connections, but use it to their personal gain (for example selling goods that are supposed 
to be given out to people in the community for free), and good punteros that have the 
                                                      
18  Politicos in this dissertation refers to anyone working for a political party, in power or not, of a political 
party movement.   
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political connections but are responsible towards the people they serve.  For example, as 
noted in Chapter 2, Flor had some punteros visit her when she was in a desperate 
situation and offer to pay her electricity bills for a while; when she refused to attend a 
dangerous demonstration, they made her pay back all the “help” that they had given her.  
On the other hand, there was once a politico who upon hearing her decision to go to 
school came and gave her schoolbooks and supplies, and never asked for anything back, 
not even political support. 
Residents viewed the Politicos in stark opposition to the other associational 
settings described in the two preceding chapters.  In this network, regulated participation 
took place, leaders generally capitalized on what they had to offer, and they carefully 
chose which residents to work with according to two residents who I spoke to—i.e., the 
people who are least likely to complain.  Here, residents were regularly expect d to not 
openly bargain, but reciprocate in some way; although whether it was an equal exchange 
in quality and value was never entirely clear.  Usually, the residents that got involved in 
this network were generally poorer and not viewed as “respectable” by the other resid nts 
that I talked to, particularly the independent Flor, because they were viewed as p ople 
who “sold themselves” to others—this was as much due to the semi-legal status of many 
of these activities that made it a particularly anxious associational space.  The Politicos 
harbored the disingenuousness and corruption that many residents of Villa Campo 
associated with the negative aspects of politics.  One of the most common terms used to 
describe participation in the political network by local people was “selling out,” a phrase 
that refers to the manipulation and corruption that is exuded in these networks (“quieren 
manejar la gente”).  By extension, the people working in this network—both the 
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punteros and the people that work for them—were widely perceived by everyone who 
was not a Politico, as unscrupulous and dishonest people.   
 The Politicos were obviously not politically marginal, yet they occupied a 
strongly stigmatized location in the community’s associational field.  Early on, the 
politicos association with the municipality marked its disreputable space.  As Chapters 4 
and 5 argue, participation in the political network provided religious and the Naranja 
leaders with examples against which to present themselves. 
 However, participants in the political network were not passively defined by their 
low position in the community’s associational hierarchy.  Indeed, in this chapter I argue 
that the political network was a space where the residents who participated in th se 
networks many times actively challenged the prejudices produced in other associational 
settings that marked them as lowly and dishonest.  The political network was an 
association dealing in blurred boundaries.  Whereas Villa Campo’s associations had 
identity-coded exclusiveness (the religious associations) or a vertical aura (Manejo), the 
practices by the Politicos had been marked as both cheap and shoddy, the people leading 
it dishonest and devious.  However, leaders in this network regularly tried to separate 
themselves from these images, through claiming themselves to be honest, forthright, 
representative, and having “la gente” foremost in their thoughts.19  In the process, these 
leaders challenged a fundamental set of underlying ideas about themselves and their low 
civic position by their displays of authenticity and conveying levels of respect to which 
they felt they are entitled.  Within a field of democratization, the Politicos served as a 
space where the expressions of democratization were used, but often to confuse its 
                                                      
19Patricio Korzeniewicz made the point, “Isn’t this what participants in any type of social network would 




meaning rather than uphold its principles.  Nevertheless, in contrast to both the 
Religiosos and Naranjas, I characterize the Politicos as generally a space that is at least 
attempting cross-community organization.  
 At the same time, the people that are in the political network were often limited in 
their resources—both material and cultural—as they disputed this social image.  
Ultimately, I will show that the challenges were largely symbolic.  In fact, the very 
resources and practices the Politicos used to challenge their bad image were frequntly 
the very same ones that distinguished them from mainstream society. 
 
Social Organization and the Opening of Symbolic Boundaries 
The Politicos was a site of symbolic struggles.  Rather than characterize Villa Campo as a 
space of power battles (which it is most certainly was), instead I view it as a theatre for 
the performance of social struggle.  Much like the city, which de Certeau portrays as 
being “left prey to contradictory movements that counterbalance and combine themselves 
outside the reach of panoptic power” (1984:95), I show that the symbolism that underlies 
the organization of participation and civic interactions in Villa Campo’s associations 
were similarly vulnerable to the political network’s practices of redefining them.  
 While civic practices in other, well-regarded associational settings involved the 
marking and maintenance of boundaries, with the Politicos I found instead practices that 
blurred boundaries and challenged territories.  For example, de Certeau draws a 
distinction between “forms used in a system” and “the ways of using this system” 
(1984:98), noting that even the most meticulously planned urban space does not fully 
dictate the people’s movement.  By extension, disadvantaged actors within a field—here 
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one simultaneously economically and symbolically—may use standard practices and 
symbolic boundaries in an attempt to turn the system to their own advantage.  In Villa
Campo, the symbolic, political and economic positioning crafted in other associations 
was subject to tampering.  
 In fact, often the participants in the Politicos used the civic ideas and practices in 
other associational settings.  Instead, they claimed the benefits of the associational setting 
while rejecting the negative definitions set upon them.   
 For de Certeau, the strategies of anti-discipline are fragmented and piecemeal and 
it is this nature that makes them elusive to disciplinary power.  By contrast, I want to 
suggest that the “social organization” performed by the participants of thePoliticos was 
in fact strategic, practiced by social actors seeking not to escape but rather redistribute 
positions in social space.  If we return to the concept of field, we might say that the 
participants in these political networks were still engaged in the game, they wer  just not 
playing by all the rules.  They engaged in economically induced participation that was 
simultaneously a “symbolic struggle” (Bourdieu 1984:244).  Located toward the bottom 
of the hierarchy in Villa Campo’s associational field, the participants used the Politicos to 
better position themselves by using the markers that made them different.  Th irs was a 
field strategy; they used the association in order to provide for their temporary needs and 
to help them rise in position.   
 
Social Identity and the Politicos in the Associational Field 
The Politicos occupy a peculiar location within the field of associations in Villa Campo.  
It was a space that was perceived as a backward, low-grade form of politics.  It was an 
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active associational place, generating economic and political profits for the leaders and 
power for the political parties (as well as linkages to the state and material id for local 
participants), but at the same time it was an indisputably low-status social spae 
associated with low-class people and cheap antics.  It was a deeply-classed as ociational 
space where the predominantly poor participants were viewed as human barometers of 
the low cultural and moral levels in this political network. 
 
 
Photo of people waiting outside of a soup kitchen funded by the municipality. 
 
The Downfall of the Lowly Network 
Much like the Religiosos, the Politicos were a product of population growth.  The 
political network was an example of the dramatic changes the population increase has 
brought to Villa Campo’s landscape, both physical and social.  The political party 
network was integral in the 1980s when Villa Campo’s relations with the municipality, 
alongside the work of the Consejo de la Comunidad, were good.  Once the local leaders 
in Villa Campo wanted to “go-it alone” because the Consejo became very “political” in 
1989 the area was visited by new associational forces and gave way to a new 
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associational landscape; thus began the development of the NGO network.  The breakup 
of the popular Consejo is mostly attributed to the selfish political interests of the Politicos 
involved in contrast to the other collective interests of the community participants and 
leaders.   
 Multiple state and political party organizations and joint ventures between these 
and other associations exist, and what appears to be many small associations were i  fact 
developed and run in a large part by two political movements: “Movimiento Evita” and 
“Federación por la Tierra y la Vivienda.”  Altogether, they were popularly known as 
“politicos.” 
 Political brokers were commonly identified as the worst politicos.  The cost of 
maintaining a group of participants (or “clientele”) for political brokers included the 
expense of finding merchandise to distribute.  This varied by the leaders’ political 
connections; the better connections they had, the better merchandise they had access to.   
The majority of the political brokers had partners, often but not always relatives or family 
members.  Their loyal following helped be their “eyes and ears” in the community.  I 
witnessed this one day when a very well-known pu tero entered into a meeting on a new 
water initiative that involved the municipality, incensed that he had not been personally 
invited.  Because of these antics associated with the political party networks, many of 
Villa Campo’s residents regarded the politicos, and many of the participants as dubious 
characters.   
 According to my interviews, the basic organization of activities in the community 
had not changed dramatically over the years, though with the political network’s loss of 
status the manner of operating has changed considerably.  All four of the municipal 
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“technicians” I spoke to hastily differentiated between the politicos and themselves, not 
wanting to be associated with the “political party machines.”  The loss of status was 
linked to the array of corrupt activities of many political brokers; for example, three 
community informants who had received funds from punteros put the costs of being in a 
monthly municipal program through a puntero at 20 to 25 pesos out of the 125 pesos 
received.  It was this kind of illegal, corrupt activity that gave punteros, and by extension, 
politicos, a bad name.  Long-time punteros in the community usually had their zones that 
were given to them directly by the party in power in the municipality.  They had people 
working underneath them as well.  This allowed them to obtain information on 
community residents.  The “standard” payback of participating in a municipal program 
varied from puntero to puntero.      
 
Social Identity and Local Stigma 
Many of the people in the Villa Campo’s political network—ranging from political 
brokers to “responsables” to community participants—were marked in the popular 
mindset as distinct from nonparticipants.  Other community leaders and residents v ewed 
political brokers as unscrupulous and dishonest.  The residents who worked for them 
were understood by fellow residents to be uncultured and morally deviant.  Other people 
participating in the network, such as residents working for some municipal program 
managed by local brokers, roving politicos spouting ideological positions in the 
community, and even the many community participants, were likewise viewed by fllow
residents as questionable, untrustworthy, and lazy people in the associational lndscape.  
Despite the Politicos’ political connections, the residents still perceived the political party 
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network as a marginal space occupied by disreputable people, located low in the 
symbolic hierarchy of Villa Campo’s associations. 
 In Villa Campo the small-scale political brokers were objects of suspicion perhaps 
because of the explosion of non-governmental associations in the community.  Friends 
and acquaintances in Villa Campo would frequently fill me with stories about 
unscrupulous behavior by political brokers whom they perceived as callous in the pursuit 
of profits.  A middle-aged couple told me such a story one day over mate, describing in 
detail an outrageous political broker who asked for 100 pesos for the right to participate 
in a municipal program for impoverished families, where the family would only be given 
250 pesos.  This was the social reality of poor communities, the couple warned me, and a 
social reality they attached to the Politicos.20   
 Increasingly, the Politicos were closely associated with the larg numbers of the 
poorest members participating in the network and who now had become emblematic of 
the network’s disreputable reputation.  The more established political brokers in the 
community were mostly older or middle-aged men and women, people who belonged to a 
political party or movement or former municipal, or state-sector, contract workers.21  One 
well-known puntero in the barrio got his job through his “close relationship” with a 
former municipal mayor that still holds a degree of power.  
 Indeed, the majority of residents actually participating in this associati nal 
network were often women, mainly single mothers.  These women and men either 
worked, or not, depending on the program, the puntero and adherence to the rules, for 
about 150-250 pesos a month.  Residents told me that these programs usually provided a 
                                                      
20  As noted in Chapter One, much of the scholars who study poor communities in Argentina would agree 
with them (i.e. Auyero, Cavarozzi, Merklen). 
21  According to my research based on the four punteros that I met. 
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needed supplemental income to the small regular incomes; they could not live on this 
little alone.  Often there was food provided by the Politicos, at times to try to ensure that 
the community participants would not need to leave during political activities, not even to 
eat. 
 Collectively, these community participants had come to represent the political 
network and its difference from the more formal, and higher-status, associations such as 
the NGO network.  As discussed in Chapters 1, identity formulations are fundamentally 
linked to social distinctions, and the participants of the Politicos served as a crucial
contrast to which other associational participants were expected to distinguih 
themselves.  I witnessed the people participating in the political party network perform a 
behavior that linked them with moral deviance and the “impolite” behavior associated 
with poor people.  As a result, the behavior and appearances of these community 




Photo of a meeting for a community water project in which the municipality was 




With the Politicos, the focus on participant’s bodies reached new extremes, in part 
because the appearance of participants alone showed their support.  The use of people’s 
bodies went from trying to get high turnouts to events in order to “show” support, to one 
puntero in particular giving out food and housing materials in exchange for sexual favors. 
 These performances were subtly translated into social distinctions.  Many of Villa 
Campo residents I spoke with viewed the appearances of the residents who participated 
with the Politicos as having morally questionable character and low social position.  This 
point was clearly illustrated for me during many conversations with Flor and other 
women who frequently expressed their disdain for many of the people participating in the 
political network, leaders and participants.  “These people lead a bad lifestyle, all th y 
want to do is fool around – party, dance, drink.”  Here social distinctions were supported 
by morally inflected symbolic boundaries (cf. Lamont 1992, 2000).  
 A participant from another associational network even suggested to me that 
participating with the Politicos could taint a person permanently.  She explained that such 
a participant would be unwilling to “work for themselves” and would get bad habits, 
especially in the way of thinking (“tienen otras formas de pensar”).22  Indeed, many Villa 
Campo residents associated Politicos’ community participants with the unethical or 
morally suspect behaviors found in the political networks, such as corruption, swindling, 
taking advantage of people, and irresponsibility.  These participants dropped neatly into a 
popular discourse on ética or individual “character” that identified them as without good 
character, an issue I will return to. 
                                                      
22  This concern about the lack of moral/ethical behavior and brusqueness of participants with the Politic s 
parallels wider discourses about people from the provinces traveling to Buenos Aires in search of work.  I 
heard often from residents that they believed people from the rural provinces to value independence, and 
not easily succumb to the lures of the punteros.     
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 The political brokers and their help were widely perceived as deceptive or “false”, 
both within the network and by those outside.  Residents claimed that these people had 
many caras, crafty ways of speaking meant to deceive ignorant residents.  Many 
participants did not trust these politicos as they commonly tried to skim money off their 
municipal checks.  People in the political network generally appeared to accept that the 
environment was not a place where one could afford to be trustful, and even fellow 
participants regarded one another with suspicion.     
 According to the literature on clientelism in Argentina, punteros are portrayed as 
having a powerful presence in the lives of the residents; however my research in Villa 
Campo indicates that they did not have this powerful sway.  This is perhaps due to the 
fact that there are more associational opportunities than surrounding poor communities, 
or because, as people like to emphasize, turning to a puntero was an act of desperation.  
Community participants usually did not have a high school education.  They frequently 
came from families with very few economic and social resources, and were unemploy d.  
These people often lacked the education and social resources to find formal employment.  
 The often unspoken association of the Politicos with urbanization evoked a 
popular discourse that associates city life with political corruption, moral/ethical 
weakness, welfare dependency, irresponsibility and laziness.  All this is part of a broader 
public discourse on development and ética or individual “character” in Villa Campo that 
differentiates people, classifying people from the provinces (rural) as hardworking, moral 




 At times, the political network was even portrayed as representing a backward, 
primitive form of politics.  The small-scale activities and the form of work Politicos 
engaged in (more on this below) caused people in other associations, who engaged in 
another form of politics, to characterize the political party network as a “low” dark” 
civic form.  They distinguished this associational environment from more reputable—and 
more “advanced”—NGOs, like the Naranjas (which is somewhat managed by a private 
foundation even though euphemistically said to be run by the people in the community).  
The Politicos were not part of the vision of democracy for the leaders in both the 
religious and NGO networks.  In this way, social distinctions were also understood 
through a framework of a transition to a particular, modern version of democracy. 
 Many view the community participants in the political network as being 
dependent, people who are “managed” with the implication that they cannot manage 
themselves.  The participants with the Politicos were, however active participan s in this 
web of civic life, practicing perhaps class organization that helped drive the civic 
practices in other associational settings. 
 
Blurred Boundaries and the Counter Strategies of Social Organization 
The difficulty of making firm distinctions between associations was, in many w ys, part 
of the accepted fabric of Villa Campo.  I have outlined above how the political network 
was a stigmatized space in the associational hierarchy in Villa Campo and its people, and 
their activities were all generally marked as low-class.  This lack of symbolic capital also 
shaped the participation activities and social organization of the associational space,
causing political brokers to promote participation strategies that destabilized the 
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distinctions between the Politicos and other, more elevated associational setti gs.  In a 
sense, the Politicos served as a theater for performances of broad-based class 
organization, a space where political brokers and their helpers fought against the 
symbolic distinctions between the Naranjas (Chapter 5) and the Religiosos (Chapter 4) 
and those fabricated in the community (Chapter 6).  The political network was a “theater” 
in the sense that it was where symbolic boundaries were dismantled.  The Politicos 
performed in a space where the expressions of civic engagement were deploye , but to 
confound its principles rather than to uphold them. 
 
Questions of Authenticity 
It was part of the nature of the growing civic life in Villa Campo to challenge 
boundaries.23  For example, the NGO network focused on public works, which was 
normally the job of the municipality. 
 The Politicos did not necessarily challenge the cultural understandings that were 
used to distinguish their network from other associational networks; rather they tried to 
reposition the Politicos and its activities with respect to those symbolic boundaries.  In 
the process, they would challenge the position of other associations in Villa Campo’s 
field.  For example, one of the many distinctions that political brokers and particints 
would complicate was that between “political” and “social” activities.  The Politicos I 
interviewed and observed commanded a large repertoire of pitches that asserted the 
                                                      
23  There were, of course, boundaries that community leaders were invested in maintaining.  The most 
obvious was the distinction between inside and outside activists.  Only insiders, who would be consistent in 
their participation and who were friends with the key leaders, would be included in meetings and important 
discussions.  Differences in treatment between insider  and outsiders were substantial and community 
leaders regularly made judgments about people who came to the community and asked questions.  The 
result was two patterns of interactions, and the boundary between the two types of interactions was 
carefully policed by fellow community leaders.   
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“authenticity” of themselves and their activities.  This included telling me up front that 
they were put in prison during the military dictatorship for their political activities as well 
as describing their personal “politicization” stories.  
 Participants in the political network would regularly cross boundaries separating 
these political network and other, better-regarded associational networks, like churches 
and non-governmental organizations.  Because Manejo was the better-known and 
ironically the most threatening entity in Villa Campo’s associational hierarchy, it served 
as the primary target of criticism over its “non-participatory” actions in the community.  
For example, in an environmental project that involved the municipality, the community 
participants, many of whom were involved in the political network, were very critical of 
Manejo because of its perceived business orientations and shallow forms of participation. 
 These distinctions—between genuine and false leaders, between quality and 
“theatric” activities, and especially the activities between those carried out by the 
“socials” and those carried out by the “politicos”—were fundamental to the associational 
field in Villa Campo and the positions allocated within it.  The socials described 
themselves as not having an ideological agenda and just wanting to help people 
effectively; the “politicals” wanted to transform a class-structured society.  
 Socials were far more interested in maintaining the boundaries, while the politicos 
emphasized the commonalities.  By asserting the value of their activities and, as the next 
section will show, themselves, the Politicos wanted to rearrange the relationa  positions 
of Villa Campo’s associational field.  They did not suggest that they had as much funds 
as Manejo, but rather their speech suggested that these other associations, mainly non-
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governmental organizations, were really just a façade.  Underneath that façade, things 
were not so different. 
 
Interacting, Power, and Dignity 
With the Religiosos, social recognition was a crucial part of undermining actual 
hierarchical civic interactions.  However, many times the leaders and community 
participants within the Politico (and often in the NGO network) often did not treat one 
another as equals; there was a lack of mutual respect.  Instead, leader-participant 
interactions within the Politicos at times intimidating power dynamics were present, 
whether it was insisting on sexual favors for housing materials, or giving out promises 
that were never kept.  At one time, a neighbor, Sofia, wanted to organize cleaning up the 
garbage from a field; but to do so she needed to obtain a truck from the municipality for 
such purposes.  She could only do this through a puntero who repeatedly insisted that he 
would get one for her.  The truck never came.  Sofia said this was another example of 
how the “politicos” do not do anything. 
 This interaction displayed many standard features of participant interactions in the 
Politicos.  Within the political network, the community participants did not consider that 
they had a negotiating role.  Residents just assumed that political brokers and their 
helpers tried to take as much as possible in order to take advantage of their positions.  
There was often mutual disrespect expressed between the political brokers in particular, 
and residents.  Many leaders within the political network would exclaim how 
irresponsible residents were and would frequently complain about how they were 
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working from their heart and not getting any benefits. One puntero told me, “People here 
are lazy.” 
 These interactions at times contained mild disagreements and arguments, yet they 
were always remarkably delicate in nature, and, as far as I observed never dissolved into 
open conflict.  However, participant interactions would at times exceed the limits of 
normal rituals and routines, revealing an underlying set of tensions that speaks to 
struggles over social positions and claims to respect.  Earlier in this chapter, I described 
many of the negative opinions about the Politicos—and especially the “punteros”—held 
by Villa Campo residents.  It was relatively rare for community residents to insult or 
challenge a political broker outright, in part because they were perceived as powerful and 
vicious.  A resident who ‘speaks her mind’ might be cut off from social welfare programs 
and not be able to access them in the future, or worse.  The instances when customers 
openly expressed their disdain to the Politicos directly were only related to me, nothing 
that I observed directly.  Punteros who treated making “promises” as nothing more than a 
game, with no relation to what they actually planned to do, were viewed as both bad and 
disrespectful.  Community residents would accuse them as being insincere, or being a
“punto negro.”  Two punteros specifically were labelled “puntos negros” both by 
residents and fellow “compañeros” in the political network. 
 These “puntos negros” in the political network themselves often characterized the 
residents as dangerous, untrustworthy and lacking dignity.  Like many leaders in other 
associational settings in Villa Campo, the Politicos often viewed residents as adversaries 
against whom they must plan.  In the project meetings with the municipality, the local 
political leaders would grumble about the lack of concern and participation of the 
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residents, the community participants would later tell me that the small turnout was 
because these political leaders did not bother to invite people.  One political broker talked 
to me as if he was speaking in confidence, that the residents do not have culture, that the 
mentality of the people has to change because they do not want to work and they have to 
learn how to “vivir mas dignamente” (to live with more dignity).  
 
Conclusion 
Within Villa Campo’s field of associations, the Politicos occupied a low position.  
Political brokers and the people associated with them were strongly viewed as dishonest 
and disreputable people.  Villa Campo residents viewed their activities as necessary at 
times, but of low quality in contrast to associations where oversight, leadership, and 
associational policies ensured at least a demonstration of professionalism.  It was the bad 
image of the political network and its unscrupulous, unrestrained political brokers again t 
which religious associations and non-governmental organizations could define 
themselves as a sort of haven from an immoral, and, at times, heartless, place.  
 Nevertheless, for the Politicos, the boundaries between “authentic” participation 
and theater, even between associations themselves and the political network, were 
muddled and redrawn on a daily basis.  These activities were in part a response to the 
Politicos’ lack of status, so they trespassed across boundaries that divided their network 
from other larger and better-financed associations in order to assert the value of their 
activities, and of themselves as honest, hard-working people.  These practices were not 
simply reactive however; in many ways, the activities deployed by the Politicos drove the 
civic activities found in the other associations.  The Politicos were especially effective at 
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meshing the activities they did and the activities in other networks.  They challenged 
other associations’ claims to offer better and more authentic activities.  The Politicos, 
who were often associated with “outsider” activities, were trying to evolve their image 
into being like “insider” organizations such as the Naranjas (for more discussion on 
“insiders” and “outsiders” see Korzeniewicz and Smith 2004). 
 Yet if the Politicos were somewhat successful at blurring the boundaries among 
the kinds of activities they and others perform, in the end they were much less succesful 
in challenging the definitions that marked them: unscrupulous, selfish, and manipulative.  
This served to reinforce the symbolic boundaries that made them objectionable. 
Whereas the residents participating in the better-regarded associational networks 
were not necessarily regular participants in the political network, they were from the 
same poor class ‘struggling to make ends meet’; they were people who might also—and 
at least one time most certainly did—patronize the extensive political network.  As the 
Chapter 6 will show, this very real socio-political competition, particularly between the 
Naranjas and the Politicos, had begun to drive new discussions in Villa Campo for 
associational participants increasingly realized the potential of the new div rse 
associational field in which they participated.  The leaders of Manejo also recognized that 
the symbolic capital their association had commanded was threatened by their social 
nearness to the Politicos.  As the next chapter will demonstrate, people in the community 
began to create civic practices themselves, seeking to distinguish themselves from 
untrustworthy politicos while using the language and tools acquired from participation 




Chapter 4:  Civic Work and Creation of Civic Understanding 
 
Introduction 
Appearing all over Villa Campo’s streets, churches and parishes constituted an ever-
evolving associational sector, and they were where the vast majority of the resid nts 
participated.  Religious associations were the most popular associational form in this poor 
community and are commonly known for being hierarchical and generally vertical.  
There were different choices of participation venues within religious activities and 
services, and many offered some financial or material aid and a place where residents 
come to tend to their material needs and problems. 
 The activities and services that appeared across the religious associational sector 
were everything from the lures of spiritual salvation and transformation to mental and 
physical health services to the meeting of basic material needs.  Help with add ctions and 
family problems could be found among the evangelical groups, and a vast selection of 
churches and parishes offered hope and a better afterlife.  These religious associations 
were growing (particularly the evangelical churches) and, out of all the associ tions, they 
had most of the residents’ interest.   
However, it was with the Catholic network--where I spent most of my time--that 
most of the historical (it was the first association in V lla Campo) civic initiatives were 
rooted; leadership and co-listening programs and other markers of civic work and 
education—human rights seminars and programs.  As for personal attention, they 
discretely offered customized help for people who were going through tough times.  
These practical services were clearly targeted at the average Villa Campo resident, of 
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whom in 2001 reportedly had a 40% chance of being in extreme poverty (2001 national 
census).   
 The popular nature of these religious associations was shown from the behavior of 
the participants.  Community members in religious associations were much more likely to 
show ownership of activities done in their associations; whenever they talked about their 
participation they would refer to “nosotros” (us).  In addition, the residents’ status was 
respected from the behaviors of the religious leaders.  Therefore, even though at the 
associational level, religious networks were vertical--hierarchical relations were 
understood by those involved-- in Villa Campo personal interactions were often 
horizontal—leaders were demonstrably respectful and generally used active listening 
rather than active talking as was common in the other two networks.  The act of 
acompañamiento (accompanying), and the attentive, deferential interactions of religious 
leaders with residents were instigators of new, civic spaces in an urbanized Villa Campo.  
 
Of course, participation in religious associations is civic work—these associ tions 
affect democratization.  Certainly, the Religiosos’ accessible, welcoming spaces and 
spiritual services set them apart from the other participatory environments like Manejo.  
However, as this chapter seeks to demonstrate, the conflicts between the Religiosos 
affected the relational organization of civic work within the social environment.   
Leaders in this associational network generally distinguished themselves and their 
particular church from all the others—usually in order to attract more partici nts.  In 
fact, when I started research as a participant-observer in the Evangelical n twork, a leader 
told me that I would find their parish much better than the Catholic Church, a long-
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embedded associational network.  He suggested that the “hierarchical” leaders at th  
Catholic Church did not want to impart knowledge to people, whereas the evangelicals 
upheld that leaders treat residents with respect.  The leader added, “You will have to 
spend time with us to understand the (cultural) difference.”  
 Those distinctive religious cultures were laden with civic meanings conveyed 
through the actions of the participants.  This chapter explores two different types of civic 
work in the religious network.  In terms of developing an exclusive community, some 
religious leaders tried to enforce a code (usually dress) through which community 
participants were expected to distinguish themselves from community particin s in 
other religious settings.  In most of the religious associations, a new, fostered conception 
of identity combined with the imagery of personal transformation to convey powerful 
meanings.  For example, the bodies and dispositions of some of the evangelical and other 
religious participants were to distinguish them from the Catholic participants. 
 Yet, there was often recognition of social responsibility.  In Villa Campo, the 
religious leaders often performed acts that recognized residents’ socially-based claims to 
dignity and respect.  This symbolic recognition of residents’ social position and their 
entitlement to dignity and respect simultaneously produced elements of democratization 
for both the collective and the individual citizen as I will further explain below. 
 Combined, these two types of civic work put the Religiosos in a direct dialogue 
with the locality’s other associational settings and their participation practices.  Leaders, 
members, and residents alike distinguished themselves through contrasts with what they 
clearly were not.  For if Manejo was regarded as a symbol of paternalism, w th no true 
participation, the Catholic Church clergy by contrast endeavored to represent a Villa 
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Campo populated by not only “la gente” or even “los pobres” but by a population with 
potential for transformation to be protagonists that can be unveiled with “the right pus .”  
Religioso leaders were equally anxious to distinguish both their members and their 
services from the morally suspect Politicos, the subject of Chapter 5.  In the Religioso 
network, discourses of identity, transformation, and constructions of “right conduct” 
converged on the associational floor to challenge the symbolic boundaries of societal 
class difference and develop human dignity.   
 This chapter presents the contradictions of the civic work that religious 
associations in Villa Campo perform.  On the one hand, religious leaders often create 
differences between denominations, and sometimes even between individual churches.  
These divisions do not indoctrinate the democratic trait of inclusiveness.  On the other 
hand, religious leaders have been essential in providing symbolic capital to a population 
who is not commonly given recognition.   
 
Diverse Forms of Civic Participation 
As earlier chapters have suggested, civic work is invigorated with the rise of a 
diverse associational space for civic-seeking residents.  The second chapter argued that 
because associational outlets were historically scarce in Villa Campo, residents’ 
patronage was a non-issue and leaders instead directed their organizational energies 
towards the state and its bureaucratic, distributive hierarchy and funding agencies.  At 
predominantly externally-run associations like the Naranja network, some ele nts of the 
past have persisted well into the new civic period in the way they try to mobilize 
participation for their initiatives.  Many of the religious associations, by contrast, actively 
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orient themselves to a changing field in order to respond to the particular needs of the 
residents.  Religious associations attract residents by offering a participatory environment 
that affirms claims of dignity and respect.  The Catholic parish and nuns, generally 
acknowledged by both the participants and community leaders that I interviewed as Villa
Campo’s most important, and probably most influential, association, serves as a prime 
example of how associations stake out their place in the emerging civic landscape of 
contemporary Villa Campo.   
 
Religiosos and the Rise of Villa Campo 
The Catholic Church, as a set of nuns and a priest, essentially came during the period of 
Argentina’s “Return to Democracy.”  The nuns came in 1982 and the priest first came in 
1985 and opened the doors of the first parish.  As the first Religiosos that lived in the 
area, from the start these Catholics distinguished themselves from the previous, more 
formal, Catholic clergy that worked in the area, and the scheming, clientelistic 
interactions that are still part of Villa   Campo’s associational environment.  These 
catholic leaders explicitly sought to work with the poor in a manner that was more ab ut 
accompanying, rather than organizing, the poor.  While a growing number of newer 
Christian churches and parishes have encroached upon the Catholic Church’s offering f 
a religious experience in Villa Campo, the catholic network appeared more devoted to the 
community (for example, they chose to live in the community), and the people living in 
the community more than any other associational network. 
 Usually, the Priest and the Hermanas (the nuns) worked independently from one 
another, and had two different roles in the community, different sets of participants and 
different types of “training.”  The priest is in charge of the parish and the Hermanas have 
89 
 
small initiatives throughout the locality.  At times, there were conflicts be ween these two 
sets of Catholic leaders (usually dealing with personality and gender issues), b t never 
enough to cause a full collapse of relations.  As reported to me many times by catholic 
leaders and participants, the majority of the catholic community members’ participation 
was inconsistent, with a small number of active members, producing many changes and 
uncertainties in the association and it is now unclear whether the Catholic Church is 
going to maintain its leading associational position in the locality.  So far, it has
successfully initiated and run a number of small projects within the Villa Campo itself 
and has also linked these initiatives to other communities. 
 While I was in Villa Campo, maintaining an array of small and specific initiatives 
was a fundamental element of the catholic leaders’ method that made it an association 
that was distinct from the rest.  Like many of the associations in the area, the Hermanas 
made careful decisions about which activities they would focus on.  What they focused 
on ranged from internationally-recognized programs to ones developed in Villa Campo; 
some activities widely well-known and others were new.  Flexible participation 
guidelines enabled local catholic participants to come and go; the Hermanas conducted 
regular reflection sessions in which they asked for feedback on their activities to, ensure 
their activities enjoyed sufficient popularity with the (predominantly catholic) 
participants.24  The Catholic leaders’ reputation for competence has made their initiatives 
attractive to funders; they receive small-scale funding to support their projects from both 
religious and non-religious funding agencies.   
                                                      
24  Through these reflection processes, the Hermanas established successful activities—for example, a 
mental health center.   
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The activities of the Hermanas were of a subtle quality; they tried to stick to the 
background as much as possible.  The Hermanas had an indirect role in forming 
associations; they start something and then they leave it alone.  The vast majority of the 
community leadership of the Naranja network originated out of the initiatives of the nuns.  
One of the Hermanas explained that they generally handed over the running of projects to 
the people themselves, including applying and managing funds.  This distinguishes the 
Catholic leaders from the other leaders, particularly the Politicos.  The Hermanas noted 
that the practice of opening the management of projects to the members of the 
community exposed them to the threat that finances might be used for things other than 
the project, such as buying groceries.  Rather than stake a reputation on coming out with 
“successful” projects, the Hermanas gave active community participants a choice of 
recognized and identifiable positions and activities often unavailable elsewhere in the 
locality.  Within the initiatives of the nuns, community participants actually pla ed a role 
in the decision-making process. 
 Not only did the Catholic leaders offer civic-training activities, they also had 
distinctively democratic leadership practices.  Two of the community leaders that I 
interviewed claimed that the most significant legacy of the nuns’ connectio with Villa 
Campo could be found in their personnel practices, which had propagated a new style of 
leadership in Villa Campo’s associational sector—principally the “secular” leadership of 
the NGO network.  As one leader explained, the Hermana’s participatory practices 
sharply distinguished them from the others (like Manejo, for example).  The Hermanas 
transmitted civic skills and experience, well before this practice became o mon in Villa 
Campo.  Part of this was because of an ideology that places an importance on both 
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treating people with dignity (with particular attention to the poor) and an emphasis on 
education, as well as an importance on reflecting on one’s actions.  All the Catholic 
leaders took their work very seriously, meeting with members and often discussing work 
matters as they ate.  (At the Naranja network, leaders could frequently be found amo g 
themselves, not directly dealing with community members.)  Not only did the Catolics 
cater to the people that live in the community, but also the Catholic leaders were careful
to convey that they themselves had a leadership style characterized by ethics and 
dedication. 
 Participants obviously arrived at the religious associations for different reasons 
than at the Naranjas, although this sometimes had little direct connection with the faith.  
Sometimes it was for basic material needs such as food and shelter, or legal and social 
support.  With the idea of setting up a Basic Christian Community, the Hermanas began 
adopting distinctively emancipatory participation practices.  This involved an 
associational model that shifted much of the responsibility for much of civic partici tion 
and education from the leaders to the community members.  The idea behind basic 
Christian communities was to focus on building community.  Catholic lay members 
generally have no formal training in the running of the Church.  Despite the Priest being 
initially against the idea of basic communities, the nuns started holding catechism and 
Bible classes in people’s homes.  
  
There were of course forms of verticalism within, and among, the Religiosos.  It was
shown that despite the fact that the Religiosos had almost no ability to pay wages;
participants were emotionally and morally bound to the religion and the leaders, who in
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effect exercised a control over their participation activities.  As will be discussed below, 
there were regulations and parameters for participation.  Usually the top religious leaders 
enforced standards through assistants, middle women and men who roamed the 
community, helping to resolve difficulties and problems but also checking in with 
community participants.  Leaders were committed to increasing spiritual growth in a 
particular religion, and helped plan particular goals for individual community 
participants.  In addition, even though many times community participants were not 
obligated to contribute financially to the religious association, they were still xpected to 
contribute what they could; sometimes, in the case of many evangelical churches, in 
order to receive a blessing.  Community participants were expected to participate n only 
one religious association, learn and conform to the religion’s behavioral expectations and 
attend religious training classes as well as other meetings and events. 
 The fact was that community participants served as one of the religious 
associations’ key resources for the growth of their particular religious c mmunity—a 
view, albeit perhaps cynical, that can be transferred to any of the discussed as ociations.  
Despite their seemingly open and informal relationship with the residents participating in 
Villa Campo, leaders sometimes regulated the activities in the streets as carefully as they 
did in the activities in the religious association itself.  The rest of this chapter will explore 
the nature of the religious associations’ relationship to the community partici nts and 
how civic work in these associations was organized to produce the civic meanings 
appropriate to a diverse associational setting.  Community participants were integral to 
the creation of those meanings; particularly the type of participant—socially responsible 
93 
 
and sufficiently inspired by the religious teachings and the leaders—was suited to b  
involved in civically servicing the population of Villa Campo.  
 
Selling Personal Attention: The Evangelical Movement 
The evangelical movement is growing in Villa Campo, along with the rest of Greater 
Buenos Aires (Semán 2006), over the past decade.  One evangelical member described it 
is as the “non-hierarchical” church.  Because of its high participation rates, the 
evangelical churches’ influence is substantial, besides religious affiliation being 
important to social status.  “People are going to the evangelical church because the 
Catholic leaders just do not seem that involved in people’s lives anymore,” explained a 
manager of a community cooperative, who originally had been a member of a Catholic 
youth group where many community initiatives began.  Either given or contributing to 
the popularity of the evangelical church, as well as other churches and temples, were all 
over Villa Campo.  I participated in two different evangelical church services, largely due 
to the efforts of Flor’s sisters.   
 





Luz, one of the sisters, in her late forties has participated in the evangelicl 
movement for several years.  Separated with eight children and several grandchildren, she 
found a lot of solace in her church which was a mega-church with a lot of music and 
activity.  Rosa, her other sister, another single woman in her late fifties, had been a 
founding member of a small evangelical church (which given the recent evangelic l 
phenomenon, she was almost a veteran evangelical).25  There was also Alfonso and 
Sandra (Rosa’s daughter) who were in their thirties and had four children who were 
members of this church.  Originally, they had all been members of a Catholic Cur h, 
where they met their present pastor (a former member of the Catholic clergy) and decided 
to follow him when he changed his religious identity.  All of them volunteered at their 
church, and gave as much money to their churches as they could; at times, they receiv d 
aid from the pastors, usually in terms of spiritual healing.  Each evangelical church set up 
its own unique financial arrangements; usually community participants were expected to 
finance the church and pay for the pastor and in some cases they were forced to pay a 
specific tithe according on their salaries to the church, though at other times this was not 
the case.  For such maintenance of the church, and to increase participation, these 
community participants often volunteered as much as possible for the church, selling 
food and going door-to-door in order to help convince other to join. 
 Because participation spaces among the religious associations were delineated 
according to denomination, they were domains largely controlled by both the 
                                                      
25  Religious associations experienced considerable and continuous turnover among community 
participants.  The evangelical leader I interviewed did not specify how many people on average the church 
had each week, though he did acknowledge that fluctuated a lot.  He explained that some left to go to 
different evangelical churches because of internal conflicts, or they wanted different (more strict) rules, and 
some left to start other churches.  
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church/parish and religious leaders, and as a result religious leaders and avid community 
members could be a continuous presence in community members’ lives.  Sometimes 
religious leaders’ approval was needed for activities and other routine matters and in the 
evangelical church, leaders and assistants would regularly inspect community participants 
for compliance with church policies and standards.  Pastors and other top religious 
leaders would periodically check-in on people directly involved in the church or parish.  
Avid community members took the responsibility of supplying members and monitoring 
participation.  Non-evangelicals were continually pressured to join, myself included.  
This worried the Catholic clergy, and there were many cases when over-eager Catholic 
members would tell on fellow members who were associating with Evangelical l aders. 
 Typically, dealing with members—introducing activities, managing projects and 
programs, negotiating participation, and trying to fend off abandonment—took up much 
of the time of the leaders.  This aspect of work at the religious associations will be
considered in the context of civic work later in the chapter.  However, I found 
Evangelical members were often preoccupied with other matters that related to promoting 
their religious community.  From the few services that I attended, this was emphasized by 
the leaders as something that they should do.  They would compare their membership 
numbers with those of other churches and parishes (something that some churches 
strongly encouraged by talking about the “growth” of membership and the need to attract 
more people) across Villa Campo, and they regularly visited residents not involved in 
their church to try to pry members from other churches and denominations.  This 
happened one day at home when Flor’s niece and her family came to visit her and urged 
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her to attend their church; I could hear Flor shouting in frustration from another rom.
“Nobody can ever tell me what I have to do!”     
I do not want to portray that it was often easy to find out how evangelical 
members were involved in their churches; how much they paid, what the pastors 
personally told them, and so on.  Perhaps they were afraid of judgment.  It was only after 
I had established myself as trustworthy in this regard that they began to relax with me. 
 
Denominational Differences and the Jealousy of Leaders 
Despite the religious associations being separated along the lines of denomination a d 
often by the actual church, I found that within these associations the range of activities 
available to participants were more flexible.  In contrast to Manejo, I did not find the 
Religiosos as regimented, and that mistakes and shortcomings were allowed.  
Participations roles were less limited than in other associations, and there awid r range 
in the extent of participation involvement.  People came to services when they could, they 
arrived and left during services, tardiness was completely accepted.  Following services, 
which were generally used to proclaim religious doctrine and to exhort members to better 
their behavior and values, members would tidy up the church or parish and chat with one 
another.  According to my observations, community participants were much more likely 
to have a sense of ownership in religious associations.      
Perhaps because of such identity construction, participants in religious 
associations were far more cohesive groups than the participants in the Naranja network.  
Yet all the competition in the community between religious associations surprisingly did 
not result in a society completely fragmented by religion.  Turnover and change in levels 
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of participation and participants meant, similar to the NGO network, religious networks 
were not necessarily all-embracing and long-standing.  Perhaps the stronge  indication of 
the lack of fragmentation among neighbors in different religious affiliations was the way 
residents, at the end of it all, accepted others’ paths.  Once while I was havinga 
stimulating conversation on religion and spirituality with an evangelical couple a 
neighbor who was an active member of the Catholic Church came and joined us; they 
discussed trying out different churches, having a diverse religious network of friends and 
neighbors, being able to discuss and accept differences of opinion, and learning though 
each other (the catholic woman visited an evangelical leader who helped her with 
depression).  They all agreed that sometimes leaders “s  ponen celosos”, but the people 
(community residents) do not usually get involved in their pettiness.  They all agreed that 
Christ never looked for a particular religion; he did not care what religion you belnged 
to.  The Catholic neighbor said “nadie me obliga”, explaining why she goes to different 
churches.  The evangelical woman quoted an African Apostle from memory: “L s lideres 
no dejen crecer el pueblo… Los lideres ponen un límite.”  I  was generally believed that it 
was the religious leaders were fragmented and divisive, and it was this which had the 
potential to create a tense and competitive environment in the religious field.  
As I discussed in Chapter 1, conceptions of identity have become integral to the 
organization of new associational life in contemporary Villa Campo.  In particular, 
religious identity has come to powerfully communicate social boundaries in partici tory 
settings through imagery associated with Villa Campo’s shift from a limited to a diverse 
associational society.  Religious associations rely upon certain norms to choregraph the 
behaviors and dispositions of their participation base, in the process distinguishing 
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themselves from other participatory settings located in the social environment.  As David 
Smilde wrote of the evangelical networks in Venezuela: “Evangelical churches generally 
have some sort of service every day of the week, and membership is considered an all-
encompassing identity that should sharply distinguish the adherent from ‘the world’” 
(2005:760).  This is often done in conspicuously divisive ways on the part of leaders.  In 
the associational sector, religion becomes a strategic tool on one side for the crea ion of 
social division, yet on the other hand, for cohesion between people in a particular 
religious setting. 
 In religious associations, leaders referenced an image of the “other” as they 
sought to secure a position at the top of the religious associational hierarchy.  Bot  
evangelical and catholic leaders engaged in this practice.  The main catholic priest was 
particularly prone to making fun of, or criticizing, evangelicals.  Six times, I witnessed 
when Catholic members, and even the nuns, would criticize the Priest for putting down 
their neighbors and family members who were evangelical, and argue that he should 
respect other people’s paths. 
 
Good Christians and Creative Subjects 
Leaders in the religious network (perhaps unconsciously) deployed two forms of control 
designed to produce and maintain clear symbolic power between their particular church’s 
network and other community associational networks.  One was aimed at standardizig 
styles of dress (as in the case of some evangelical churches), and the second was 
exposure to what might be called leadership’s practices of “subjectification,” which was 
aimed at making participants manage themselves.  Here, my analysis draws particularly 
from the work of Meyer and Rowan.  From the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977), I 
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utilize their discussion on the effects of institutional norms on organizational structures 
and social legitimation. 
In these religious associations, leaders used images such as heaven and hell, and 
spirit and form to encourage participants to become individuals who did not just appear to 
be, but in fact were good citizens and good people.  It was through this imagery that 
religious leaders on the one hand allowed for transformational experiences to occur, and 
on the other hand played the powerful role of shaping beliefs.    
Identity or cultural norms were meant to make distinctions among groups of 
religious members.  On the one hand there were the happy, self-focused, skirt-wearing 
evangelicals, and on the other hand there were the serious, depressing, hierarchical, 
collectively-minded Catholics.  In all these cases, stereotypes were form d to maintain an 
easily visible distinction the religious association’s members and nonmembers in Villa 
Campo.  Participants’ careful performances served as a clear channel for communicating 
distinctions among religious associations and, by extension, their membership bases.  
Religious discipline, however, was always incomplete.  The limited extent of 
leadership’s claims on members meant that member noncompliance was widesprea  and 
frequent.  As a result, leaders engaged in practices that called up on participants to govern 
their own behavior not out of fear of leaders’ disapproval but rather because such 
behavior accorded with their own sense of self, in the process also distinguishing 
themselves from others.  For example, catholic homes would be full of images of saints 
and virgins, whereas evangelical members would never have any of these images 
because, according to them, that was against God’s wishes.  In this way, religious leaders 
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were actually able to enlist participants’ active aid and participation in the production of 
group adhesiveness.   
 Ultimately, the leaders’ emphasized doctrines were to be supported by the 
membership.  Both associational doctrines and the participants’ dispositions operated to 
distinguish the association, through its participants, from other associational settings in 
the locality.  In an effort to secure their position and attract more members, many 
churches cultivated distinctions and tried to mark differences between their members and 
others, while assuring their members spiritual success.  
 
Association and the Creation of Civic Meanings 
Members of religious associations, by virtue of easily visible differences from 
other associational settings, created an aura of associational difference that was 
recognized and discussed by residents.  However, as I argued in Chapter 1, civic work 
operates at two levels: the associational and interactional.  At the level of interactions, 
civic work can produce social differences and commonalities among individuals by 
drawing upon yet also constructing broader social patterns.  Indeed, the interactions 
performed at the religious associations were also a form of civic work, though here the 
creation of civic channels involved the interaction with residents by community 
participants as well.  In a newly diverse associational sector, civic acts performed by 
community members, as well as those organized by the associations, became visible ways 
that recognized residents’ capabilities and value.    
How could so many of my fellow colleagues have missed the critical element of 
religious institutions in the history of Villa Campo?  It is important to remember that this 
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largely underlying networking within this poor community was tied to associatinal 
strategies directly linked to the creation and maintenance of spaces of legitimation and 
civicness for Villa Campo’s population.   
 
Symbolic Capital, Civic Work and the Performance of Transmitting Civicness 
It is “symbolic capital” which dominant social groups receive as recogniti n that their 
way of life is worthy of esteem (Bourdieu 1990:135).  Conversely, acts of respect from 
privileged individuals towards under-privileged individuals challenge asymmetrical 
social positions.  The way that these religious associations played a criticl role in 
democratization processes was that they transmitted symbolic capital to poor members.  
The people that I interviewed, both Protestants and Catholics, all mentioned that they 
started to “feel alive”, to “wake up” when they began participating in these religious 
associations.  Many of them started to serve others in the community through, and as a 
result of, participation in the religious associations.  What appears as recognition of the 
individual is in fact a recognition of civic entitlement. 
 To understand how civic associations are able to perform these acts of civic 
recognition and the legitimization of civic entitlement is crucial.  Associations have long 
been associated with cross-class, gender, and ethnic notions of respect and have served as 
important sites for the creation of civicness in communities (“citizens who identify their 
social membership with the particularism of one G meinschaft may not make very 
effective democrats” (Barber 1998:24)).  The argument is that exclusive organizatio s 
may restrict democratic social formation by creating “us” and “them” boundaries.  While 
it may be difficult for associations located in small communities to have a diverse 
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membership, these associations may “bridge” with other associations that represent 
different categories of the population. 
 Thereby acts of respect can be used to simply reflect symbolic capital and relative 
social positions and to reproduce structures of unequal human relations, but they can also 
be consciously used to contradict these social norms.  One of the most important barriers 
to citizenship is the self-recognition of being a worthy citizen, and not having to defer to 
authority.  It is through interactions, and acts of deference that we get a sense of what, to 
borrow again the phrase from Stinchcombe (1965:180), “powerful people can get others 
to do”, yet it is also through interactions that people learn to confront social assumptions. 
Religious associations not only offered members an environment of compassion 
and personal attention; the associations also created an atmosphere of attentivedeference 
to people who normally did not receive this kind of attention, and this was their mark of 
civic work in Villa Campo.  As one active catholic member, Sofia, told me, “When I met 
the nuns and taught me another form of living I began to have value in myself; for the 
first time I was human.”  Leaders also ensured that the association’s religious doctrine 
produced the proper markers of civicness for the members.   
 A very different sort of knowledge hierarchy existed, then, than the one 
constructed and maintained by leaders and participants at the NGO network.  In the 
religious associations, participants were trained in regards to both skills and symbolic 
capital.  This did not occur to the same extent in either the non-governmental or the 
political networks.   
 
A Civic Space 
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 The key mode for transmitting civic recognition outside of particular 
associations, however, was the interactions between residents and participants.  Religious 
leaders frequently spoke on such interactions.  In some churches, it was an emphasis to 
not trust the outside.  I heard one particular evangelical leader say, “e  muy feo afuera,” 
indicating the streets outside and, symbolically, non-members, “caminan, y no se ven.”  
Associational practices in some evangelical churches exacerbated the situation by 
institutionalizing differential treatment meant to reward members who gave more money 
special treatment that members wore like a badge of honor.  In one of the evangelical 
services I attended, members would go up in front of the congregation to put their money 
in a shiny gold box and receive a blessing; those who could not give would stay in the 
pews.  On the other hand there were other leaders imploring people to reach out and help 
their fellow residents, whether they were from the same religious affiliation or not.  For 
example, one evangelical leader urged people to not discriminate against non-
evangelicals.  All of the five of the initiatives started by community members (excluding 
local NGO leaders) that I saw were motivated by religious involvement and the call to 
help their fellow neighbors. 
 There were many examples of religious participants initiating their own projects 
when they saw a need.  One evangelical couple started their own soup-kitchen from their 
house when they saw that there were children on their block that were not allowed into 
the community soup kitchen.  They used the skills from prior participation in a bakery 
started by one of the nuns.  Many women that were trained in the co-listening program by 
the nuns would serve non-participants in their homes.  
 
The Contradictions of Civic Work 
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All this made the religious associations a mixture of highly emancipatory nd, at 
the same time, highly stratified spaces.  And they did not equally “serve” all residents.  
This was one of the key contradictions of the religious associations; they were semi-
public and open to all residents, yet they clearly catered to their own members.  This, of 
course, is where religion clashes with inclusive democratic ideals.  
 Yet, many of the religious participants did not accept these differentiations ( he 
NGO leaders also strived to communicate that they were open to all religious 
backgrounds).  Within the home is where the “bridging” work (to borrow a term from the 
social capital literature) took place.  Considering that family members, friends and 
neighbors could have different religious affiliations, collective meetings or meals were 
started with prayers that reflected the diversity of the participants.  There were always 
open discussions of different religious views.  Many participants said that they learn 
(grow spiritually) by exploring other Christian denominations.    
 Of course, it was not always the case that community members respected one 
another’s religion.  Generally, however, different religious affiliations did not seem to be 
as much of an issue with people as among the leaders themselves.   
 
Keeping the Spirit Alive 
It is important to note that the civic projects of the religious leaders, in the shape 
of religious doctrine and efforts to get participants to identify personally with the image 
of themselves as a deserving, valued and important members of society.  This may be the 
reason that many of the community leaders in Villa Campo, including the vast majority of 
the leaders in the Naranja network, began their community activism within the Cat olic 
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Church.  In practice, the deeply religious nature of these associations and the 
subjectivities it called forth could make the line between members’ personal inclinations 
and religious leaders’ guiding principles a fuzzy one.  This suggests therefore that there 
may be substantial overlap between the “culture” of community leaders and of the 
Catholic Church (for example, the nuns had a direct impression on the female leaders 
through leadership classes). 
 The flight of catholic members to evangelical pastors was a fact that troubled the 
catholic leaders and something that they could not quite understand.  The priest reacted to 
the situation by making fun of evangelicals, which many catholic members would 
criticize as they were often related to or were friends with evangelical members.  The 
Hermanas conducted a study to find out what people thought of their activities.  (They 
had outsiders, such as me, conduct the interviews.)  Generally catholic members 
responded by saying that they wanted more religious classes instead of all the social 
programs that the nuns headed; there was a general sentiment that the nuns were not as 
religious as they were when they first arrived in V lla Campo.  One of the Hermanas said 
to me, “You have probably noticed this already.  Poor people are profoundly spiritual 
people.  Often more so than we are!”  One of the main factors that drew people to the 
evangelical churches was the personal visitations from the pastors and other evang lical 
leaders.  Ironically, it was these personal visitations, this accompanying, that ini ially 
made the catholic network more cohesive.  People said that the priest changed when he 
went from riding around in a bicycle, to driving around in a van.  On reflection, it is 
ironic that once the catholic leaders acted more like NGO leaders, they wer  less popular.  
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In contrast to evangelical leaders who emphasized individual salvation, however, the 
catholic leaders had a strong emphasis on the collective.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined the extensive empowering and subject-shaping 
activities designed by leadership at religious associations, and in which participants 
participated, with the ultimate aim of producing social change.  Leaders at these religious 
associations recognized themselves in a competition for residents who sought personal 
transformation in a collective participatory setting.  In Villa Campo today, members, and 
by extension most religious associations, practice the most vigorous civic work as they 
stake out their positions at a reorganized social landscape. 
 Civic work, I have shown, occurred at two levels; this demonstrates 
contradictions.  Leaders of religious associations produced associational differentiation 
between one another by engaging in symbolic dialogue with other associational setti gs 
(primarily religious) in the community and identifying their association as more modern 
and authentic by comparison.  Leaders, particularly in the evangelical networks, found 
members, trained, and monitored their participants’ activities in order to ensure that these 
members successfully distinguished themselves from non-members.  To do so, leaders 
drew upon discourses of identity, as differentiations were mainly along religious 
identities.   
I have also shown that relations between leaders and community members in this 
religious associational setting contributed to democratization at the level of p rsonal 
interaction.  Personal interactions--combined with acts of deference, reciprocity, and 
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mutuality--were recognition of citizenship.  If we locate these interac ions in a context 
much broader that the leader-participant dyad or even the leader-participant-resident 
triad, we see they belong to an environment where there is a claim to the poor’s esteem
and respect. 
Ultimately, the religious associations served as spaces where civic ntitlements 
were enacted—by members—and symbolic recognition was envisioned.  Indeed, the 
participants’ activities at the religious associations and the social interactions it structured 
sat nested in a wider context in which poor people are viewed as legitimate and 
appropriate recipients of esteem and respect.  The civic meanings produced by civic work 
served as a powerful collective undermining of social inequalities: every person should 








In the spotlight of the story of Villa Campo, the NGO network is a setting that is often 
associated by community leaders, development practitioners and scholars with 
confronting clientelism and verticality.  The network itself was a result of the Community 
Council established in 1986, even before Villa Campo had a political and social identity.  
As a civic space, the NGO network characterizes itself as distinctly grassroots.  The 
network is spread out in the locality, but the main center is a few small cement buildings 
on a field covering an entire acre.  On the walls inside the main meeting room is a list of 
ethical principles of social interaction which is on the walls of most of the community 
organizations in the area.  Each day, the main building hosts meetings where often one 
hears quite theatric, sentimental declarations, steeped in populist fervor.  One of the 
organizations in this network, henceforth called Manejo, stands out.  Its aim is “To 
strengthen the union and organization between neighbors in order to better the 
neighborhoods and the quality of life of the inhabitants.”  Although written for the 
opening of this organization in 2001, the mission is infused with the language of the new 
“democratic,” “grassroots” times and encourages the participation of Villa Campo’s 
residents to building a new future. 
 This association has garnered a lot of attention from scholars, typically from 
Argentina.  Often the NGO, Manejo, was confused with the name of the community 
itself, Villa Campo by these scholars whose methods usually consisted of going to the 
buildings owned by the Naranja network in a taxi and speaking to community organizers.  
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They had a generally positive view of the association.  After observing interactions 
attending meetings, conducting interviews and informally chatting with both leaders nd 
community volunteers as well as living in the community over a period of six months, I 
was able to see that democratic appearances were not always what they seemed to be.   
 The somewhat paternalistic sentiment and the organization of activities in thi
associational network raise a number of questions about civic work, the evolution of 
democratization and civic human relations.  As this chapter will show, the NGO network 
forces us to ask about the conditions under which participation pushes democratization.  
In particular, when do leaders of an association like a non-governmental organization 
structure their participation, decision-making and activities to further the democratization 
process?  Conversely, when do civic organizations become invested in the production and 
reproduction of a paternalistic culture, or habitus?  How are residents’ civic perceptions 
influenced by the actions of leaders and how much do they accept? 
 In the introduction, I suggested that associational diversity is a key factor in the 
civic relational process.  In this chapter, I examine the activities and interactions in a 
NGO network, demonstrating that this “participatory” association did not further 
democratization at the level that it intended.  This is largely because participation at this 
largely externally-run network was originally organized under the conditions of a 
centralized, planned committee; it does not bear the characteristics of a horizontal 
association and furthermore bears resemblance to the political party network that it was 
trying to distance itself from.  However, the associational network has contributed to 
democratic processes within the community through augmenting people’s civic capa ities 
and contributing to civic discussion (albeit usually criticizing the NGO itself). 
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 As Chapter 2 has detailed, in the mid-eighties associations and participation 
venues were limited in Villa Campo and isolation was a major issue.  Associational 
networks largely directed their organizational energies towards the state and its 
bureaucratic distributive hierarchy, almost the exclusive source of material resources and 
other benefits.  In this chapter, I demonstrate that this “vertical” mindset continued to 
guide the operational activities in the NGO network.  Consequently, the top leaders in the 
network (in contrast to leaders of the Religiosos) did not have practices that brought 
about genuine civic relations within Villa Campo itself.   
 The result, largely, was an association bearing the symbols of a vertical relational 
process.  While leaders focused on building relations with other, local and non-local 
NGO leaders, academics, provincial and municipal governments and external funding 
agencies, the local participants’ activities were relatively constrai ed by the leaders’ 
interventions.  An acceptance of the leaders’ authority and assertions of leaders’ xp rtise 
and control of the activities characterized the culture of this association as was 
continually demonstrated in interactions.  As a result, most of the interactions were 
constructed on a basis of community member–leader inequality and required the subtle 
recognition and legitimization of inequality, or social difference.  This chapter explores 
these three elements: an authoritarian leadership style,26 a paternalistic civic culture 
obstructing equality, and non-egalitarian civic interactions.  I should emphasize that I am 
not arguing that activities at the Naranjas is the same as before the chang s of civic 
participation—it is not—but rather that the organization of participation and the quality 
of interactions in the association was clearly shaped by paternalistic social relations. 
                                                      
26  Authoritarian leadership style refers to when the leaders make the decisions of the goals and processes, 
and other participants follow; whereas democratic leadership styles have more inclusive decision-making 




Associations and Habitus 
Part of the civic work that associations do, I argue, involves leaders making 
activities and decisions that distinguish their own civic setting from others; in this case of 
the NGO, distinguishing themselves from less “popular” or “genuine” associations 
(according to them).  These associational-level practices were often not mirrored at an 
interactional-level, where leaders were expected to recognize resid nts’ claims to be 
protagonists and entitlement to respect.   
 I have borrowed the concept of “field” to argue that associational cultures and 
orientations are very much a product of the environment in which they operate (Fligstein 
2001; Schoenberger 1997).  At the same time, both leadership and participatory cultures
are also structured by the broader political-economic organization of society (e.g. type of 
economy, or form of political structure), as Tocqueville argued in Democracy in America 
(1939).  In this chapter, I attempt to show the crucial connection between associational 
fields and the broader political economy, and the importance of both factors in shaping 
life in Villa Campo.   
 In the introduction, I suggested that culture is an integral part of associations.  As 
this chapter will show, culture can structure a durable set of dispositions deeply 
embedded in the practices of the leaders and participants who make up a civic 
organization (cf Auyero 2000).  In contrast to studies of associational networks that focus 
on explicit attempts to engineer an associational culture (Englund 2006), I point instead 
to a more subtle but important role of culture structuring activities and rhetoric with n 
associations.  Bourdieu noted that the “harmony” between objective structures and 
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subjective orientations in social settings, what he called a “coincidence of habitus nd 
habit” by which institutions are made real by actors disposed to fill rolesin them.  An 
association only comes to life if, “like a garment or a house [it] finds someone who … 
feels sufficiently at home in it to take it on” (Bourdieu 1981:309).  In other words, the 
notion of “habitus”—made up of largely unspoken values, dispositions, and practices—
helps explain why social structures, housed in institutions, are so enduring and are readily 
reproduced through the daily practices of individual social actors who feel “at home” in 
these institutions. 
 The Naranja network, with a history shaped before the economic crisis, also offers 
us an opportunity to consider questions of cultural durability within an associational 
setting.  In particular, Manejo presents us with a civic association in which the elem nts 
of a vertical organization have proved resilient through the course of associational 
changes— for example, certain managerial attitudes and interactional level had f atures 
of what I characterize as verticality (which I outline below in Table 3.1).  These 
culturally guided attitudes, values and practices all made up the “tool kit” (Swidler 1986) 
that Naranja leaders and participants relied upon to structure their participation activities 
in the association.  For leaders at the association, their mindset operated largely through 
accepted power relations and unstated assumptions—assumptions often only made 
explicit when together, either forgetting about my presence or thinking that I did not 
understand.  In this sense, leadership orientations were evidence of a paternalistic habitus 





TABLE 3.1:  Associational Structures and Practices 
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 Like leaders, participants in the network also expressed dispositions strongly 
associated with authoritarianism and clientelism.  To some degree, the repeated and 
explicit assertion by some leaders of their grassroots civic culture hinted at less coherence 
between circumstance and culture than the concept of habitus suggests.  There are two 
reasons why this might be so.  Following Auyero (2000), I suggest that the explicitness of 
this civic culture was in part a product of the organization of civic life under conditis of 
clientelism.  Also, as Ann Swidler has argued, during unsettled times, strategies of action 
become more explicit, and “culture’s role in sustaining existing strategies of action and 
its role in constructing new ones” becomes more apparent.  This chapter is primarily 
concerned how both circumstance and culture have operated to sustain existing strategies 
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of action at Manejo, as associational leaders maintained many traditional vertical 
orientations and participants continued to participate in a largely vertical civic culture.  
(Chapter 6 will explore the construction of new strategies of civic action by partici nts 
in Villa Campo.)  Ultimately, the consequences of civic work for associations, leaders 
and participants become especially clear when we examine a participatory setting not 
directly shaped by their civic participatory claims. 
 
A Vertical, but Civic, Association 
Despite numerous differences and changes, Manejo of 2006 retained many 
orientations of verticality.  In particular, leaders mainly directed theirattention and 
energies not towards the community and the residents but rather towards funding 
agencies that are above them in the vertical network of “local” development.  Having 
enjoyed a privileged position among the local organizations, Manejo’s links to, and 
dependencies upon, the local and international funding agencies grew.  Ultimately, this 
fostered a “vertical” mindset, one not geared to produce democracy in the participatory 
setting.27 
Villa Campo enjoyed a distinct, civically-advantaged position within the 
municipality of Garcia and in Buenos Aires province more generally.  Prior to 1986, there 
                                                      
27  The argument presented here contrasts with Pablo Forni and M. E. Longro’s (2004) findings for Villa 
Campo’s associational sector.  Forni and Longro (31) found that these well-situated non-governmental 
organizations—for example, autonomous from the municipal jurisdiction—were more likely to embody the 
elements of democratic reforms.  Forni showed that in the 1990s, these well-situated non-governmental 
organizations were likely to cope with lack of infrastructure by organizing the community’s participation.  
There is no evidence to contradict arguments, however, that the community’s participation was a result of 
simply wanting the infrastructure.  I do not mean to suggest that the Manejo’s relationship with the funding 
sources and the local government is representative of Greater Buenos Aires’ associations and non-
governmental organizations in other localities, though the pattern was representative within Villa Campo.  
The locality’s largest associations were not under pr ssure to change.  My point here, rather, is to explain 
the enduring paternalistic nature of leadership and participation in this particular network.  
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were no formal associations in the locality besides churches and brokers for the 
municipality (la municipalidad) nor any local organizations or networks (“no tuvimos un 
idea quien somos”) that were more typical in other areas.  This meant that there were not 
so many political party brokers (punteros) in Villa Campo, and therefore there was 
limited access to provincial and municipal-level state distribution systems with tate 
programs and goods meant for poor communities.  In the aftermath of the return to 
democracy, Villa Campo was one of the first localities in the province that established a 
Community Council to make decisions directly within the community (Prévôt Schapira 
1996).  During this time, a good relationship to the municipality and the province was 
one of the more valuable resources at the disposal of the Council’s leadership.  The 
Council’s special relationship with municipal leaders remained strong enough through the 
course of political reforms in the municipality, and in the late 1980s they created a 
municipal delegation, built a chapel, established a police station, inaugurated two 
schools, paved the majority of the roads, and obtained an ambulance.  Through time, the 
success of the Council attracted less ‘community-oriented’ players and people from 
established political networks entered into this local democratic process.  Because of 
political conflicts, Villa Campo’s first formal organization finished in 1989.  The 
Council’s leaders claim (in ‘esoteric’ fashion) that the Community Council had become 
“a seed … sown in the community which continues to grow and yield fruit.”28 
Economic conditions, of course, had dramatically altered the way the way this 
network engaged in the work of community development.  By the late 1980s, for 
                                                      
28  These leadership claims are laden with the tones f spiritual symbolism, primarily Catholicism.  Marie 
Prévôt Schapira, in her study of municipal politics and administration in Greater Buenos Aires, notes th  
heritage of basismo, “a specific confluence between a Catholic current influenced by Liberation Theology 
and a secular movement, namely Peronism”, that motivated the development of certain government policies 
in the local government in the 1980s (Prévôt Schapira 1999).   
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example, the Naranjas were no longer looking for funds through political and state 
networks, opting instead for the direct links the community had with other funding 
sources that had developed through the Community Council.  In the early 1990s, this 
network shifted from depending on the state and instead looked at private funding 
sources.29  This shift happened through different associational incarnations; from a 
decentralized community council, to a transport collective, and then into the Naranja 
network with Manejo at the head.30  People who worked in the network shifted from 
being “militantes” to being “community development professionals”, with more secure 
salaries.  When I was in the community, this NGO network that originally was populated 
by young Catholic youth had evolved into a more bureaucratic, “professional” form. 
In 2001, state welfare programs collapsed, along with the state and the economy.  
Inhabitants were, before this collapse, enrolled in state welfare programs sponsored by 
the government and which they relied upon for their monthly contributions.  The state no 
longer could shoulder the full social welfare burden for all its inhabitants.31 
 These associational changes, all responses to new social, economic and political 
conditions, and to declining employment, were largely initiated by what was going on at 
the national level.  Indeed, these changes had not contributed to a change in leadership 
within the NGO itself; in fact, the network was headed by the same community leaders 
throughout this period of change.   
 In other ways, the Naranjas remained as financially tied to external financial 
agencies as other local associations in previous times.  2003-2004, when Manejo 
                                                      
29  Given that Argentina first began introducing decentralization of social programs in the early 1980s, Villa 
Campo seems to have become accustomed to this system relatively early.  
30  It should be pointed out that this is a quick runthrough the community’s rich associational history. 
31  This system was still functioning of course when I lived in Villa Campo with the poorest relying on 
government handouts through punteros in order to get by.   
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completed the massive new water project built on funds through the Foundation, was also 
a turning point in Villa Campo’s associational sector.  As the previous chapter described, 
local development, which began to increase in the late 80s and the early 90s, had 
attracted large numbers of new social initiatives, while political party ne works saw their 
support slide.  During the national economic crisis in 2001, the community’s financial 
fate was largely left in the hands of external non-governmental financial institutions. 
 The officials at the Foundation controlled the association through a general 
manager, who was not selected by the community, but externally appointed by the 
Foundation and seemed to be expected to approve every decision of any importance of 
the Foundation’s director.  As a result, the participants expressed little sense of contr l 
over and as a result often little interest in, the major affairs of the associ tion.  “They 
used a gestión comunitaria para vender algo,” said a disgruntled former community 
participant, “They were using people.  ... (I)t does not appear logical to use people, to lie 
to people, and make them believe they are participating in something progressive when in
reality they are selling a multinational (sic).”  “We are just a community organization;” 
said one of the community leaders explaining why they rely heavily on the Foundati n as 
the entity in charge of promoting the organization, providing administrative support, and 
looking for funds for the activities of Manejo.  As one of the staff pointed out, the pueblo 
is the face of Manejo, but behind this facade, the entity that administrates projcts and 
makes decisions is the Foundation.32 
 This sense of lack of authority or control also characterized leaders’ relations with 
participants.  In particular, leaders frequently reminded me of their inability to get people 
to participate.  The association did have an institutional process for people to participate, 
                                                      
32  From interview on November 11, 2006. 
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involving a large meeting of participants (una asamblea) and also passed out approved 
targeted surveys.  However, finding committed participants was viewed as difficult, 
unless the individuals were already involved in the network’s circle.33 
 All this suggests that the Naranjas inhabited an associational environment similar 
to the vertical elements (outlined in Table 3.1) found in clientelist networks (clientelism 
is explained in Chapter One).  The vertical political environment, then, with its array of 
interlocking government and political party organizations and local units, was similar to 
the field in which community leaders operated.34  This understanding dictated the issues 
and relationships many of the NGO professionals focused upon, particularly the ones in 
Manejo, turning their attention away from the participants and residents in favor of d n r 
officials.  In the minds of most community leaders, Manejo’s position in the cosmos of 
Villa Campo’s associational life was dictated not by the community’s demands, 
ultimately, but by the Foundation.  Even community leaders’ reaction to my desireto 
volunteer and conduct research in the association served as a case in point, for they to k a 
foreigner’s interest in them to be yet further evidence of Manejo’s elevat d position in 
local development in the Province of Buenos Aires and within Argentina as a whole. 
 
Verticality and Civic Culture 
                                                      
33  Englund (2006: 170-171) found similar expressions f leaders’ concern for participation, which he 
attributed to Western human rights ideology and its sense of individual responsibility. 
34  The association’s relations with municipal government made up a distinct field in which community 
leaders operated.  However, the community organization-funding agency relations, which I will address 
here, were strongly shaped by perceptions about the association’s break with the municipal government.  
The community leaders believed their historical positi n as one of the community’s champion 
associations—a position designated by financial backing—meant that external agencies would want to go 
through the Naranjas’ network.  External agencies through their role recognized the network’s historically 
central position in the locality’s associational sector and judged its financial viability based on its close ties 
with other external funding sources. 
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Fixed upon benefiting from the Naranja network’s relations with the Foundation, 
the NGO professionals, especially the ones in Manejo, did not focus on creating a space
for development and education of civic life.  Instead, it appeared that the community 
itself received little attention from these particular professionals on a day-to-day basis, 
and therefore it was primarily left to the domain of community participants (volunteers) 
and residents.  In this relatively autonomous space, volunteers cultivated a civic culture 
infused with the stated, if not often realized, civic values of democracy.  So, even though
participation was not structured democratically, this vertical, authoritarian association, in 
fact, helped foster a civic ethic along with critiques of inequality.     
 Civic culture in a participatory setting can provide participants with resources to 
stake claims and challenge authoritarian control in the community.  In a study of church 
groups in the United States, Paul Lichterman (2005:56) defines civic culture as “the 
cultural patterns that shape the means or ends of civic engagement.”  Civic culture 
incorporates collectively held values as well as the practices through whic these beliefs 
are enacted.  The streets of the community became a space where participants asserted 
themselves, collectively, through self-organization of activities, a sense of entitlement 
and public speaking skills, and strategies to handle both leaders and fellow residents.  
 Even though I found through my observations, meetings, interactions between 
leaders and community members and decision-making processes bore the clear marks of 
experiences with clientelism and paternalism, most strikingly, participants maintained a 
culture that frequently invoked democratic values and included an explicit critique of 
inequality in these associations and of the leaders’ authority over community volunteers 
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 Ethnographic studies of social life in clientelist networks in the villas and barrios 
in Greater Buenos Aires identified a consciousness grounded in both ideology and 
material relations of the paternalistic system.  For example, Scheper-Hughes (1992) 
argued that the political power in clientelist networks required an explicit ideology that 
attempts to “mystify reality, obscure relations of power and domination, and prevent 
people from grasping their situation in the world” (Scheper-Hughes 1992:171 quoted in 
Auyero 2000:150).  Under situations of clientelism and authoritarianism in general, 
participation and its results are commonly appropriated by the authority, whether it is the 
state or another entity.   
 In Malaysia, anthropologist James C. Scott found civic consciousness, what he 
terms as “weapons of the weak” in the peasant class.  For this group, Scott argues that, 
“in small but significant ways, the mutuality of the poor represents a form of daily 
resistance that prevents, or at least delays, the worst consequences of the full 
“rationalization” of production relations in the countryside” (1985:265).  In Scott’s study, 
this politics was most clearly expressed in informal interactions, where peasants resisted 
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attempts to impose new, ideological and material rules by ridicule, noncompliance and 
foot dragging.  He contends, the peasants “act to defend their interests” by “boycotts, 
quiet strikes, thefts and malicious gossip” (1985:304).  Scott holds that these actions were 
contingent, tied to the era of the green revolution and the organization of production, 
rather than the result of a general social organization of power and disadvantage, s 
Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey (2003) argue.   
 At Villa Campo it was clear that there was an oppositional consciousness, which 
was not embedded in a particular ideology or event, as seasoned active community 
members often presented an almost structural understanding and critique of their 
relationship to Manejo leadership, and other “politicos” more generally.  Community 
participants demonstrated an acute understanding of the inequalities created by Villa 
Campo’s brand of clientelism, “local development,” verticalism (or the vertical elem nts 
involved in civic life as outlined in Table 3.1) and opinions of the new relations in the 
community.  Much like the Malaysian peasant workers described by Scott (1985), 
community participants in Manejo drew upon cultural resources cultivated by experience 
and knowledge to critique Manejo’s building (or even un-building) of a failed or 
compromised democracy.  However, unlike Malay impoverished peasants, the 
democratic and egalitarian strands to the civic culture at Vill  Campo were neither 
nostalgic nor repressed, grounded as they were in daily activities and discussions among 
participants despite the verticalism that prevailed in associational life.  Th  result was a 
set of deeply held dispositions—a democratic habitus—from which participants actively 
endeavored to make the community a place in which they felt at home—bending it, with 




Politics in the Barrio 
The community participants in the Naranja network served as an example of how “civic 
consciousness” was forged daily through concrete organization of activities.  When there 
were no leaders around, it enabled community participants to engage in critiques that 
both challenged leaders’ power and asserted community participants’ competence and 
wisdom in matters of the community.  This was certainly true in the corner of “the red 
zone” of Villa Campo where I was living. 
 This part of the barrio was the oldest and poorest neighborhood of Villa Campo, 
stretching along the border of the neighboring municipality.  Manzaneras, Manejo block 
representatives, usually women, were in charge of being the links between the association 
and the residents, passing out information on the activities of the association.  I found 
myself in the house of one of these manzaneras.  They mainly worked in their blocks, 
occasionally going to an asamblea or jornada when they could go.  All told, the 
participants who I accompanied and spoke with were typical of the association’s 
community volunteer-force: they were women, grandmothers, in their forties and fifties.  
In addition, they had lived in Villa Campo for a long period and were well socially 
connected and respected. 
 Starting from the 1990s, associational changes had gradually altered the 
community activism in Villa Campo; from working for free to infrequent, unstable 
honorariums to opportunities for stable wages.  This has been the pattern in many social 
movements in the past.  Many trade unions, for example, also began with volunteer work 
that eventually turned into paid activities, and there were intense debates as to the 
consequences of this shift on the issues of activism and representation.  Community 
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volunteers, if they showed sufficient commitment during the week, had an opportunity to 
make some money on the weekends.  These salaries and bonuses were issued by the 
Foundation.  Given the poverty in Villa Campo, participants actively pursued these small 
contracts, and in the interactions I had with them, I never heard these particular, 
ambitious participants ever critiquing or holding back on their praise of the association. 
 An associational manager and four other representatives were in charge of daily
operations in Manejo, and people from the Foundation would conduct periodic 
inspections.  People who worked in the Naranja network were subject to 
admonishments—for not being in frequent contact with the Foundation, for not being 
organized and on schedule—but in practice they were rarely let go.  However, these 
leaders were rarely doing their work in the streets of the community, and when a Manejo
representative did come by he or she was likely to focus upon incidental issues that 
benefit the Foundation such as passing out surveys and handing out pamphlets.  
Community volunteers’ autonomy in the barrio gave them the freedom to organize their 
participation activities as they saw fit.   
In a sense, the patterns of participation of the leaders in Manejo were similarto 
those Max Weber (1978) observed in a bureaucracy.  Weber identified low levels of 
personal self-direction and autonomy as a key element of this “bureaucratic 
organization,” revealed by the static positions in the organization, even as people flow in 
and out of the organizational space.35  While Villa Campo’s participants were certainly 
not free from the professionals’ evaluation and control, participants’ self-direction also 
                                                      
35  Participants, by contrast, deal mainly with the demands of the locality—of its residents—which is 
generally a source of uncertainty in an unstable sphere.  
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enhanced their sense of expertise and competence, heightening their disdain for a 
seemingly arrogant leadership. 
 Participant autonomy in the community made community volunteers especially 
skeptical of leadership power, so it is perhaps unsurprising that open critiques of 
authority were most frequently provoked by the appearance of professionals in the 
community itself.  When the top leaders did appear—usually in some formal “work” 
sense—or when their names were mentioned, participants were likely to comment to m 
on the power relation between participants and these community leaders, in the process 
revealing the politicized nature of civic participation in the community. 
 Such a critique came out quite unexpectedly one day when I was questioning La 
Gorda about her participation in the association.  A group of people who worked at the 
association had just passed out a newsletter.  “Have your activities changed from when 
you first started participating?” I asked La Gorda, who was in her fifties and had lived in 
Villa Campo most of her life.  “This…” La Gorda’svoice trailed off.  Then she launched 
the conversation in another direction.  “You know, there are hundreds of us who work on 
the water project, but only a few are actually getting paid for it, and they get paid quite 
well.  We are not paid and we do most of the work.  They are just using us (os están 
utilizando).”  La Gorda’s comments pointed to the unfairness of salaried workers of the 
association asserting authority and profiting over those who are doing a lot of the work.  
This critique was quickly directed against the realities of life where thereis in quality.  
“Those people are just where they are because they had an opportunity to have an 
education, whereas, we did not.  It is the way things are,” La Gorda continued.  She 
threw her hands up in exasperation, with a serious, agitated face looking at me straight in 
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the eye.  La Gorda criticized both the “authoritarian” nature of the community leaders 
(according to her, they did not do more work to justify their salaries) and the social 
realities of the development process.36 
 I received many comments on another occasion at a community party when some 
of the Manejo leaders appeared.  I was chatting with Sofia and Ladi, participan s at 
neighboring blocks.  When a few women from Manejo stood near us, Sofia and Ladi 
straightened up, making it clear that these women were distinct, of another s cial 
category.  Sofia looked at me and pointed to the group, “esta gente, son de afuera”; I told 
her that a couple of them are from the community and still live in the community.  She 
looked at me with a little smile and said, “Si, son gente con educación, son de afuera.”  It 
was interesting that the Irish nuns who were present were not referred to as outsiders; 
perhaps they transcended the outsider/insider divide as their particular work was at a 
much more personal level.  Another occasion when representatives from Manejo passed 
by the house, they incited fiery discussion.  Ladi commented, her voice rising in volume, 
“Everyone thinks they are the boss of us (todos piensan que son los dueños de nosotros),” 
she said, and started making a list: the municipality, the politicos, the police, the religious 
leaders, and the people that worked in the Naranja network.  “It seems like everyone but 
the garbage collectors … when they bother to come!” she scoffed.  At this point Sofia 
joked that Ladi was “talking about the difficult life of the poor (la vida de las pobres).”  
This was a jab at Ladi, who did not like to think of herself as poor. 
                                                      
36  There are two issues that arise here.  The first is the fact that volunteer civic work was frequently 
considered “work from the heart” by Peronists and people in the Catholic Third World Movement 
(according to many of the interviews); the same people who are now the professionals.  The second issue i  
that the one way these community leaders demonstrated their own leadership position was through the 
assertion of their unique expertise and abilities. 
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Populist rhetoric--along with concepts of neoliberalismo and autoritanismo--
continued to find critical, if at times ironic, usage in the community hints at the clos
connection between participants’ critiques of authority and the discourse of Latin 
American-style populism.37  Critiques of democracy made from within democracies are 
often based on the notion of justice and equality that is promised, but not delivered, by 
the democratic state itself.  Ironically, democratic ideology provides the bar against 
which to measure reality—and criticize that reality for coming up short.   
 The long ritualized meetings planned by the community leaders and people from 
the Foundation sharpened participants’ skepticism.  The emptiness of these meetings was 
apparent at the first meeting I attended.  That day the Foundation had a 2-3 hour-long 
meeting to discuss, or rather inform of, a future project.  I arrived to find that in order to 
enter into the room where the meeting was held, your name had to be on a list.  As mine 
was not on the list, they were planning not to let me in, until the woman at the Foundation 
who invited me let me pass.  The gatherings felt more like rituals than meetings that were 
serious in terms of deeply involving community members in the project process or ven 
getting their opinions, however.  A couple of people did challenge the project until the 
woman from the Foundation handed the mike over to a male community participant who 
aggressively answered back to questioning community members.  Despite this, people in 
the room would always pay attention to whomever was speaking, usually one of the 
leaders reading a carefully prepared Power Point presentation.  As a result, th  
“participatory” or “democratic” content of the meeting was hard to find.  From the 
beginning, the women from the Foundation announced that this was a project information 
                                                      
37  Even residents might use the language—and the implicit critical perspective—of the politicized populist 
language in their interactions.  For example, when t re were people coming from the United States, the 
man scowled, “Ay, los yanquis!” 
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session.  The presentation was read aloud and had been prepared by the Foundation and 
focused on a number of things: such as 99% of the families surveyed who did not have 
running water wanted running water (not a big surprise); there was money for the project; 
and that this work is usually advanced by businesses and municipal governments, “but 
this time it is different because it is from Ustedes--the same vecinos that benefit are the 
ones that do the obra”.  There were some questions concerning who would be handling 
the funds (the Foundation), what would the costs be, and whether it would be better for a 
private company to come in and do the work so that the “vecinos” did not have to.  The 
Naranjas identified the municipality and private enterprise as threats to the community.  
 On one level, participants and leaders alike recognized that these events paid lip 
service to ideals and principles that the community non-governmental organization h d 
had originally, and now in practice seemed to have largely abandoned.  Yet seeing th  
leaders orchestrating these events made them seem like part of a charade.  These events 
fit perfectly with the participants’ negative perceptions of their “higher-ups” (los 
politicos); feeding a critique of leaders’ authority that drew in part upon experiences of 
the inequalities of community or local development. 
 The ethic was especially evident in criticisms of leaders’ favoritism and the use of 
personal connections, or amistades, to secure good positions and salaries within the 
Naranja network.  These amistades can be viewed as an oppositional force, acting 
counter to the inclusive ideals of democracy, and their existence makes the organization 
vulnerable to criticisms based on notions of impartial fairness.  In fact, partici nts 
perceived the use of instrumental ties in community associations, rather than skill or 
merit, to be part of the notion of local development and not in opposition to it.  The use 
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of social connections served as yet another basis upon which to analyze associational 
leaders.38 
 In the Naranja network, favoritism was also linked to how well the project was 
financed.  Pay was not uniform and variable, earning potential was powerfully influenced 
by the program or project that the leader was in, as well as their “professional”, or rather, 
educational level.  Favoritism was expressed through the hierarchy of financed projects 
and corresponding to the leaders’ positions. 
 For this reason, community workers’ earnings were not perceived to be a good 
measure of ability or effort, but rather a sign of educational level and “middle class 
culture” and, by extension, the strength of one’s connections with the Foundation’s 
leadership.  For example, one day after a meeting (itself more form than conte t), Maria--
one of the few professionals in the Naranja network that was committed to civic work 
and from the community and is the hardest working and paid the least--started working 
on a presentation.  As Maria sat working on the presentation, other community leaders
passed-by and joked how Maria knew and was involved in everything.  She was widely 
admired.  “She never stops and she knows everything about Villa Campo,” said one 
woman, and when Lola talked about her she said, “Such a great leader, she really is worth
studying (vale la pena de estudiarla)!”   Maria was the lowest paid community leader 
even though she was unanimously recognized as the hardest working and the most 
committed.  I assumed that it was because she lacked educational credentials that others 
had, she was from the community and she was a woman. 
 
                                                      
38  Community members who discussed this issue with me were against the use of amistades in 




Participant Authority on the Streets 
Challenges to leaders’ authority in the Naranja network had a meaning, namely a 
powerful assertion of community participants’ authority, expertise, and ability of the 
leaders to represent them.  Being in a leadership position in the Naranja network fostered 
a sense of competence among leaders that was reflected in their interactions with both 
outsiders and residents.  The length of time these paid professionals were in the network, 
and to a lesser degree their younger age (relative to the Religiosos for exampl ), also 
enhanced the network’s authority and provided a space in which the Naranja’s 
associational culture could flourish. 
 I rarely witnessed real open challenges to Manejo leaders in associational 
activities, and certainly, there existed recognition of the formal hierarchy that allowed 
leaders to direct participants and allocate them to certain activities.  All the same, without 
leaders’ presence, participants would regularly be critical and do the activities their own 
way.39  Therefore, there was space outside of the formal network for participants to 
develop civic capacities on their own, with the tools that they gained from particiting in 
this network.  
 However, autonomy in the Naranja network extended far beyond freedom to 
circumvent the formal associational rules and even beyond the flexibility in deal g with 
fellow residents—the kind of autonomy we might expect with informal participaton 
(Stark 1989:644).  Participants gained knowledge over aspects of participation frequetly 
not given to participants in other settings in Villa Campo; from tasks such as the 
                                                      
39 There are parallels between these forms of participants’ resistance to leaders’ authority and Scott’s 
descriptions of everyday resistance in his influential work, Weapons of the Weak (1985).  However, I wish 
to emphasize that Naranja participants were more ass rtive, and carried a greater sense of entitlement, than 
the impoverished Malaysians in Scott’s accounts carry.  As the conclusion to this dissertation will ind cate, 
formal hierarchy and the distribution of power it upholds ultimately changes at the community level. 
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organization and management of materials to arrangement of the meetings with their 
neighbors and soliciting their opinion. 
 Information in particular—as Englund (2006) has noted in his ethnography of 
poor communities—is a key element in civic work.  In many ways, accessing informati n 
is civic work for community participants, and familiarity with the range and availability 
of civic choices, and the ability to access civic education, is often crucial for community 
members to make claims, and to become citizens.  At the Naranja network, the 
organization of civic activities and information served as an important way for 
participants to adapt their civic work to their individual styles and preferences.  
Community members expected not only associational leaders, but also Foundation 
managers and external funding agents, to teach them.  As such, it is a perfect example of 
how participants conceived of themselves as capable students with civic responsibility to 
change the conditions of the community. 
 Participants were keenly aware that well-organized activities could greatly 
enhance one’s ability to be a ‘citizen.’  This was especially true of the work done in the 
community, in small “by invitation only” meetings, as well as taking classes and 
seminars.  In regards to classes and seminars, for example, the information imparted 
usually dealt with issues with which the community members were familiar.  One good 
example of this in the Naranja network was the gardening school.  Ambitious students 
could go on to become teachers in the barrio.  Each trained community teacher tailored 
their teaching arrangements to their own needs, habits and preferences. 
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 Information issues also highlight another set of relationships with the 
associational network, namely that between the Foundation representatives (los j fes)40 
and community participants.  In a technical sense the participants had two levels above 
them in the Naranja network—the community leaders, who organized and monitored 
their activities, and representatives from the Foundation who actually paid contracts and 
salaries, funded campaigns, shouldered the costs for renting and outfitting the office 
space, and importantly, handled and supplied the information and propaganda.  These 
representatives from the Foundation would naturally seek to communicate the most 
popular and positive information and propaganda to venues where they believed it would 
attract more financing, and as a result, they did not treat all projects, and did notfund all 
projects, equally.  Professionals in the Naranja network recognized that in this respect 
they were highly dependent upon the representatives in the Foundation in terms of the 
activities that they did. 
 In contrast with the participants in the Religioso network, community members 
asserted themselves with Manejo representatives in ways that reflected their legitimate 
authority and expertise in the community.  The issues of financing and service for th
water project were ones which Villa Campo community members were constantly 
exerting pressure on leaders.  It was, for instance, a regular practice for m mbers of the 
water project to try to make claims to the association they hoped the association would 
help them with—though, according to the residents I spoke to, that rarely ended up 
happening.  If dissatisfied, community members might speak up to the Manejo 
representative when they came by with newsletter or surveys.  On one occasion, Flor a d 
                                                      
40  The people in the Foundation could be also view as “middle men” in terms of funding, as in this case it 
was their job to look for funding for the community’s activities. 
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a few women gathered at the house were particularly stern with one or the 
representatives, a young moody female professional who was joined by her husband, both 
of whom worked in Villa Campo but lived in the neighboring municipality.  Flor 
informed them that she did not intend to participate in their new initiative, setting up a 
cooperative for public services, because they made such a mess of the previous project, 
the water project.  She said that when they hooked up the water to her house they did not 
do it properly and messed up her yard and they never came back to fix it.  She said that 
they should finish what they started before beginning another project.  The NGO’s 
representative seemed a bit surprised and a bit embarrassed that I was there to witness it 
all, but noted down the information and told Flor what she had to do was indicated in the 
contract (a highly technical, long document) that she signed.  Flor did not conceal her 
annoyance on this issue. 
 Right after, all the other women chimed in.  Doña, Ladi, and Sofia 
enthusiastically informed them that they ended up having to use their own time to do 
work on the water service that they had paid for.  The NGO representative, Gordita, kept 
taking notes and looking very uncomfortable.  Ladi articulated a number of problems that 
resulted from this project, including that in her case because the water pipes were put in 
improperly, her house was ruined; she grilled Gordita about this.  Gordita defended 
herself by explaining that it was not directly the work of the Manejo and therefor  they 
were not directly at fault.  Ladi responded that if she hired someone to do work, then she 
was responsible for seeing that they do it properly; the same should hold true for the 
association.  She stated that she was not being aggressive; she was only stating the truth. 
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 My fellow residents understood very well that having the right civic skills was 
crucial to contributing to their own and the community’s development, and increasing 
this development was the basis for a healthy future.  When the various community 
volunteers would stop by, Carmen, Sandra, and Flor would discuss what was happening, 
soliciting information on activities and projects in the hope that more benefits would 
come the community’s way.  It was from these conversations that I incidentally learned 
the amount of civic education and information the neighbors passed on to each other.  
This was a key resource in their search for more and better civic opportunities and 
resources.  “Whatever I find out I’ll tell you,” was a common assurance. 
 Community leaders recognized that they served as a vital source of current 
associational information--often the only source of information--about what was going on 
in the community to the outside world.  Passing information to enquiring academics, 
seemed to be sometimes self-interested—assertion of expertise, professionalism, and 
authority.  Many professionals in Manejo were so confident of their expertise that they 
would routinely offer up their rigid opinions of the locality’s problems to others, that 
always seemed in turn to be about them.  At one meeting for example, Constantina began 
lecturing everyone in the meeting on starting a research center in Villa Campo, 
complaining that academics do not give back the information that they take from the 
community.  “I’ve never heard or been given these papers and reports, and I am the one 
giving them information!” she exclaimed.  It turns out that she was not angry that 
community members do not see these papers and reports; it was that she did not see them.  
 Community members asserted a sense of authority in other ways, such as resisting 
attempts to impose new ideas or participatory practices upon them; consider, for instance, 
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the very short and targeted surveys from Manejo.  The association had devised this 
system as a means for tracking the sentiments and the opinions of the community.  
Because this was a new procedure, or a procedure they did not like, community members 
frequently did not fill out these surveys; nor were they always collected, as I found out.41  
When I asked why people were not filling out the surveys, the answers were, “This 
information is for them and they expect us work for free; they are going to have to pay 
us” or “I am just too busy.”42 
 
A Vertical Participatory Interaction 
Civic culture in the Naranja network, then, was composed of not only managerial 
power at the level of the Foundation but also a sense of authority, expertise, and 
professionalism among the community leaders.  The entitlement this generated carri d 
over into interactions between these community leaders and their members, producing a 
leader-participant dynamic different from the interactions found at the Religiosos.  
Instead, an aura of entitlement, representativeness, and expectations of deferential 
treatment dominated civic interactions at Manejo and not a democratic ethos, which 
would require listening, deferential service and lack of entitlement.  Shaped by new times 
and a new civic culture, both leaders and participants in Manejo participated in 
encounters marked by professionalism and hierarchy. 
 
Encounters among Un-Equals 
                                                      
41 It is possible that some of the community members’ re istance to this system was related to the fact th t it 
would partially reduce their ability to express their r al opinion and ideas. 
42 This is not to deny that community leaders did successfully impose all sorts of participation activities on 
community members.  In fact, every block operated only slightly differently as a mixture of the NGO’s and 
the community members’ own rules of conduct and practices.   
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As noted above, leaders did not always cultivate either the associational space or 
activities that were democratic.  Instead, the NGO was a closed, impermeable, and even 
often an authoritarian space, in the sense that the world “outside” was frequently shut off 
and was subject to much filtering: community members visited the association for 
business transactions, to make complaints, to socialize, but there was little engagment 
with social activism.  Plenty of students and academics would parade through the 
association carrying their notebooks and cameras, and look around in case someone 
might mug or pickpocket them, while exclaiming “Qué sentido diferente tiene Villa 
Campo!  Es muy participativa!”  Community members and participants would drop by 
and their appearance enhanced the association’s populist and community feel.  Many 
people carried on other, non-associational activities within the conglomerate as well—
sold candied apples, jams and crafts.   
 Community participants themselves were not so distinct from “the masses.”  Their 
appearance, class, and religion allowed the streets of Villa Campo to be reproduced 
within the associational network, at the level of community volunteers.  The association’s 
participant base fell into the very poor and poor-income ranges among the population, 
meaning that community members and leaders that were from the community came from 
similar socio-economic strata and earned a range of incomes that reflected this low 
strata—between 162 and 3612 pesos a month, on average—and lived in the same 
manner.43 
 In fact, community leaders would often make explicit the lack of social distance 
between them and the participants.  For example, when trying to sell a new initiative to a 
                                                      
43  Since the beginning, the association had no “target” population and aimed to serve the entire population 
of Villa Campo.  It should be noted, however, that some of the leaders had access to leadership positions 
closed to the general population. 
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middle-aged woman, Constantina urged her to attend the meeting, explaining that it was 
“de nosotros, para nosotros” (“from us, for us”).  The woman smiled and told her that 
she did not think she had the time “no sé si puedo ir, es depende en otras cosas.”  In other 
instances, participants complained to me about how their own economic situation was not 
good.  One of the leaders diagnosed this as a problem stemming from neoliberalismo, the 
current macro-economic context that affected everyone.  The community residents did 
not see it the same way: “They are doing well,” one community participant told me, 
indicating the community leaders, “They earn very good salaries.”  At times, community 
leaders would point out their own life conditions or experiences to participants as a way 
of establishing a sense of empathy or rapport.  Yet, I never spoke to any resident, be they 
supportive or unsupportive, who believed that the leaders of Manejo were truly members 
of the community. 
 At the same time, community leaders tried to establish themselves as both 
experienced and experts regarding the activities, projects and programs they tried to 
sell.44  The two sides, leaders and participants, of course, did not enter into these 
interactions as complete equals, especially as the community leaders’ sala ies were 
closely bound to the community members’ participation.  However, leaders did not show 
any deference or accountability to community members’ wishes (though members did not 
anticipate the levels of surliness that was at times demonstrated when community 
members expressed an opinion).  Instead, community leaders constructed a knowledge 
hierarchy that elevated them above community members, and from that elevated position
                                                      
44  Robert Michels explains that community leaders use this aura of professionalism to exert control over 
their interactions with community participants (in Perrow 1991:198).  At Manejo, leaders managed to 
establish their expertise and authority independent from the Foundation. 
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leaders could and often did issue judgments and declarations on residents’ tastes, choic , 
and civic knowledge. 
 For example, Gordita made fun of one of the residents who was taking a long 
time trying to think of response for a survey question on what organizations she 
participates.  “I told her that you participate in Manejo! Ma-ne-jo!!!”  Community leaders 
could be quite aggressive about redirecting community participants’ choices (often to all 
in line with what they had already planned), and the community members were often 
intimidated into accepting these authoritative decisions.  For example, Constantina 
exclaimed to a community member who wanted to get a private enterprise or the 
municipality to be in charge of public services that this would be giving power away to 
outsiders for them to make the decisions, and they would not do it as the community 
wished.  In many cases, community leaders would guide choices, instructing them as to 
what was appropriate or inappropriate for them.  There were many other examples—not 
just in the Naranja network--of this lack of respect, or paternalism.   
 Community members rarely dared to openly challenge leaders’ interpretations of 
the direction of the community.  A telling exchange occurred in a “by invitation only” 
meeting when the leaders were discussing popular education and how “fantastic ad 
marvelous” it was compared to the education in university; one of the three community 
members who was there (who ended up not really knowing what the meeting was about) 
shyly admitted that she was going to university, but quickly added she did not like it in 
order to fit in with the prevailing opinion of the leaders, who smiled and nodded in 
agreement.  In line with the “popular” character of the association, leaders often engaged 
a veiled enforcement of “universal” standards by which community members’ behaviors 
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and opinions were judged.  Failure to conform was a mark of stupidity or perhaps “old 
ideas,” but not of relative social location per se.  The irony, of course, was that these 
“universal” standards had actually become class-specific—that is, specific to the middle-
income leaders who were employed at the association, not the low-income residents who 
volunteered in the association. 
 
(Dis)Association in the Community 
If community participants’ expressions of deference are a key means of signaling 
social difference and recognizing leaders’ claims to leadership (see Chapter 4), then civic 
interactions at Manejo were especially notable for the social distance expr ssed by both 
sides.  In fact, the uneven playing ground upon which leaders and participants engaged 
one another was exemplified by the degree of disassociation between actors and the 
distance between them.  On the part of the leaders, disrespect at times took the form of 
gruff dismissal of quarrelsome residents or people they felt who were beneath th m.  One 
time some residents responded with suspicion about the quality of work of the 
association.  Constantina argued, “Go look around at other places!  They do not have a 
say as to who comes in and does the work and how it is done.  They have no control.  The 
community needs to be in control of its own development!”  For example, one resident 
responded to a sales pitch for a water project by exclaiming, “But why do we have to do 
this work?  Why don’t we hire a private company to do it instead?”  A male 
representative from the NGO responded aggressively, “We have to be in control of our 
community, do you want to hand over control to outsiders?” 
 At the same time, community members also expected a degree of respect from 
community leaders (and likewise might attribute bad service to the poor “quality” of the 
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leaders).  Community members, of course, responded to such disrespect.  The most 
common way of doing this was to be cynical of the community leaders’ sales pitch, but 
community members might do other things, like say they support something and then 
change their mind and go somewhere else.  As one of the nuns said, “People vote with 
their feet.”  At least five people who participated in Manejo in the beginning voluntari y 
stated they would not be prepared to work for them again.   
 Ironically, it was clear to me that the people that claimed they were representing 
the community in Manejo did not treat community members with respect.  There was a 
gap between the leaders’ rhetoric and what I witnessed actually occurring.  One of the 
community leaders said to me with gravity: “With people’s participation in taki g control 
of the path of their own community, this will lead to a tr nsferencia.”  She continued: 
“People just have to realize this; they have to get it through their heads.”   
 My claim is that community leaders in Manejo did engage in class judgments.  
Community leaders’ treatment of people was colored by discrimination.  There were 
people in the community that did not have access to the water project, did not receive the 
association’s surveys and did not get any of the “community” organization’s informati n 
or invitations.  These excluded, marginalized community residents were rarely directly 
confronted with the judgments and opinions of these community leaders, nor did they 
apparently challenge the fact that they were not served. 
 In fact, when community residents did suggest that they should receive better 
service, their “ideologies” or “loyalties” were used to discredit these demands.  For 
example, on one occasion I spoke with two female residents who were carefully 
explaining to me how things worked.  One of the women praised my “humble attitude 
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(humildad), noting that as a foreigner I was very patient.  She said that that “they” (the 
leaders) “do not have patience with la gente; they discriminate and are very 
authoritarian.” 
 “Don’t you consider the people from Manejo as one of you?” I asked, surprised.  
Sofia said no, noting that it was their education and the way they treated people that gave 
them away.  This explanation left me surprised that such levels of distance—as Chapter 6 
will suggest—were common among Villa Campo’s residents towards community leaders.  
Rather, it was clear that labeling these community leaders as “per onas de afuera” 
(which they may or may not have been), Sofia and all the other people I talked to 
discounted the association’s claims of being a “grassroots” “participatory” organization. 
 Indeed, as the explanations of community members show, the vertical nature of 
community leader-member interactions in the non-governmental organization was to
some degree class-bounded.  The NGO itself made few efforts to recognize these unequal 
relations between its leaders and community volunteers.  As a result, community leaders 
did not seek the opinion or deep participation of community members because doing this 
would than recognize differences in opinion and that in most cases leaders and residents 
occupied dissimilar socio-economic positions in V lla Campo’s society.  However, when 
leaders were confronted with residents with whom there was a social gap—ordinary folk 
from the community—the illusion of similarity was disrupted.  As educated 
professionals, community leaders felt distinct from and distinctly elevated above the 
community residents and the former’s treatment of disrespect was converted into the 





Manejo was, in many ways, a vertical associational network.  Community leaders 
operated the association by drawing on strategies that focused primarily upon the 
financing agencies, not the local community.  In their associational work, leaders 
sustained an active civic culture characterized not only by a grassroots politics tha  
critiqued the power of outsiders, the government and the universities but also by active 
assertions of their own authority, professionalism, and skill.  The associational space also 
showed the relative polarity between community members and leaders, and vertical civic 
interactions predominated.  In a sense, both leaders’ and members’ habitus served as 
durable institutions for values and practices linked with a paternalistic social 
organization.  These features of civic life at Manejo also served to identify the 
association, in the minds of Villa Campo residents, with an association of politicos, and 
an association that does what the municipal government does not. 
 Manejo demonstrates how an associational culture that maintains a perceived 
discontinuity with the authoritarian past, a past where associational life was in a large 
part controlled by political brokers, is still thought of as belonging to that past.  Villa 
Campo’s residents frequently described the people in Manejo as “political” and “out to 
sell something,” characteristics that also marked them as belonging to the paternalistic, 
clientelist era.  In an increasingly civically diverse society being “out to sell something” 
also differentiated these particular community leaders from not only more local 
grassroots groups, but from what they were before. 
 Community leaders like those at Manejo provided a contrast for community 
members with whom spiritual associations, like the Religiosos, were defined as more 
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connected with people and more grassroots.  As the following chapter will show, leaders 
at the Religiosos mobilized a subtle, internalized notion of citizenship that both required 
civic work from their community members and which distinguished the Religiosos from 




Chapter 6:  Civic Work among Diverse Associational Settings 
 
Introduction 
The last week of my fieldwork, I went to a particularly difficult meeting with a 
group of NGO professionals which taught me a lot about ruling relations in the 
associational field in Villa Campo.  A small number of people who worked at Manejo 
accompanied by a young sociologist at a local university who did survey work for them, 
and three of us who were doing research in the community were meeting in regards to 
establishing a research center for the “community.”  I had been asked to be a part of this 
initiative for the past few months.   
From the beginning there were accusations to me and fellow invited university 
researchers about the validity of our projects that we were doing.  The NGO professionals 
and “popular” sociologist, Margo, claimed that what we were doing was individualistic 
and what they were doing was “popular” and for “social transformation.”  They 
complained about us coming into the community and using it as a lab, and regarding 
people as objects for our own purposes.     
 “You are only here so you can take information and the leave and be a professor 
in Canada,” one of the NGO workers said.  He glared at me aggressively until I star ed 
looking back. 
 “I can do a better study than you can,” one of the man married to an NGO worker 
challenged a female researcher, without knowing what she was doing.   
 ‘Certainly not,’ I thought.  ‘What was happening?’  This was all rather 
unexpected.  Of course I had reflected many times on issues of power and representation 
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before and during my fieldwork.  I had no idea that these NGO professionals were so 
angry.  Were they upset that I found out that residents had problems with the NGO?    
 The young female leader of the NGO, Constantina, then insisted that she wanted 
things to change in regards to academics coming into the community—that is, they would 
have to go through this future center in order to get “information.”  I told her that if there 
were going to be a center that controlled academic research in the community, it would 
have to go through a committee that really represented the community, as they did not.  I 
had openly expressed my unease with the way some NGO leaders -- the ones that wre 
present at this meeting -- felt that they were representatives for Villa Campo.  There were 
only four residents of Villa Campo present, including her, and all of them worked in the 
NGO sector.  The other three residents were silent throughout the meeting and admitted 
at the end of the meeting that they did not know why they were invited.  After this there 
was a lecture on the importance of participation from the sociologist that took place for 
over an hour; the only other person that spoke up was Constantina.  I was reminded of a 
university classroom.  She said, “University people come here and use our time and the 
time from people in the community for projects that do not serve us, but serve 
themselves.” At the time, I was outraged at their suggestion that I was here for my own 
purposes only and insulted at the implication that I was using people (albeit true and 
something I had personally reflected on quite a bit), particularly because I had only 
interviewed one of the people was at the meeting. 
 I was struck with a dreadful thought, ‘Could I be like Constantina and this sociologist, 
Margo?’  I was schooled.   
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 This encounter brought up issues I was constantly wrestling with, and I knew my 
other two colleagues were as well.  What do they expect from me?  Why was I here?  
And why were they “attacking” me anyway considering I had not used very much of their 
time, and I did not know many of them?  How did Margo know so much about me even 
though I had never met her before?  “Well, you just have to make clear to people that 
they should give send back whatever they write to the people whose time they used,” I 
responded lamely, and to my relief a young male Argentine professor spoke up.  He 
talked about that knowledge came in many different forms and that it is hard to determin  
which type of knowledge is better than the other, be it collective or individualistic, or 
scientific or non-scientific.  Then a young male a teacher in the gardening school, who 
was one of the residents and someone I knew well, spoke up and said, “I think we need to 
trust people.”    
At this, we broke off and ate an sado (barbecue).   
I quickly learned not to take this encounter personally, for this kind of distrustful 
interaction occurred all the time with the leaders and others, including members of the 
community.  Reciprocity was an expected norm, and no one wanted to be “used”.  In 
addition, the rise of such distrust in this diverse associational setting was also important 
for understanding the emergence of new forms of civic work as residents and leaders 
reacted to and reconfigured the associational field in Villa Campo. 
 
This chapter will consider the appearance of civic practices at Vill  Campo.  In Chapter 
5, I argued that, because of the poor communities’ vertical associational legacy and 
continued instances of political party clientelism, at times leaders did not organize 
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activities that would produce social democratization directly.  In this chapter, however, I 
will demonstrate that Villa Campo was not locked in stasis but in fact was changing in the 
face of an altered environment with new diverse conditions.  For while leaders continued 
to take their cue from the local NGO foundation, the municipality, and Church hierarchy, 
the residents at Villa Campo had began to innovate civic practices between neighbors. 
 The impetus for participants to innovate civic practices was found in an 
environment of general distrust that Villa Campo was experiencing as a setting of 
poverty.  Confronted with competitive pressures from the municipality, NGO leaders 
developed a repertoire of trust-producing practices meant to set Manejo, both its workers 
and its products, apart from the shady reputation of the municipality.  Nevertheless, in 
stark contrast to the nuns, where civic work was carefully implemented and openly 
discussed by the nuns for all participants, at Manejo the civic work was more towards the 
creation and empowerment of the leaders themselves.   
 Participants in all of the associations did draw upon ideological and cultural 
resources acquired under a predominantly vertical system.  By calling forth both the 
locality’s waning symbolic capital as an entity ignored by the government and heir own 
cultural resources as part of a poor community, participants at Vill  Campo produced a 
particular configuration of civic practices that traced the trajectory fr m one with limited 
possibilities to a new diverse associational setting.  In what amounted to a bott m-up 
strategy of cultural representation, leaders and participants attempted to deploy th  
reconstructed symbolic capital of a poor community that has battled for its autonomy a d 
its reinterpretation of traditional relations between poor communities and outside 
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institutions.  In the process, they staked out a democratically-evolving location in the 
province’s associational field. 
 
Cultural Innovation and Post-Vertical Trajectories 
The creation and continuance of civic practices by the leaders of Manejo raises 
questions about social change and cultural continuity.  Chapter 5 considered the role of 
associational culture in “sustaining existing strategies of action” (Swidler 1986:278).  
This chapter takes a different track, examining instead how people draw upon culture to 
create new practices and plans.  To do so, I turn to Bourdieu’s concept of “trajectory.” 
 Swidler (1986) suggests that during “unsettled times,” cultural values become 
more explicit.  Pierre Bourdieu similarly argues that social change can cre te dissonance 
between unconscious values and social circumstances; for sociologists, such tensions can 
demystify the more common and “seemingly miraculous adjustment” of individual 
dispositions to the social positions (1984:110).  Doing so requires us to recognize that 
social categories and fractions are made up of individuals and groups who do not only 
exist in the present but also experience change as they move through social and historical 
time.  
 In other words, the social conditions under which an individual’s or group’s 
habitus develops may not be the same as those in which it is presently exercised—a 
situation that can result from individual or collective social mobility (upwards or 
downwards), something Bourdieu dubs “the trajectory effect” (1984:111).  This trajectory 
effect may also be the result of the collective upward movement of a group or a fraction 
with the broader social structure, resulting in discord between the practices and 
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expectations of a given group, on the one hand, and the objective possibilities open to 
them under changed social circumstances, on the other.  For an individual or a group, the 
relationship between habitus and social position is not frozen in time but reflects an 
historical trajectory, either an individual one through the layers of social space or a 
collective one through transformations of social structure.  The methods people use to 
adapt to social change are shaped by historically-constituted dispositions.   
 Within Villa Campo’s associational field, social trajectories take on the specific 
forms of strategy and method.  Given that a field is the product of historical struggles and 
changes (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:90), the concept of “field” provides a framework 
for speaking concretely about social trajectories and individual and group strategies 
(Bourdieu 1996).  By locating the leaders, participants, and residents at Villa Campo 
within the community’s civic field, we can see how social actors attempt to adapt their 
resources to changing circumstances.  On the community level in Villa Campo, there is 
an overlap between two distinct trajectories: the upward trajectory of thesocial 
development sector within the associational field, paralleled by the broader growing 
inequality in Argentina. 
 This chapter explores civic innovation and trajectory by focusing upon residents’ 
reactions to new civic behaviors and orientations.  Unlike many of Villa Campo’s 
community leaders, who were aware of the problems in Villa Campo but were not 
themselves impoverished, community participants faced the daily consequences of the 
community’s low position in comparison to neighboring communities.  It was in the 
community where changing civic practices interacted with participants’ civic culture and 
their broader collective habitus.  As participants regularly encountered blurred boundaries 
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between democratization and its antithesis, authoritarianism, they were comp lled to 
clarify the obvious difference between civic participation and the untrustworthy sphere of 
clientelism.  As with the Religiosos, the Naranjas, and the Politicos, this civic work was 
relational, and it engaged Villa Campo participants symbolically with other settings in the 
area’s associational field. 
 These participants’ trajectory through historical and social circumstance becomes 
clear, however, from the particular cultural resources community particints drew on to 
support civic engagement.  Specifically, participants defended against the locality’s low 
position in the new democratic context by attempting to translate the locality’s, and their 
own, democratic-era symbolic and cultural capital into forms fellow residents could 
recognize.  As a means to establish fellow residents’ interest and trust, participants 
evoked Villa Campo’s status as a flourishing participatory place.  Through their 
interactions with residents, participants also produced a setting characterized by many of 
the hallmarks of the traditional culture of the poor.  Frank, sociable civic interactions 
conveyed the underlying message that Villa Campo was the appropriate place for poor 
residents seeking to create social changes in the new democracy.  These democratic 
practices were the fruits of participants’ habitus encountering changed social 
circumstances.  In a reconstituted associational field, participants in Villa Campo staked 
out their position by practicing a form of civic work with their own distinct 
characteristics.  
 
The Skeptical Inhabitant in an Environment of Distrust 
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Residents of Villa Campo were very careful in their interactions.  The first day I 
arrived in Villa Campo I was told by Flor and others in the community who I could and 
could not trust.  Residents’ distrust—and an accompanying, deep-seated fear of being 
tricked or taken advantage of (nos van a engañar)—manifested itself in a variety of 
forms.  These skeptical residents would interrogate associational participants about 
money, the quality of the activities, and the association’s policies.  They feared th t if 
there was money involved, they were being ripped off; yet they also feared that if there 
was no money the project would not function properly.  These skeptical residents seemed 
to feel that the slightest detectable flaw was evidence that an activity would fall apart 
soon after it started.  They would examine new and present initiatives with great 
apprehension. 
Skeptical participating was, however, a social practice, and at Vill  Campo these 
sleptics were far too prevalent to be attributed to personality quirks.  Rather such patterns 
of participant behavior were a clear reaction to the perceived risks of being involved in 
associational activities, especially because of their vulnerable status.  Many of Villa 
Campo’s residents honed these practices in the oft-corrupt political network like the 
Politicos, where they also participated and to which their limited resources, to varying 
degrees, restricted them.  Often, resident fears and skepticism grew out of bad 
experiences, as was the case with one woman who told me about being involved in a 
municipal microenterprise program.  “Phew!  There were so many forms and papers that 
we were required to fill out, we hardly had time to do the cooking we were supposed to 
be doing.  Tanto trabajo, y no paga nada! … After that experience, I am not interested in 
being involved in anymore of these programs!”  
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 At this point, the reader may be skeptical at how ‘participatory’ residents were in 
Villa Campo.  Yet the care and attention many residents devoted to their participation 
activities represented a more complex phenomenon than hesitation over spending a fair 
sum of time.  For while many residents who had the means or could rely on external 
support (usually from a religious association) could avoid Villa Campo’s corrupt, 
manipulating associational networks by participating in other “better” associ tional 
settings, residents with more modest means had to strategize between these associational 
networks regularly.  In Villa Campo, this meant that the sharp lines that supposedly 
defined an association’s reputation as a reliable institution and that set it aparfrom the 
corrupt clientelistic associational networks were really not so sharp for the residents 
themselves.  Often from the point of view of the residents, they saw that leaders wer  
trying to sell them activities to benefit not the community as much as themselves. 
 As previously mentioned, there was a lot of competition between the political 
party network and the NGO network.  According to one community leader that I 
interviewed, it was partly because the director of the Foundation and are former mayor 
with continuing political influence clash.  There was a meeting within the Naranja 
network once in which an outside NGO was conducting a seminar on how to strengthen 
community networks (ironically).  The meeting was attended exclusively by all the 
organizations in the Naranja network.  At the meeting one of the prominent community 
leaders criticized a municipal project, saying that they wanted to take away power from 
the community.  Whether it was the community Villa Campo or the community of the 
Naranjas that she was referring to was unclear as often the two were conflated.   
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 Protecting territory was a key element of competition among associational 
leaders, and so many groups were careful to conceal actual funds from others in t 
community in an effort to protect their interests.  For example, a cultural group that was 
part of the Naranja network was well-known, not because its “popular” classes attracted a 
lot of community youth, but because it was able to attract funds.  Many similar 
organizations, particularly ones that were part of the political network, were disgruntled 
over this fact and wanted to know how this cultural group was able to attract so much 
funding, but the group was not forthcoming with the information.  There was a conflict, 
particularly between the leaders of these two groups where the residents were put in the 
middle: the political group arguing the NGO group was only in the barrio to get funds, 
the NGO group arguing that activities that promoted “culture” for “culture’s sake” (i.e., 
not for politics) were justified.  For this reason, funding sources and financial informati n 
were jealously guarded. 
 This competition however, created boundaries in the structure of Villa Campo’s 
associational field and complicated the democratization process to which residents and 
the community leaders sought to contribute.  High levels of social cleavages prevent 
democratic communities from forming.  The conceptualization of trust contains a scope 
which can range from trust towards a small group to trust towards humanity in general 
(Paxton 1999; Putnam 1993).  In- group trust can exacerbate social cleavages and is 
common in organizations such as the mafia, ethnic separatist groups and cults.  In-group 
trust conceivably isolates a group from broader society and promotes feelings of distrust 
towards nonmembers.  Generalized trust, however, is not only contained in one group, 
but is diffused throughout the society.  In sum, when trust is limited to a small group –
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although it may produce stronger feelings of bonding towards members of that group– it 
does not necessarily benefit the community/society as a whole.  Associations that have 
strong constructed identities contribute to in-group networks, but do not contribute to the 
between-group networks that are critical to democratization.  Recently, a World Bank 
study (2002) found social capital to be low in Argentina.45  Some of the main conclusions 
of the report were that social capital is low; associations are religious based; the poor 
participate to survive while the rich participate to advance; and the poor do not have a 
chance to lead, control or make decisions.  These findings are consistent with the World 
Values Survey that found participation and trust rates in Argentina are significantly lower 
than other developing and developed countries (World Bank 2002:14).  It is interesting to 
note that despite these findings, there has been an increase in the number of civil society 
organizations.  This increase in organizations does not necessarily translate into increased 
general ‘trust’ or an increased intensity of ‘participation.’  The important factor is not 
merely whether people are involved in an organization, but the effect of that 
participation; such as, whether or not people know that they share common elements and 
feel a general sense of community with a large number of people who are connected to 
them through this network. 
 
Risk in the Environment 
Skeptical residents appearing on Villa Campo’s streets were very much a product of 
Buenos Aires’ broader civic environment.  However, as I suggested above, both 
perceptions of and exposure to participants’ risks were not distributed equally, and for the 
                                                      
45 In the report, social capital was defined as “the networks, associations, norms and values which enabl  
people to act collectively in order to produce a positive externality for them or their community” (2002: 5). 
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ordinary person in Greater Buenos Aires the civic environment was a realm full of risks.  
In Chapter 5, I discussed negative popular perceptions of the Politicos and other political
networks, where Villa Campo residents regarded participants with distrust and moral 
distaste and viewed the activities as cheap and suspicious.  In contrast to the area’s mo e 
limited participatory days, when (one informant described) “yeah they were corrupt, but 
that was all you had,” many of Greater Buenos Aires’ residents today face a more diverse 
associational environment where the authenticity of activities are all subject to question 
and generate debate for residents.  
 To some degree, these residents’ attitudes reflect historical experiences with a 
manipulative politics such as clientelism, and parallels exist between the participatory 
environment in Greater Buenos Aires and other transitioning contexts.  A generatio  gap 
exists between young and old Argentines, and in Villa Campo, older people were most 
likely to convey unease with the new ambiguities of forms of participation and the risks 
of non-genuine participation according to my interviews, whereas the few younger 
participants that I spoke with did not express this skepticism.  However, in the 
associational sector increasingly dominated by non-governmental associations and 
younger leaders, the older residents are still more likely to participate in these settings.  
During interviews I conducted among former participants in the political network, they 
expressed their discomfort with the strong encouragement to participate (that is, work for 
free) in order to reap the benefits in the new associational settings.  “This place has 
changed so fast,” said one long-time participant.  Whether the change was positive or 
negative was always up for debate; but, generally out of all the conversations I had with 





Source: http://www.escanda.org/proyectos/renovables.php, November 21, 2007 
 
 The risk of taking the time and energy of participating in activities that were fake, 
inauthentic, and not successful, created more worry than whether there was debating 
and/or having a role in decision-making.  Like many poor communities, Greater Buenos 
Aires’ associational environments are full of inauthentic activities, fake promises and 
schemes to cheat or deceive locals.  Many people have personal experiences of being 
“cheated” (engañado) in some way, though it was usually on the scale of wasting their 
time for something to happen or being “sold” on a flawed project.  The sense of distrust 
and risk associated with participating is heightened by regular media reports on 
associational deceptions and frauds. For example, while I was there, local and national 
media reported on incidents relating to nuns “kidnapping” poor children and running 
illegal adoption services which grabbed the attention of Flor and my neighbors.  
 There were a lot of stories floating around of both outsiders and insiders with 
means trying to take advantage of community residents; and some of those stories were 
about me!  Friends and acquaintances in Villa Campo regularly informed me of examples 
of bad associations or leaders, some personally experienced and others garnered from 
acquaintances or media.  Residents I encountered at Villa Campo were also informed on 
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these issues.  One of the most astonishing story—and quite possibly legendary—was of a 
puntero in the community selling housing materials given to the municipality meant to be 
handed out for free to the very poorest!  The man who related this story to me explained 
that this was one of the reasons that he tried to avoid places where punteros are 
participating.  
 Indeed, most associations would try to distance themselves from these 
untrustworthy associational networks by offering residents explicit guarantees for 
funding to see projects through.  As one Buenos Aires expert in civil society explain d to 
me, “When these people participate in something, use their time, they are unsure of what
is going to come out of it.”  He added that he and his colleagues were careful not to make 
any promises or require participation.  Of course, with the religious associ tions, the 
existence of some form of ethics was generally taken for granted by locals, who tended to 
focus on asking about specific terms of policies and results in the other associational 
networks.  Still, the fact that most local participants level of participation was unstable—
intense at times, non-existent at other times--was commonplace.  
 
 




 However, for many residents, they could not avoid taking risks in their 
participation.  Given the access to goods that political brokers offered, including the 
range of welfare programs with often few time commitments, increased their ability to 
survive through bad times.  Therefore, three Villa Campo residents explained to me that 
they were willing or felt compelled to give up the often more time-consuming 
participation of respectable associations for the less time-consuming but corrupt Politico 
venues.  And, as I explore below, participating in the political network called forth a 
whole set of defensive practices—ranging from questioning over what was expected of 
them to inspecting projects and programs—that had become a deeply ingrained 
orientation towards participating in general.  So even though very poor residents still 
participate in non-governmental associations for large projects, like the water project, 
participating in a non-governmental organizational setting was not seen as a necessity.  
Even a non-governmental association like the Naranjas, which targeted poor people, 
often had substantial time commitments and had well-financed, big activities, and so it 
required more in terms of time and energy than the political brokers.  As one man 
remarked to a woman participating in Manejo, “I don’t have time to be in that group and 
their projects.  I have to work!”  Time constraints on the part of the poor local residents 
were one of the key reasons they participated in the more “risky” associational networks 
that provided immediate material gratification.       
 
The Crisis of Trust and Representation in Villa Campo 
At the end of my time participating in Villa Campo, many community leaders asked me 
to present my thoughts on their activities.  Wanting to avoid personally criticizing any of 
them, I settled upon abstract ideas, namely, problems of representation and distrust.   I 
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began a piece written for community leaders and participants, in which I identified what 
were Villa Campo’s major strengths and why it attracted so many local academics: the 
leadership qualities and the reputation they have, Villa Campo’s history of and dedication 
to civic participation—especially the fact that they accomplished what they set out to do 
(se cumplen).  
These points could have easily been anticipated.  I then explained that I believed 
an environment that was not stable produced uncertainty and contributed to the distrust 
that was present in Villa Campo.  I argued that despite the fact that there wer  so many 
avenues of participation, and success, residents’ fears had nevertheless mad their way 
into this area.  This indicated the possible decline of Villa Campo’s associations’ 
trustworthiness in the eyes of the residents. 
On the one hand, residents did not clearly distinguish between many political 
network settings and a non-governmental organization run by a centralized manage e t, 
with a uniform action and participation policies.  Indeed, some “non-governmental” 
associations in the community had shifted entirely to allowing politicos to run things, and 
some associations that often looked “social” were very much politicized.  In such cases, 
the associational type, for the individual participant, might not guarantee a certain fo m 
of participation and service.  Just by looking, there was no way for a resident to know 
that Villa Campo had remained largely impermeable to these “political” influences.   
 At the same time, residents imported their participation anxieties into non-
governmental organizations.  Because the participants who were involved in the Naranja 
network also tended to have participated in associations like the Politicos, they had grown 
accustomed to confronting the dangers of participation.  In many ways, the streets of 
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Villa Campo had been invaded by the political brokers’ practices.  The result, for 
participants, was regular encounters with distrustful residents and the repeated n ed to 
establish trust in order to gather enough participants to create a worthwhile project.  The 
associations needed to help community participants in this endeavor by making the 
benefits of participation clear to residents at a more formal level.   
 By the end of my fieldwork, it became clear that some community leaders 
recognized a change in residents’ participation levels but were unwilling to acknowledge 
a problem with trust in their association.  Instead, one of the top leaders declared that just 
by signing up to receive water in their homes, residents were expressing their trust in 
Manejo.  One of her co-workers who retold the community’s strengths in instructive 
fashion took up this problematic logic: its history, the value of community participation, 
large-scale collective action, and, not surprisingly, its well-known solidarity.  The issue, 
of course, was that this “solidarity” had to be produced, regularly, in the course of 
personal interactions and by means of the residents’ own methods of civic activity. 
 
A Question of Democratizations 
Once living in Villa Campo, I quickly encountered the fuzziness surrounding civic 
participation.  One of my first surprises at Villa Campo was the amount with which 
residents hoped for, but did not ultimately expect to have a role in decision-making.  
“Pero no me hacen caso” r “pero no me escuchan” resident after resident would say. 
 Participation in Villa Campo, for the most part, did not have broad-based 
community decision-making, and the associations had to, in effect, “sell” activities as 
they were already created.  However, given the space to voice in some associational 
settings—mainly religious associations—residents were reluctant to relinquish their 
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rights to opine.  They often refused to believe in leaders’ insistence on the viability of 
written projects.  One example of this was when La Gorda (a grandmother who was very 
involved in the water project), while among other residents, questioned whether Manjo 
would be able to start the new public works initiative because of all the volunteer labor 
they required from community members the previous time: “They are really going to 
have to sell it (the project) to us in order for us to work this time.”  This is just another 
example of the skepticism on the part of the residents of being “used” for an activity in 
the name of “grassroots participation.” 
 Over time, I came to realize that the problem was one of distinguishing among 
associational settings.  Given the changes to associational organization in V lla Campo, it 
is understandable that residents would be unclear about where the rules for participating 
had changed and where they had stayed the same.  As described in Chapters 4 and 5, 
associations offered some opportunities for debating, especially for the most outgoing 
and opinionated residents.  (Indeed, at times opining and debating seemed less about 
having an input and more about presentation and a sense of entitlement and capacities, 
including the recognition of citizenship.)  Other new associational venues were 
increasingly the front of Politicos, but they often looked the same as a non-governmental 
organization, complete with community participants.  Even in the Naranja network, the 
occasional space might be taken over by a politico.  In the one instance at a Naranja 
event, I witnessed a person not in the Naranja network, speak with residents about 
political activities, completely separate from the Naranja activities that were occurring at 
the time.  Therefore, when residents began to participate in the Naranja network, they 
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often did not know, or were confused on just what kind of associational system they were 
dealing with.     
 At Villa Campo, there was a problem of divisions.  One of the primary divisions 
was between the “sociales” and the “politicos” despite their similar activities.  The 
sociales were more likely to distinguish themselves from the politicos saying that their 
activities did not stem from any ideological basis, and they were not seeking power, 
whereas they just wanted to help people.  As one very active NGO leader explained to m  
on a bus ride, the difference between sociales and politicos were that the later wants to 
implement an agenda the former just wants to help people.  This rhetoric (or sales pitch) 
tapped into a broader discourse that portrayed associations as “risk-free” participatory 
environments where residents were protected by semi-formal policies and activities that 
went further to guarantee the outcomes.  Despite this, I witnessed them negotiating and 
working tightly with political movements for some programs, especially relating to 
education and health. 
Such confusion meant that, in the eyes of some residents, the Naranja network 
was not significantly different from a political network, and drastically erod d much of 
the symbolic capital the Naranja network might have claimed in the early days and 
through the years of democratic reforms in the 1980s.  Despite the fact that community 
leaders insisted that simply by entering the association, “residents expres their trust in 
us,” in fact the residents that I talked to on this issue (approximately 25 people, with the 
exception of 3 or 4 highly active members) had little confidence that the Naranja network 
or its leaders operated according to anything but short-term, money-driven motives that 
for them defined most of Villa Campo’s associational settings.   
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This was made clear to me when I first arrived in Villa Campo.  I was talking to a 
neighbor, telling him that I was going over to the Naranjas.  He looked at me seriously 
and said, “You know that there are a lot of p liticos there, don’t you?  They are politicos 
as well.” 
 
Strategies of the Skeptical Inhabitant 
The Villa Campo associations’ promises of genuine grassroots participation were 
not well-believed.  The community’s residents were skeptical participants, and their 
participation strategies clearly revealed this.  Residents often blurred distinctions between 
associational settings like the Naranjas and other settings, such as the Politicos. 
 Two of the most common practices were the close inspection of activities and a 
practice of choosing, or selecting, the best from a number of associational activities.  
Both inspecting and choosing were practices I would later see regularly exe cis d in most 
associations, unsurprising given that these strategies reduced risk in a settig without 
guarantees.  Equally important, however, were the expressions of distrust and perceptions 
of suspicion, amplified by the amount of volunteer participation that most associational 
activities required.  For while verticality may have become a common practice in most 
associational settings, Villa Campo’s poor residents had introduced their own 
participation strategies to these associations.  In doing so, residents actd on the social 
problem of distrust that Villa Campo, a poor community, was undergoing. 
 These strategies indicated what life was like in the Villa Campo’s associ tional 
field.  Careful inspection of activities was the first line of defense against being tricked 
into participating in the corrupt and badly organized schemes that filled the associational 
field.  Residents in Villa Campo would regularly examine and closely scrutinize every 
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aspect of a project.  Residents would carefully pick over initiatives, examining for any 
flaws, as one man put it, “to see if something happens (para ver si pasa algo).”  
Unaccounted money, a common occurrence, given the poor context, could bring cries of 
‘I-told-you-sos’ or abandonment from participants.  When the nuns handed over the 
financial responsibilities for a community daycare to a community participant, Flor 
protested by leaving the project, saying that she did not want to watch all of the hard 
work she and others did “go out the window”.  At the time I was leaving, the daycare was 
going to be shut down because of financial problems.  Flor told me that she always knew 
that it was going to happen. 
The result to close inspection of activities was the practice of choosing.  The basic 
principle behind choosing is that you never participate in anything without choosing the 
best from the other options.  In Villa Campo, inspections of activities and choosing were 
not only frequent; they were also just the most prominent of a whole collection of 
practices calculated to compensate for the lack of trust in associational setti gs.  
Residents would engage in casual participating (i.e. seeing what is going on but not 
committing to anything).  Some would question very carefully what was in effect being 
sold to them:  How much money is there?  What activities are they expected to do?  Other 
residents would simply rely upon instinct and social relations for some form of 
guarantees saying things like, “I know her.  She is very careful with her promises.”  
 
Creating Trust and Counter-Strategies of Democratization 
Given that residents did not take for granted Villa Campo’s associations’ forthrightness 
and abilities, the associations’ community participants faced the task of producing trust at 
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the level of individuals, through interactions.  Community participants encountered 
regular reminders of the residents’ distrust, and their interactions with residents (coupled 
with their own status as poor residents) made participants acutely aware of their
repositioning within the community’s associational field.46  At the same time, the 
community participants were able to assuage fears in order to get people to participate.  
Given the levels of participant autonomy in the community (discussed in Chapter 5), the 
community participants developed their own set of methods for dealing with residents’ 
suspicion and distrust. 
 Thus, we find the rise of civic work in Villa Campo, for interactions centered 
upon the creation of horizontal relations and the drawing of symbolic resources.  
Recognizing themselves as occupying a middle position among Villa Campo’s 
associations, participants sought to establish in the minds of residents that these 
associational settings can be both trustworthy and practical, as well as spaces that are for 
poor modest residents like themselves.  
 The resources participants relied upon to draw these symbolic resources were 
laden with social meanings and reflected their collective trajectory through Argentina’s 
era of democratic and economic reforms and social change.  While participant’s methods 
were conscious in the sense they involved the explicit goal of informing fellow residents 
of activities, these methods also drew upon participant dispositions and cultural 
orientations—the realm of habitus—that were steeped in a kind of implicit cultural 
knowledge.  Participants’ methods found traction with residents precisely because m ny 
                                                      
46  Community participants themselves frequented many other types of associational settings—including 
ones such as the Politicos—in order to be cautious.  They associated me with the Naranjas or the 
Religiosos, however, explaining that since I was a foreigner it was more likely that I would be at a large 
formal organization.  
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residents in Villa Campo shared these cultural orientations.  Changes to Villa Campo’s 
associational field had brought forth a set of social practices that traced a trajectory.  By 
relying on an increasingly devalued cultural knowledge, participants’ methods 
acknowledged their own (and their fellow residents’) social position. 
 Here, I identify two specific methods participants used with their friends a 
families.  The first was an explicit evocation of Villa Campo’s status as place of 
collective action that represented the long-standing division between the municipality and 
local associations in order to revive the positive status of Villa Campo’s civic sector had.  
At the same time, participants recognized that Villa Campo’s grassroots (collective 
action) status, once the area’s great symbolic and material resource, could also lack 
accountability with people in the new “democratized” associational environment and, as I 
will show, they drew from the rhetoric on civic participation in a flexible manner.  
 The second trust-producing strategy involved the far more subtle creation of a 
distinctive participatory culture and set of personal interactions at Vill  Campo.  This 
participatory culture revolved around the notion of s lidaridad (which could mean the 
display of warm feelings or acts of serving others) and relied upon elements of culture
that resonated with both the civic culture at Villa Campo and the habitus of many of the 
community’s residents.  Indeed, as I will argue below, expressions of solidaridad by 
participants took on an almost nostalgic aura in a context of limited mobility for large
portions of the community’s struggling, poor population.  Both these methods—explicit 
claims and implied cultural understandings—went towards producing trust and 
democratization (in this case, expanding horizontal relations, relations of equality) by 
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means of cultural expressions that were highly intelligible to the more traditional 
segments of Villa Campo’s poor.  
 
Locally-Owned Symbolic Capital 
If leaders in Villa Campo felt confident on the community’s reputation as a place with 
grassroots collective action, participants in the community had cause, as I have shown, to 
be less cheerful.  Participants lacked one of the easiest methods used in other 
associational settings to diminish residents’ reluctance to participate—giving material 
items and money.  As a result, participants instead sought to gain residents’ trust in order 
to cultivate civic participation.  Though aware of the declining status of many 
associations (especially leaders) in the community, V lla Campo participants nevertheless 
sought to mobilize what remained of the associations’ diminishing symbolic capital by 
emphasizing the positive connections with its ‘community-owned’ status—in particul , a 
reputation for openness and collectiveness in a underhanded and capitalistic environment.   
 Participants reminded residents of the community associations’ history of 
dedication by highlighting the difference between Villa Campo’s capable community-
owned sector and the greedy powerful state political entities.  An interaction between a 
community leader, Zapo, a participant from Manejo and a female resident was 
exemplary.  A woman asked with suspicion how it was decided who the first houses to 
receive water would be.  Zapo replied, “We treat all members equally, we don’t charge 
you one thing, and charge another price to your neighbor.  We are not like corporations 
(multinacionales).”  The woman, Flor, was persistent.  “But why did some people receive 
water before others?”  Zapo explained, “We are a community organization!”  
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 Here, Zapo suggested that Manejo operated on principles of fairness, treating all 
residents equally.  Separately, Flor suggested to me some people were more likely to 
receive water first, as well as other privileges, because they were friends with people in 
Manejo and not all residents were treated the same, and as all of the participants n 
Manejo (but not the leaders) told me, many people felt taken advantage of.47  In Villa 
Campo’s associations, participants attempted to demonstrate that residents would not be 
cheated.   
 Participants frequently sought to tap into Villa Campo’s grassroots symbolic 
capital to reinforce the associations’ integrity with residents, believing that the mark 
“community-owned” still denoted straightforwardness, reliability and fairness.  The 
connection between the two was not so obvious to most residents as “community–run” 
Manejo was often more perceived as a business than a community association.48  Naranja 
participants reminded residents that only at the NGO network could they find a reflection 
of all the community that was from the community, and for the community.   
 These methods reflected participants’ attempts to mobilize Villa Campo’s 
symbolic capital in order to garner residents’ trust.  But this capital (the community’s 
civic history) was in decline as most of the residents were new to the area and did not live 
through its rich civic history.  Also initiatives commonly were corrupted by individual 
interests that caused projects to collapse.  As noted in Chapter 5, the Naranjas 
emphasized their modernity compared with the political and religious associations.  
                                                      
47  It could be argued, then, that leaders in the Naranj s were indeed asserting a kind of equality of “the
masses” that was an ideal, if often unrealized, of Villa Campo’s civic life.  
48  I do not want to oversimplify: At times, distrust involved trying to conceal differences between 
organizations.  This was often the case with residents’ expectations for material aid.   
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Within the confines of Villa Campo itself, however, participants frequently portrayed the 
Naranjas as influenced by non-local political and economic forces. 
 When participants drew attention to the community’s grassroots status, they 
attempted to bring diminishing symbolic capital to bear in a new associational context.  
In this way, participants and leaders deployed a set of increasingly historically-bound 
resources as methods of promoting both trust and participation. 
 
“Solidaridad” and the Poor’s Sentimentality and Nostalgia in the Community 
In seeking to distinguish the associational settings in Villa Campo—at the one end, 
spaces like the suspicious, insecure, Politicos; at the other, the more formal, regul ted 
settings like the Naranjas—participants in these associations also created a space that f lt 
distinct to residents.  Participants modeled their interactions with residents on otions of 
straightforwardness and warmth—solidaridad—that both participants and residents 
identified as characteristic of traditional provincial culture and, even expressive of a kind 
of genuine feeling that had been greatly dampened by political and economic crises, 
economic relations, and the increased inequality in the Province of Buenos Aires.  
Solidaridad expressed a sense of mutuality between participants and residents that was, 
in many ways, the flipside of mutual disrespect described in Chapter 3.  In this case, the 
resulting personal interactions were marked by warmth and caring for the other. 
 In civic settings, the term solidaridad has been broadly adopted by promoters of 
new, modern standards of civic life,49 and talk within the Religiosos and elsewhere 
exhorted participants to engage in warm and loving relations with others (raten otros con 
cariño y amor).  One community leader I frequently talked to described meeting people 
                                                      
49 Session on The Civic Sphere by Jeffery Alexander, ASA 2007. 
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with a hug as a kind of solidaridad; “Greeting people with kiss and a hug gives them a 
good feeling.”   
 At Villa Campo, however, the notion of solidaridad took on a distinct 
significance, caught up as it was in a politics of nostalgia. At a time when many in Villa 
Campo faced economic hardships, participants’ performances and acts of solidaridad 
created a social space that evoked the positive qualities associated with the urban poor, 
simultaneously asserting both Villa Campo’s difference and the value of the poor’s social 
relations. 
 According to The Oxford Dictionary (1978), the term solidaridad or solidarity 
means “community of responsibilities or interests” and refers to genuine expressions of 
“cooperation” or “community.”  In everyday life, the word is used to describe people of 
honest friendliness and warm hospitality, and the people from Argentina’s provinces 
understand themselves to be especially endowed with these qualities of warmth and 
generosity.  For the poor, expressions of olidaridad are also linked to perceptions of 
themselves as unselfish and dedicated to others (d  no ser egoísta).  But whereas traits 
associated with poor people like hablar claro (to speak clearly) can carry negative 
connotations, especially in Argentina’s middle- and upper- class, of “naiveté,” 
solidaridad commands a uniformly positive meaning in politically progressive circles. 
 Such character traits and cultural ideals are closely associated with the culture of 
Argentina’s provinces.  Similarly, traditional poor neighborhoods were social institutions 
characterized not only by the instrumental and authoritarian factors such as clientelism 
identified by Javier Auyero (2000), but also by a community of highly personalized 
relations resulting in strong, long-term relationships and a sense of collective interests.   
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 Solidaridad interactions in Villa Campo similarly performed a kind of traditional 
nostalgia by evoking a space and a set of social relations that harkened to a time when 
poor people, like them, enjoyed simpler times and collective security.  Indeed, 
solidaridad operated as part of a method of representation that involved not necessarily 
an authentic past but an imagined one in order to stake a claim on the present (Anderson 
1991).  To be sure, some people’s actual memories of interactions in the provinces are 
not ones of solidaridad.   
 In the hands of poor participants dealing with their poor neighbors, s lidaridad 
conveyed levels of care and concern for the resident that community members felt set 
Villa Campo apart from the newer, more profit-driven associational settings.  In this 
sense, expressions of solidaridad were as much a poor person’s strategy of cultural 
representations as they were methods to counter distrust in the environment.  They were 
methods that appealed to a cultural identity shared by participants and everyday r si ents; 
it was in their sense that civic strategies were also cultural representations.   
 The following scenes were exemplary of the sentiment called soli aridad: 
 An elderly couple arrived on the corner where I lived.  The woman was guiding 
the man who was walking, gesturing but not being able to speak.  When Sofia greeted 
them, it became clear that it was not the first visit.  Sofia listened to the woman’s troubles 
patiently.  After they left, Flor and Marie explained to me that the couple frequently goes 
to the neighbors to seek pity and ask for help.  Once I was walking with two women in a 
neighboring indigenous community, poorer than the one I was living in.  We saw a 
woman giving food to an elderly man from Villa Campo.  One of the women murmured; 
“It is true sometimes, isn’t it, the poorer a person is, the easier they can give to others.”  I 
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regularly saw the small business owners in the community helping people out by not 
charging them anything when they were going through tough times.  
 Certainly, this kind of solidaridad was bit of an informal community policy—and 
as well as these incidents illustrate, socializing could be interpreted as an expression of 
solidaridad.  Of course, not all community members used olidaridad as a strategy to 
create rapport with neighbors, believing it a waste of time and energy.  Nevertheless, in 
my part of the barrio as well as surrounding areas, I repeatedly saw instances where 
participants went to considerable lengths to create a feeling of concern and intimacy 
between themselves and their neighbors.  These solidaridad practices were in part rooted 
in a participatory culture that fostered intimacy, sociability, and, ultimately, trust, among 
participants and could be extended to include everyday residents.  These practices also 
stood in stark contrast to wo associational settings, the formal part of the Naranja 
network as well as the Politicos, where leaders and residents tended not to identify with 
one another.  With many of the Religiosos, by contrast, solidaridad built upon a sense of 
shared place in the world and a mutual understanding of needs and desires.  Moreover, as 
the examples above suggests, olidaridad distinguished Villa Campo as an 
interdependent—and caring—space for the community’s poor residents.   
 In practical terms, solidaridad meant involvement with neighbors and close but 
unaffected personal attention to their needs—as one might expect from a friend or, in 
some cases, a family member.  Flor was forthright about performing and fomenting these 
personal interactions.  When I joked with Flor about the little profit she received from the 
kiosk, she responded that she had the kiosk because she enjoyed the interactions with the 
people.  “I get to see more people and it gets me out of the house,” she said.  On one 
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occasion Sofia declared that serving others in the community poorer than she was a kind 
of “spiritual enjoyment.”  At other times, both Sofia and Flor devoted a considerable 
amount of time to helping others in the formal settings of the associations, as well  the 
informal settings of their own homes. 
 Indeed, performances of solidaridad often resulted in a sense of mutuality 
between community members, and between community leaders and participants.  Given 
that solidaridad was most definitely part of a participatory strategy, there were times
when community leaders’ performances of s lidaridad were portrayed as a personal 
connection with residents that created almost an obligation to participate.   
 For while some community members engaged in solidaridad with fellow 
residents—which at times included buying and selling items--they produced an 
atmosphere of comradely sociability in which all community members would partici te.  
Solidaridad interactions sat on a continuum of mutuality, the opposite of which was the 
mutual disrespect detailed in Chapter 5.  Indeed, unlike the many of the asembleas, 
services and events that I attended, community leaders did not choreograph the behavior 
of community residents, so acts of solidaridad with neighbors happened when people felt 
so disposed (and rude when they did not).  This mutuality could be seen in the ways that 
all sorts of personal information would be solicited or shared between people; there 
appeared to be an entitlement to question fellow neighbors about their occupations, ther 
relationships, their religious and political beliefs, their family, and theirfinancial 
situation.  Women frequently made recommendations regarding raising children.   
 On other occasions, such as the opening vignette with the NGO leaders, 
reciprocity would be held as an ideal (and a demand) alongside soli aridad.  In many of 
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these cases, leaders held an exclusionary idea of solidaridad which upheld a distinction 
between “us” and “them.”  At the same time, they tried to establish a sense of empathy 
and common interest with the fellow residents. 
The term ‘solidarity’ has an implied, often unmentioned, scope.  The scope can 
range from solidarity towards a small group to solidarity towards humanity in general. 
These different scopes can be termed respectively as ‘closed solidarity’ and ‘open 
solidarity’.  Closed solidarity may isolate the group from broader society and in turn 
promote feelings of distrust to non-members; on the other hand, it also can create denser 
social ties and bonding relationships.  Alternatively, open solidarity can create feelings of 
trust towards the general society and promote bridging between groups as well
promoting weak social ties instead of bonding ones.  Bonding signifies relationships with 
people that are close to your situation (i.e. family members, work colleagues, close 
friends, neighbors); whereas bridging is relating with people that are outside of the 
‘bonding’ network, but are more or less in equal standing (Putnam1993).   
 The friendly, open interactions at Villa Campo were partly what identified the 
community as special (especial), as one leader had pointed out to me.  Like the examples 
of disrespect I described in Chapter 5, the sociability that solidaridad represented was 
meant to be reciprocal between neighbors.  Failure by a neighbor to respond to 
solidaridad was viewed by fellow neighbors as a breach of etiquette.   
 
Conclusion 
 In a context where participants in Villa Campo’s associational environment have 
become diversified by exposure and perceptions of economic and political risks, Villa 
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Campo has gone through two eras of associational life.  Changes in the customs of 
participation and activities in Villa Campo resulted in the expansion of choice for 
residents—in terms of both the kinds of activities and the spaces that are available—that 
was accompanied by uncertainties about corruption and the authenticity of the activities.  
In Villa Campo, the consequences were problems with trust, as residents carried their 
anxieties and deep distrust of the associational sphere into each initiative.  An institutio  
that had once commanded resident’s patronage by virtue of scarcity and enjoyed their 
status as one of the only associational outlets in the community, the Politicos, could no 
longer elicit loyal participation by virtue of its place in the association l universe.  In 
Villa Campo’s associational trajectory, the dynamics of participation had begun to 
dramatically change for participants.  The methods participants developed in order to 
cope with the problems of trust can be seen, I have suggested above, as a form of civic 
work.  Conscious of the environment they now inhabited and sensitive to the increasingly 
murky boundaries between reputable and disreputable associational spaces, community 
participants in this poor community sought to re-establish the civic virtues that once set 
Villa Campo apart, and above, in the community grassroots sector.   
Nevertheless, the strategies participants relied upon to counter suspicion and 
distrust simultaneously traced the trajectory of Argentina’s poor.  Indeed, their methods 
only made sense within this context.  In the course of distinguishing themselves, 
participants and leaders also engaged in a nostalgic method of representation that 
portrayed Villa Campo as endowed with the symbolic capital of grassroots activism.  
Community members endeavored to create a space in the community characterized by a 
set of sociable interactions that recollected an imagined, pre-capitalistic golden era of 
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genuine warmth and feeling among strangers—among the poor and the working class.  
Here we find that moral ideals be laden with socially coded meanings and cultural 
practices.  We also find, however, that moral ideals are shaped by the social trajectories 
of the groups they define.  In Villa Campo, the production of trust and democratization 
mapped a social trajectory in which the past became a resource to the present.  In reaction 
to socio-economic instability, the community members staked a claim about value and 




Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
As I have demonstrated in the preceding chapters, participation can be organized 
around the construction and communication of symbolic capital, in particular those 
demarcating civic capacities.  I call this civic work.  Civic work was clear with the nuns, 
where the nuns were deeply committed to the creation of an empowered community force 
that could not only communicate religious teachings within their field but also ably 
recognize residents’ rights to more dignified lives and social esteem through the course of 
their interactions.  The ethic of treating people with dignity and respect was most easily 
conveyed when the nuns were compared to other key associational settings in the 
community, such as the NGO and political networks, both known to most local residents, 
with the former as both a “community” and “vertical” space, and the latter s an 
untrustworthy and disreputable one.  As I noted in Chapter 4, recognizing the type of 
social space of the Religiosos, and by extension other associations, requires identifying 
what they were not.  In this way, civic work—and the construction of civic 
conceptualizations—is relational in nature. 
 However, some community leaders, such as some of the NGO leaders and 
political brokers, challenged “outsiders” that invaded their space, their infrastructure, and 
even “their people.”  I have suggested that by making distinctions between political 
people and social people, was in a sense anti-democratic.  Their work nevertheless pulled 
them into a larger symbolic meaning in which they remained unable to erect the 
boundaries to mark them from each other.   
 The NGO network revealed conditions under which democratization does—and 
does not—appear.  The NGO’s leaders focused more upon relations between themselves 
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and with financers, academics and community leaders than with its members (the 
residents).  Instead, the NGO network was a place where participant culture with v rtical 
characteristics could flourish.  Confronted daily with the pressures of competition and the 
encroachment of clientelistic practices and mindsets, Manejo workers attmpted to 
distinguish the association by reminding residents of the association’s illustrious, populist 
pedigree.  Civic work in this setting sometimes translated clientelism into aform 
recognized as new and modern.  Nevertheless, as Chapter 6 demonstrated, the 
associational space at Villa Campo was also a place where participants could create a 
relational civic process and create their own form of civic work.  
 In all three cases, the organization of civic life suggests that the creation of social 
relations can be a key aspect to how democratization is created.  The creation of civic 
meanings sets different civic settings in conversation with one another.  As I have argued 
in the preceding chapters, we can only recognize the role of civic work in one civic 
setting if we take into account how its relations with how other spaces in the field shape 
it.  This approach to democratization, and to the symbolic construction of social 
boundaries that it entails, provides insight into the practical and relational aspects of 
democratization. 
 The symbolic boundaries that stake out the cultural borders of social groups are 
critical aspects of both everyday social interactions and the construction of hierarc s.  
These boundaries are also contested and changing.  Leaders in Villa Campo often sought 
to rely on a kind of grassroots symbolic capital that was in decline.  Indeed, the trajectory 
of Villa Campo and its community participants says much about the social implication of 




What did people who lived in the community think about the new activities Manejo was 
proposing?  It turned out that the upcoming incorporation of the cooperative was the 
culmination of a series of events that made my fellow neighbors frustrated and 
suspicious.  Ali explained that over the past years the community leaders had gotten m re 
distant from the community.  “They have a circle where they do not let anyone else nter.  
It is always the same people.”  Another man told me that they were never going to be 
successful because people do not trust them because their previous work was a “disaster.”  
Ali was utterly unconvinced of what alleged motives were behind the new initiative.  “It 
is not about the community, it’s about making profits for themselves.” 
 
Social Identity and the Face of New Era  
Civil society organizations like the associations that I studied are invested in a structure 
that sets them—and their participants—apart from others.  When I was in Villa Campo, 
community participants commonly distinguished themselves from the politicos malos and 
the community.  However, as the local government’s interest in the area became 
increasingly clear, community leaders adopted a confrontational stance to support their 
own associational welfare.  Ironically, it seemed that some associations in Villa Campo 
were now distinguishing themselves from their original purposes of community 
development. 
 Many of the Naranja leaders were distancing the associational network from its 
grassroots legacy.  The requirement that participants have to sign in when they attended 
an asamblea seemed like a copy of the participatory model offered by the traditional 
political associations.  In the hopes of attracting more funding from development 
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agencies who desired quantifiable measures of participation, decision-makers in the 
Naranja network (mainly people in the Foundation and a few community leaders) sought 
to cast off the association’s connections with political parties by acquiring a new, modern 
face with the veneer of democratic participation.   
 That face was not just rhetorical but also quantifiable, and the well-known 
community-wide network would count the members that sign contracts, attend meetings 
and so on.  In an expanding civic sector where community participants served as 
representatives of a new democratic society, the politics and economics of “democratic 
transformation” has combined with social inequalities to weigh on poor people.  
Associations, of course, can disappear, their structures usually occupied by another new 
association. 
 The fact remains that when I carried out this study, community leaders in 
religious associations, like the nuns, conducted their work with levels of dignity and 
respect for residents that find no equivalents in more “modern” models of civic work in 
poor communities.  It appeared that political and religious associations in Villa Campo 
have lost symbolic capital among middle-class outsiders in the course of the democratic 
era because they are traditional, and seemingly unchangeable.  Yet, as one of my 
community informants said of associations like Manejo (believing that community 
opinion matters), “They have to change … or they are not going to last.”   
 Nevertheless, Villa Campo residents were often simply connected with tradition 
by virtue of their social category as ‘poor.’  The dominant culture also identified them as 
undisciplined, irresponsible and unintelligent and not willing to conform to the 
parameters of order in a democratic environment —not as creative citizens.  Poor 
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community participants are usually destined to live in anonymity.  They are mainly 
middle-aged female participants who are involved in largely invisible, background 
participatory activities such as food preparation and domestic work and are volunteers 
with sometimes small, or no, benefits. 
 What does it mean when there is no ladder of advancement in the associational 
field?  Where do participants go when they attain skills from the association?  These are 
empirical questions, and while the fate of civic participants is an issue beyond the scope 
of my study, these questions point to important directions for future research.  
Another question raised by this research is one of participant resistance.  If 
associational life becomes more vertical, and if community leaders shed responsibilities 
for participants (but not control over them) in increasingly fragmented civic sett ngs like 
Villa Campo, what are the possibilities for participants’ resistance?  Moreover, for 
community participants like those in Villa Campo, where I have argued a grassroots civic 
culture flourished, what is the likelihood that their critical consciousness mightbe 
redeployed against the erosion of civic privileges? 
 
Participation Changes 
Yet, Villa Campo’s civic culture could be threatened by changing participation 
practices, such as the individualization of participatory practices that could prohibit 
collective resistance.  The option for getting some money for some work over the 
weekend in an association could easily produce competition between co-participants.  As 
Denis Merklen’s (2005) study of Greater Buenos Aires testifies the intense competition 
for scarce rewards and resources that occur under this system create divided loyalties.  In 
fact, many participants believed these associational changes to be very unfair, but they 
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also saw little opening for protest.  In the end, community members would have to 
choose, on an individual basis, their own relationship with these associations.   
 At the Naranjas and the Politicos, participation was more fragmented and 
individualized.  Indeed, the civic arrangements at the Naranjas and the Politicos were at 
times antithetical to collective action, and the environmental dynamics created fractured, 
competitive, and even distrustful relations among participants.  In contrast to participants 
in wealthier places, the participants that participated in associations in Villa Campo had 
few resources: In these settings, community participants would largely resist “with their 
feet,” leaving to participate elsewhere.  At the very least, it is unclear if changes to the 
organization of civic work like those found in non-governmental organizations have 
been, in many ways, a recipe for community members’ disempowerment.  
 
Changes in the Field 
The day after my going-away lunch, and my last day in Villa Campo, I saw the 
Naranjas, who were having a meeting at their center.  A representative of an outside
NGO said that he was very impressed with the capacity in Villa Campo–he was referring 
to the Naranjas.  One of the community participants introduced herself as someone who 
was coordinated by one of the leaders, Constantina; then she went on to say that they (the
group of community participants) were learning a lot from Manejo, she called them “the 
pioneers.”  I talked to another community participant from Manejo, and she said that 
plans to form a public works cooperative was already going ahead.  When I asked if they 
had received any feedback from the community on this initiative she told me that there 
was a survey that was handed out and the response of the residents was stupendous–82% 
of the population wanted a cooperative.  I asked her why they did not come to pick up the 
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survey in the house I was staying at, and she explained that they only had time and 
money to go to two barrios.  I question the accuracy of these surveys.   
 The parallels with the vertical, controlled participation of the past were the.  The 
signing in of the participants at the informational meeting, the lack of any true public 
discourse, the rhetoric, was all very similar to the political network.  This network catered 
to non-political participants, but the activities were the same as those found with the 
Politicos (and may well have been swiped from the large, decentralized political 
network).  The two types of networks—one well-financed and externally legitimized, the 
other broke and not well-regarded—seemed truly locked in a symbolic, relationship as 
was pointed out in Chapters 3 and 5.  
But when I gazed across the busy meeting, I could not help but be overwhelmed 
by the extent to which international donors have had a role in the rise of non-
governmental organizations and the power they have in these communities.  This is a 
reconfiguration of associational life in a poor community: but it also suggests change 
from the past as well. 
 
The Structure of Legitimation 
Of course, I am not suggesting that Villa Campo prior to these associational 
changes was a civic paradise.  I do want to suggest, however, that civic disempowerment 
is closely tied to a broad acceptance in V lla Campo of new levels and forms of inequality 
that are often seen as unavoidable accompaniments to social changes.  To be sure, the 
model of civic work pursued by Villa Campo’s most elite association—and now 
mimicked, to some degree, by declining political ones—invests a new structure of 
legitimation that not only dictates who is deserving of a powerful position in the 
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community but also who is entitled to make decisions and represent people from there.  
Acts of disrespect or respect in the community, I have tried to show, recognize soc al 
differences and commonalities.  Civic interactions that involve such expressions of 
respect must, I contend, be located in a context much broader than the leader-participant 
dyad or even the funder-leader-participant triad.  These social interactions are situated in 
a wider social context in which well-educated elites are viewed as rightfully entitled to 
esteem, respect, and deference.  Rituals of social recognition embedded in civic 
interactions are indicative as well as constitutive of these new social hier rchies that help 
create a culture of differentiated privileges and legitimation in Villa Campo. 
 A belief in the power of diverse forms of participation to regulate civic 
interactions—that residents will simply take their time elsewhere if they are not 
adequately fulfilled—suggests that a community member’s time becomes valu d.   
 No doubt, the categories that mark symbolic boundaries and construct a field of 
differences among associational settings, among community members, and between 
leaders and participants are a central pillar of this structure of legitimation.  Symbolic 
boundaries are important in large part because they translate into social boundaries 
(Lamont and Molnár 2002:168-9).   
 As the previous chapters have detailed, new social inequalities in Villa Campo are 
sometimes legitimated through discourses of social and of democratic transition.  Indeed, 
when poor communities are associated with verticality, corruption, and clientelism, their 
civic capacities in this recent democratic era seems like they would self-evidently be 
undeveloped.  Perhaps we can conclude that these poor “communities” are laden by the 
same tensions as the associational networks:  that democracy, solidarity and trust 
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advances hand in hand with exclusion, inequality and distrust.  In the associational 
hierarchy, the organization of participation can produce social meanings that serve a  a 





Appendix A:  Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This appendix attempts to address a number of methodological issues.  One 
objective is to clarify the data gathering process.  Second, I outline some of the 
theoretical and methodological considerations that lay behind my approach to data 
gathering.  Finally, I address some of the challenges that arose in the cours of carrying 
out this research project.  
 
General Approach 
The method I used first required locating myself within the field site.  I hen 
observed and identified the actual social linkages, connections, and relations of power 
that impact the everyday organization of social life, and follow these connectio s to 
wherever they led me.  
 This project began as a comparison between three associations—one political and 
connected with the state, one religious and connected with larger religious institutions 
and one run by a foundation connected by international funding agencies.  The rationale 
behind a three-pronged comparison was simply to explore how associational work and 
participation were changing in the course of Argentina’s democratic reforms; a contrast 
between an entrenched political network, the social work that was being done by 
religious institutions, and a newer association using more “modern” leadership p actices 
seemed appropriate.  It quickly became apparent, however, that I would have to expand 
my comparison to include a fourth setting—that of the community—because the three 
associational settings were in no way discrete and separate cases.  It was clear that the 
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people in each associational setting were acutely aware of one another (and of other 
associations in the area) as well as of the activities going on about Villa Campo.   
 Understanding why this was so not only led me to a fourth site—the streets of 
Villa Campo—but it also guided my search for interview informants and shaped the 
discussions with them.  As my study progressed, the connections and relations among my 
field sites began to direct my research and drove the questions I asked.  In this way, 
tracing social linkages “on the ground” led me from three sites to four and drew me out 
of the associations and into the homes of the community members as well.  
 
Participant-Observation 
The bulk of the data I draw upon in this project is derived from over six months of 
participant-observation conducted in these settings.   
 
Site selection and entry 
To some degree, site selection was determined by which associations were willing 
to give me access to their activities.  I was almost shunned by one of the associations I 
tried to gain access to—a non-governmental organization run by a foundation outsidethe 
community—presumably because leaders at the association had fears about my 
discovering their “secrets.”  This was despite what I thought to be a very good 
introduction to the association through friends connected with the community leaders. 
Many community leaders and the people in the Catholic Church rarely appeared 
to think in terms of “secrecy” and my “sacando información,” (taking information) so 
when I approached the community leader (who I was acquainted with already f om 
contacts and meeting two years prior) in the Naranja network, I was received without 
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hesitation.  I explained that I was a Canadian graduate student studying cha ges in civil 
society and participation in Villa Campo, and that I hoped to spend some time in the 
associations—as a participant, if possible—to gain some first-hand knowledge.  This 
leader introduced me to other community leaders and the nuns, who readily agreed to 
allow me to participate in the association.  I initially visited the associati n during a 
preliminary research trip, a couple of years before I formally arrived in Villa Campo to 
pursue my research.  
I never was successfully able to formalize any volunteer arrangements.  This was 
due in part with my initial struggles with the language, and not having practical skills (or 
knowledge) on what to do.  In addition, it was not until the end that the associations knew 
what to do with me, as they were not bureaucratized so far as to be able to handle the 
capacity for volunteers, particularly ones as ‘foreign’ as I was.  As an expression of 
thanks, I agreed to share the “information that I took” at the end of my stay.  
 At the same time, community leaders were excited about the prospect of having 
an international “visitor” in their association, and they clearly felt that I d selected their 
association because it was so well known.  I was the first non-religious foreigner that had 
lived in the community, and therefore, quite an oddity.   
 Needless to say, there was a lot of suspicion as to what I was doing.  People quite 
rightly asked me what I was doing and for whom, and for what purposes the information 
would be used.  There were rumors that I was a spy for Bush, and that secretly I was a
real estate tycoon that was going to buy up the land.  There was also a rumor that 
someone was going around telling people not to speak to me.  Community residents who 
I talked to directly asked me to clarify what I was doing, which I really appreciated.  The 
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people who were angry about my presence in the community were the leaders; 
particularly, curiously enough, the ones from outside the community.  Why was this?  I 
do not know.  The elements that we shared were that we were both profiting from our 
activities in the community: them financially, me for my educational career.  
 At first, all this attention was unsettling, but people quickly grew accustomed to 
my presence in the NGO compound.  Initially I thought the associations might restrict me 
to simply observing the activities of participants in the association, but I was wrong.  
Some of my of the NGO leader (who were not in Manejo) enthusiastically coached me in 
almost all aspects of the association—such as organizing activities and introducing them 
to residents.  Overall, I was extremely lucky with the level of access that I was able to get 
within the associations and the community. 
 Ultimately, all the attention I received at the non-governmental organization made 
it possible for me to gain access to the Catholic network, which I had no preliminary 
contact with.  In the course of my time at the Naranja network, I made the acquaintance 
of other community leaders that also worked on various initiatives in the community.  
Through the community leader at the Naranjas, Angela, I was introduced to the nuns.  
These nuns, having seen what a good impression the community leader had of me, helped 
me find volunteer opportunities within the community, whether it was gardening or 
working in a food kitchen.  So when I asked them if I could arrange to live in a private 
home in the community, they readily agreed.  It was largely through the nuns and 
Angela’s efforts, and their negotiations on my behalf, that I was able to enter the 
‘community’, Villa Campo.  It was through hearing the struggles of other students doing 
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ethnographic work (such as community leaders avoiding them for months) that I realized 
how much they did for me.   
 At Manejo, where leaders were far more anxious about making mistakes and there 
was a workplace discipline, it took me a much longer time to become acquainted with 
them.  There were activities that I never felt comfortable observing.  As I noted in 
Chapter 5, some community leaders worried that I would take information out of the 
community; to my surprise this occurred in the non-governmental network a lot, where, 
with the exception of one phenomenal leader and a volunteer, there seemed to be a 
loathing to speak to me.  The first few times in Manejo were uncomfortable, though I 
eventually came to understand that this was in fact a feature of the environment, and ot 
simply of my reception by these certain community leaders.  Unprompted, a number of 
community participants individually expressed to me that they had similar expe i nces 
when they first arrived at Manejo.     
 Gaining access to the Politicos was less straightforward, in the sense that 
acquaintances had to introduce me to people, or I happened to be in the right place at the 
right time.  In these settings, I was an observer rather than a participant, and got most of 
my information through interviews in a large part because the Politicos work consisted 
mainly of personal interactions and negotiations.  In addition, community leaders in the 
Politicos often consider their work delicate and best kept secretive, and did not want my 
investigation to affect these relations negatively. 
 If getting an interview with the Politicos proved difficult, participating n their 
activities or events would be even more difficult.  I had received no invitation to spend
time with them and the Politicos in the Villa Campo did not seem to care much about my 
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presence.  The Politicos were regulated by the political representatives in th  
Municipality of Garcia, whose programs were theoretically carried out by a group of 
brokers who many times in practice tended to bully residents in Villa Campo in order to 
get a cut on any welfare programs.  On one occasion, one of these men appeared at my 
house and suggested that I might have to “go out with him” in order to have an interview.  
I just acted as if I did not understand what the man was saying.  Later I found out that he
had propositioned the vast majority of women in the neighborhood, offering housing 
materials, food and access to municipal programs in return for sexual favors.  I also 
worried about what kind of negative impact my presence might have on the woman that 
was hosting me, Flor.  However, Flor was on very good terms with everyone, leaders an  
residents, and in the end, nothing came of all my worries.    
 Additional observations and interviews were conducted in a number of other 
settings in Villa Campo.  I spent time in evangelical churches attending services.  I spent 
quite a bit of time in a project where I was introduced to a couple of political brokers; it 
was run by an external non-governmental organization and specialized on environmental 
issues.  I spent time in health centers, also the domain of people that work in the 
municipality.  I regularly visited the community’s soup-kitchens and daycare centers, and 
accompanied a woman that worked in a women’s center on her daily rounds, including a 
meeting with political party activists.  At the very end of my stay in Villa Campo, I spent 
time observing the management transition of one of the community centers from the nuns 





In all four field settings, my presence was obvious to all and my general purpose 
known to people in these sites.  As a result, I could openly write shorthand field notes, 
and people grew accustomed to me writing things down.  I kept a pad and paper and 
through the course of a meeting, an activity or an event, I would jot down observations.  
At the end of the day, I sat down at my computer to reconstruct the day’s events based on 
these abbreviated notes.  For this reason, the direct quotations and conversations that I 
report from participant observation are usually reconstructed.  I have only placed 
people’s words in quotation marks when I had confidence in my ability to reproduce 
closely their meaning, if not their exact words.  In some cases, however, my hand-written 
notes did include direct quotations in Spanish.  In general, I was able to reconstruct the 
important events of each day in detail.   
 
Interviews 
In order to understand the organization of participation of the Naranjas, the 
Religiosos, and the Politicos—and the external agencies that supported these 
associational networks—I conducted interviews with leaders of these associations as well 
as other associations in the community (both private and with state ties).  Other 
interviewees included people in external support agencies (including foundations, 
political movements and the municipal government), professors in local universities (who 
have done studies on Villa Campo), as well as socio-political experts in Buenos Aires 
who have done research on broad, national-level trends.  In Villa Campo, I also 
interviewed people who had participated or were still participating in these local 
associations.  This last set of interviews helped me evaluate how if I might generalize 
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experiences of certain styles of participation to other associations and other types of 
activities. 
 Some of these interviews were taped; if not, I relied upon hand-written notes that 
were typed up into interview reports as soon as possible after the interview.  My fear in 
some cases was that the presence of a tape recorder would inhibit interviewees.  In a 
couple of cases, I was able to conduct follow-up interviews, and so I was able to clarify 
any gaps. 
 One of the biggest “challenges” I encountered in the course of conducting 
interviews was that some interviewees felt the need to talk about what they wished to talk 
about, dealing with opinion rather than being factual.  I quickly learned that I had to 
triangulate carefully my sources, asking the same questions of many peoplein rd r to 
arrive at an answer about which I could feel confident.  In the case of the social, political 
and economic changes and the unfolding of events in the 1980s and 1990s, I found that 
people’s memories were frequently inconsistent or unclear; memories usually are.   
 
Challenges in the Field 
One of the biggest challenges in the course of my research was managing my 
impact on the events and conversations I studied.  I was never an invisible, and rarely an 
inconspicuous, observer as much as I tried.  For my first few weeks in Villa Campo, I was 
frequently in the position of being observed.  The level of scrutiny meant that my 
attempts to maintain anonymity of my research sites and subjects had been somewhat 
compromised.  At the same time, I felt confident that nothing I have written in this 
dissertation could negatively affect any of my informants. 
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My foreignness also meant that simply by being present I created an effect on the 
spaces I was studying.  As time passed, I realized that this could be as much an asset as a 
liability.  My presence caused people to raise and discuss issues that might not have 
gotten an airing otherwise.  I learned much about how Villa Campo residents think about 
la gente de afuera in comparison to richer Argentines, in part because my foreignness 
was a catalyst for commentary on such matters.  At Villa Campo, the people living and 
participating in these spaces expressed a strong desire to teach me—almost tutor me, at 
times—about how these associations were organized and how things “really” worked.  
By the end of my stay, I became accepted and almost an ordinary presence.  I found that 
people used interviews for their own purposes: for example sharing information with 
others in the room. 
Finally, even though writing this dissertation gave me the power to reconstruct 
and frame the words and actions of other people.  Within the community itself the power 
dynamics were quite different.  Not only was I highly dependent upon my informants for 
almost every piece of information in this dissertation, and many people went out of their
way to help me do my research.  Yes, I also became an object of gossip and speculation, 
and people continually asked me questions on what I was doing as if it were highly 
suspicious.  However, perhaps this is just as it should be--curiosity on both sides.  The 
ethnographic researcher can expect to share herself with her informants, just a  they share 
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